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Abstract
This dissertation is comprises three essays. The first attempts to answer the follow-
ing question. Is fiscal policy more effective, as measured by the government spending
multiplier, when the economy is “weak” relative to when it is “strong?” Results in
the empirical literature have been mixed on this question. I use local projection tech-
niques to estimate the impulse response functions of real output and real government
spending to a shock to military spending. In addition, I attempt to endogenously
estimate the level of the unemployment rate that distinguishes between states of the
economy. I find that fiscal multipliers are near two at horizons of two to four years
when unemployment is relatively high, compared to below 1 when unemployment is
low. The second paper seeks to understand why disagreement in the emprical lit-
erature is so pervasive and if there are certain modeling choices that systematically
lead to particular findings on the state dependence of the government spending mul-
tiplier. I identify eight dimensions along which many of the studies in the literature
vary and determine if choices along these dimensions have a systematic impact on
the results. I conclude that estimation of a state-dependent multiplier is, in general,
not robust to various plausible specification assumptions. Finally, I estimate the
effect of government spending at the county level using a previously little studied
spending program, the Vinson-Trammell Act of 1934. Stimulated by fears about
Japanese military expansion, this act aimed to build up the United States Navy to
treaty allowances. I am able to identify local areas in the United States that hosted
shipyards in 1934, and I estimate the effects of government spending on these areas.
I find that manufacturing output, employment, and earnings all rise faster over the
iv
course of the 1930s in counties hosting shipyards at the time of the bill’s passage.
Also, I see significantly faster growth in county level retail sales and a positive ef-
fect on household consumption. Attempting to scale these results to an aggregate
government spending multiplier, however, leads to a wide range of estimates for the
effect on overall output.
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Chapter 1
Introduction to Essays on State
Dependence in the Government
Spending Multiplier
In this dissertation, I will address a question that has interested economists since at
least the time of Keynes (1936), which is to what extent an increase in government
purchases of goods and services impacts a nation’s economy more generally. In par-
ticular, I will consider the notion of “state dependence” in the government spending
multiplier.1 Put simply, the state dependence that I refer to is the possibility that
additional government purchases may stimulate economic activity more when the
aggregate economy is in a certain condition (or “state”) than they would if applied
1The government spending multiplier is, as I will touch upon again later, the amount of extra
dollars of output that an economy produces for each additional dollar of output bought by the
government.
1
under different circumstances. Indeed, although the empirical examination of this
question has only become popular in recent years (notably since the advent of the
Great Recession and the move by the Federal Reserve to hold nominal interest rates
at zero), the idea that the effects of government purchases might be state dependent
is actually addressed in Keynes (1936).
The focus of the essays in this dissertation is predominantly empirical. Many
studies have been written trying to formalize a theory as to why government pur-
chases may have differing effects in different states of the world, and I will briefly
address these theoretical propagation mechanisms in the chapters to follow, but my
primary interest is in the estimation of a pair of multipliers, one that describes the ef-
fects of increased (or decreased) government spending in a “good” state of the world
and one that describes the analogous multiplier in a “bad” state of the world. I will
also treat to some extent the methodological issues that attend such an estimation,
both at an aggregate, or economy-wide, level and at the local, specifically the U.S.
county, level.
The first substantive chapter of this dissertation, which entitled, “Asymmetric Ef-
fects of Government Purchases over the Business Cycle,” goes about the estimation
referred to above in a very straightforward way. Using a time series of unexpected
shocks to expected government purchases (driven mainly by foreign wars) that was
developed and introduced by Ramey (2011b), Owyang, Ramey, and Zubairy (2013),
and Ramey and Zubairy (2014), I sort all of the post-World War II observations on
United States economic outcomes into a high unemployment state and a low unem-
ployment state by means of endogenous threshold estimation. The findings of this
2
particular analysis are striking. The results suggest that when unemployment is rel-
atively low (a “good” state of the economy), the effects of an increase in government
purchases are fairly modest, with a multiplier well below one. This implies that the
government’s actions compel private actors in the economy to trim their consumption
or investment activity. On the other hand, if unemployment is relatively high, the
government spending multiplier is closer to two, which implies that for every dollar
the government spends buying output, nearly another dollar of output is produced.
The only way that this could occur is if private consumption or private investment
were to rise with (and as a result of) the increase in government purchases.
The econometric approach taken in the essay described above is fairly conven-
tional relative to much of the recent literature. A notable feature about the recent
empirical literature estimating state dependence in the multiplier is that, especially
when estimated on aggregate macroeconomic time series variables, there is still little
consensus about the results. In fact, there are almost as many studies arguing plau-
sibly that there is no evidence of different multipliers for purchases in different states
of the world as there are those finding this state dependence. The second chapter
of this dissertation, which is titled, “The Uncertain State Dependent Government
Spending Multiplier,” explores whether or not this is so because of the myriad of
specification choices available to the econometrician. In a sense, this chapter is a
very broad generalization of the first chapter, evaluating the sensitivity of the results
to variations in the estimation setting. Specifically, this chapter allows variation
along eight dimensions of specification choice, which results in nearly 2000 pairs
of state dependent multiplier estimates. It will show that some choices are more
3
likely to deliver incredibly high or low multiplier values or to systematically push
the multiplier in either state of the world in one direction or another. In so doing, it
illustrates the simple lack of robustness that plagues the estimation of the multiplier
on aggregate data and provides part of the motivation for the third chapter of the
dissertation.
In the third chapter, “Local Effects of a Military Spending Shock: Evidence from
Shipbuilding in the 1930s and 1940s,” I examine the effects of a specific government
spending program, the Vinson-Trammell Act of 1934, which had, as its goal, the
expansion and rehabilitation of the United States Navy’s fleet. The setting of this
study is local, as I am able to identify the counties of the United States that are
subject to the spending authorized by this act. With a relatively underutilized
panel data set that tracks local economies throughout the 1930s, I test to see if the
counties that hosted shipyards at the time of the passage of this act experience better
economic outcomes in the latter part of the decade than otherwise like counties that
did not have a shipyard. Indeed, I will show that this was the case. In the midst
of the Great Depression, counties that hosted shipyards experience manufacturing
output growth six percentage points faster (at an annual rate) than their peers
without shipyards. This faster growth extends even to retail sales and household
consumption. The examination of this question at a local level has a number of
advantages, including sharper identification of an exogenous shock to purchases, the
ability to difference out potentially confounding effects of aggregate tax policy or
monetary policy, and, simply, a much larger number of observations. The downside,
however, is the difficulty of translating these local results to the aggregate government
4
spending multiplier in good times and in bad times. This difficulty will be more fully
explored in the essay below.
On balance, the evidence reported in this dissertation seems to argue that, in
fact, government purchases are more likely to stimulate economic activity in bad
times than in good times. That is, there does seem to be state dependence in the
government spending multiplier. Each chapter, however, comes with its own caveats,
and it still does not seem as though it is safe to conclude definitively that an increase
in government purchases will boost activity enough to justify the welfare costs that
may be associated with it, even at a time when unemployment is very high. Thus,
more research will be necessary to continue building the body of evidence.
The next part of this dissertation is a brief survey of about ten studies in the
literature that are most relevant to the analysis that follows. The three dissertation
chapters alluded to in the preceding paragraphs can then be found, before a brief
section that contains some concluding remarks.
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Chapter 2
Review of the Literature on State
Dependence in the Government
Spending Multiplier
In this part of the dissertation, I will review a small number of the most influential
papers to have informed the analysis that is to follow. Specifically, I consider ten
sets of particularly insightful studies.
Baxter and King (1993) develop a neoclassical model in which they aim to answer
a number of questions, among them being how much a permanent change in govern-
ment spending changes the level of output, to what extent a temporary change in
spending has different effects, how much the financing of the government spending
matters, and whether productive government spending has different effects relative to
unproductive spending. They find that a permanent change in government purchases
6
induces a negative wealth effect on private households, leading to an increase in labor
supply, a coincident decline in consumption, and an increase in private investment as
the marginal product of capital rises. The upshot is a multiplier just above unity. In
contrast, Baxter and King (1993) find that a transitory increase in government pur-
chases has a multiplier below unity, because the investment boom that accompanies
a permanent change does not materialize (private investment is crowded out along
with private consumption). Output declines on impact in response to both kinds
of government spending increase when taxes are raised concurrently to finance the
higher spending. Although they do not consider state dependence in the multiplier
they study, the results discussed by Baxter and King (1993) form the theoretical
bedrock for the argument that an increase in government purchases need not be
stimulative for the economy as a whole and help justify empirical estimates below
unity.
On the other side of the spectrum is the work of Rotemberg and Woodford (1992),
who consider a model in which oligopolistic price setting allows for an increase in
government spending to lead to an increase in aggregate labor demand. This phe-
nomenon does not occur in the work of Baxter and King (1993). An increase in
labor demand can offset the effects on real wages from the increase in labor supply
stimulated by the negative wealth effect. With higher wages, the response of private
consumption may be positive potentially giving a multiplier greater than one. The
model of Rotemberg and Woodford (1992) also relies on a countercyclical markup
of price over marginal cost, a common mechanism by which New Keynesian models
generate a role for aggregate demand in firms’ behavior that can allow government
7
purchases to have more positive effects on overall output. This paper is one of the
earlier dynamic stochastic general equilibrium models whose influence led the way
for models in which government purchases may have a multiplier above one.
The seminal work of Blanchard and Perotti (2002) has had a tremendous influence
on the empirical estimation of government spending multipliers. They employ what
was at the time a fairly novel technique to identify exogenous shocks to government
spending through the use of vector autoregressions. Specifically, it was this paper
that popularized the strategy of assuming that government spending does not react
contemporaneously to innovations in output or other macro aggregates. In short,
they order government purchases first and use Cholesky decompositions to identify
structural shocks. With these shocks in hand, Blanchard and Perotti (2002) are then
capable of estimating the impulse responses of output and government spending to
these structural shocks. The identification scheme that they introduced has become
standard in the empirical literature estimating multipliers, with the only other pop-
ularly employed identification being the narrative method that is discussed below.
Their empirical results suggest that the multiplier on spending shocks was around
one over a period of five years.
Of the papers mentioned above, none of them consider that there may be any
nonlinearity in the effects of government purchases on output. Among the earliest
and still most influential to do so is the work of Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Re-
belo (2011), who examine how the economy may respond to a government spending
shock when the nominal interest rate is held constant, such. A specific case would be
when the monetary authorities is constrained by the so-called “Zero Lower Bound”
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from reducing interest rates when they might otherwise be inclined to. They con-
struct a model in which agents are subject to shocks to their discount factors that
may generate a suddenly drastically increased desire to save. There is no positive
nominal rate that can restore equilibrium to the market for loanable funds. In this
situation, a shock to government purchases raises inflation, which, when combined
with the constant nominal rate, implies a sharply lower real rate of interest, spurring
private consumption. In “normal” times, general equilibrium effects, in contrast,
work against this consumption increase. The multiplier in their model may be as
large as 3.7. Although other mechanisms have been proposed for generating non-
linearity in the multiplier, such as financial accelerators and occasionally binding
capacity constraints, it is the Zero Lower Bound that has generally garnered the
most attention.
This theoretical breakthrough, along with the work of Eggertsson (2010) and
Woodford (2011), was accompanied by new empirical methods that sought to esti-
mate multipliers that had different values in different states of the economy. A leader
in this new strand of the literature was Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012b). In
that study, the authors combine the identification scheme of Blanchard and Per-
otti (2002) with a smooth transition vector autoregression to evaluate whether or
not purchases were more impactful when growth was slowing or the economy was
in recession. They use a centered moving average of GDP growth and a calibrated
transition function to distinguish between boom states and recession states, and
their result is a stark one. Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012b) find a multiplier
well above two in low growth regimes, compared to a multiplier very close to zero
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when output is growing rapidly. In a similar work applied to cross country data
(Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012a)), they again find a larger multiplier in bad
times relative to good times. What is more, they find that both private consump-
tion and investment rise in response to higher purchases in a recession, but they fall
following a boost to spending in expansions. Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012b)
remains the most influential study in the literature that finds evidence in support of
a countercyclical government spending multiplier.
The next set of papers offers a new approach to the identification of government
spending shocks using narrative methods and consequently comes to very different
conclusions on the efficacy of government purchases as a means of stimulus, whether
one is considering an overall multiplier or a state dependent one. Perhaps the headline
work in this strand of the literature is Ramey (2011b). That paper develops a time
series of the change in the expected present value of future military spending that
results from some political or military event, based on close readings of contemporary
periodicals. The motivation behind this exercise is the notion that identifying shocks
to government purchases using structural VAR methods as in Blanchard and Perotti
(2002) risks counting as “shocks” innovations to spending that private agents already
expected and had reacted to. This approach builds on a simpler series introduced
in Ramey and Shapiro (1998) that only considers military build-ups associated with
wars and it is extended in later work to the Canadian context and as far back as 1890
in Owyang, Ramey, and Zubairy (2013) and Ramey and Zubairy (2014). All of these
papers come to a similar conclusion as to the magnitude of the government spending
multiplier, which is that it is below one, even when unemployment is fairly high (that
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is, even when there is a large amount of underutilized resources in the economy).
These papers, then, through sharper identification of spending shocks, find evidence
supporting the theoretical results of Baxter and King (1993). The mechanism at
work is postulated to be the negative wealth effect that impedes consumption or
costly reallocation of physical capital from the civilian to the military sector and
back again.
To this point in the literature review, all of the studies under discussion deal with
the aggregate effects on output of an overall increase in government spending. Of
course, a substantial portion of the literature takes the tack of examining subnational
economies, such as states or counties. The third chapter of this dissertation adopts
this approach as well. A paper that considers a similar time period at a similar
level of aggregation as my contribution is Fishback, Horrace, and Kantor (2005).
The primary focus of that paper is whether grants and loans distributed during
the 1930s as a part of the New Deal had a positive impact on retail sales at the
county level. They adopt an instrumental variables approach, and they find that
there is heterogeneity in the effects of various New Deal programs. In fact, public
works projects and relief grants do provide a stimulus to local retail sales, but that
funds distributed by the Agricultural Adjustment Administration (which, in fact,
paid farmers not to produce) had a strongly negative effect on retail sales. One can
interpret their results as at least providing evidence consistent with the notion that
public spending can boost activity when the aggregate economy is in a state of severe
slack.
Another recent paper that evaluates the effects of government spending shocks at
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a disaggregated level is Nakamura and Steinsson (2014). Their paper consists of an
empirical section in which they estimate the multiplier on federal defense purchases
in U.S. states (including an extension in which they interact purchases with the
state’s unemployment rate). They find an empirical multiplier on the order of about
1.5. In their terminology, the local multiplier is called an “Open Economy Relative
Multiplier,” while the aggregate multiplier is called the “Closed Economy Aggregate
Multiplier.” To interpret these empirical findings, the authors build a DSGE model
with a number of possible variations that aims to scale the local values up to an
aggregate government spending multiplier. They consider both flexible and sticky
price models, utility specifications that are separable and nonseparable in labor and
consumption, and different stances of the monetary policy authority. They find
that their empirical results are best approximated by a sticky price model with
nonseparable preferences. The aggregate multiplier is very small when monetary
policy is described by a standard Taylor rule, but it can be extremely large in their
model if monetary policy accommodates the increase in expenditure.
In the first two substantive chapters of this dissertation, I make use of an econo-
metric technique developed by Hansen (2000) to estimate the threshold level of some
variable across which the effects of a certain independent variable on a dependent
variable differs. This procedure has a fairly straightforward intuition. Conditional
on the existence of a threshold, I look for the value amongst all of the candidate
values that minimizes the sum of squared errors. The particular contribution of
Hansen (2000) is to develop an asymptotic distribution theory that facilitates sta-
tistical inference on the estimated threshold level. Thus, not only can I estimate a
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least squares threshold level in a given variable (unemployment, say) across which
the effects of government purchases on output may differ, but I can also construct
confidence intervals on that threshold level that help inform on the estimates of the
state dependent government spending multiplier. This procedure is heavily used in
the analysis to follow.
Another econometric procedure that I lean on is the local projections method
for estimating impulse responses examined by Jorda` (2005). Relative to the conven-
tional means of estimating impulse response functions by iterating on the coefficient
matrix estimated in a vector autoregression, local projections are much more flexi-
ble. They allow more easily for nonlinear specifications and do not necessitate that
the left hand side variable be expressed in exactly the same form as the right hand
side variables. These attributes make this approach particularly appealing in the
context of estimating state dependent government spending multipliers, as observed
by Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012a) and Ramey and Zubairy (2014), who were
the first authors to estimate government spending multipliers in this fashion.
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Chapter 3
Asymmetric Effects of Government
Purchases over the Business Cycle
3.1 Introduction
Interest in the effects of fiscal policy, particularly those of government purchases, has
risen in recent years as the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates has limited
the ability of monetary policy to provide stimulus via conventional measures. The
government spending multiplier is a statistic often used to summarize the effects
of the government’s purchase of goods and services, and is defined as the amount
of extra output generated by an additional dollar of spending. A value above one
is often considered evidence that the fiscal authorities are successfully encouraging
more consumption or investment on the part of the private sector, while a figure
below one implies that this private activity is being crowded out.
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Although many papers have attempted to estimate an overall government spend-
ing multiplier for the economy of the United States, a growing literature, both theo-
retical and empirical, has questioned whether the multiplier has nonlinear properties,
that is, whether it might have different values in times of economic strength and in
times of economic weakness. This is important, since in “bad” times, policy makers
may be more inclined to use spending measures to stimulate the economy than they
would be in bad times. Indeed, this was the motivation behind the American Recov-
ery and Reinvestment Act of 2009. This paper again seeks to answer the question of
whether government purchases have asymmetric effects over the business cycle.
I will start from the framework of Owyang, Ramey, and Zubairy (2013) and
Ramey and Zubairy (2014), using the identified military spending news shock of
Ramey (2011b) in a local projections setting to construct impulse responses and, from
these, government spending multipliers when there is relatively more or less “slack” in
the economy. In contrast to these papers, I will only use data from the period after the
end of World War II, and I will make other slight modifications to their specification.
Most importantly, I will endogenously estimate the unemployment rate that divides
“good” from “bad” times, rather than using an imposed threshold unemployment
rate, as those papers do. I will show that when one allows for stochastic trends,
controls for the monetary policy stance, and estimates the threshold level of the
unemployment rate, the fiscal multiplier in times of economic weakness is on the
order of 1.6 to 1.9, significantly higher than the corresponding multipliers in times
of economic strength. These estimates fall in between the generally small multipliers
(below 1 in both states of the world) found in Ramey and Zubairy (2014) and the
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very large recession multipliers (above 2) and negative expansion multipliers reported
in Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012b).
As already hinted, there have been many contradictory findings in the academic
literature about this issue. On one side of the debate, one can find the work of
Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012b) and Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012a),
which has become quite influential in a short amount of time. Using a couple of
different econometric techniques, they find fiscal multipliers over 2.0 during reces-
sionary periods and multipliers below 1.0 (or even negative, as mentioned above)
during expansionary periods. They arrive at these multiplier estimates looking first
at the United States only (Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012b)), and then in a
panel setting using a large set of OECD countries (Auerbach and Gorodnichenko
(2012a)). In further work (Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2013)), they also find ev-
idence of spillover effects of fiscal policy in one country on economic outcomes in
major trading partners of that country, which effects are again stronger when the
economies concerned are weak. Other papers using various estimation methods and
different schemes for identifying exogenous shocks to government spending that find
results in line with those of Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012b) and Auerbach
and Gorodnichenko (2012a) include Bachmann and Sims (2012), Fazzari, Morley,
and Panovska (2013), Gordon and Krenn (2014), Jorda` and Taylor (2013), Candelon
and Lieb (2013) and Tagkalakis (2008), among others.
On the other hand, there is a substantial literature questioning whether govern-
ment spending is any more effective in times of economic weakness than in normal
times. Perhaps the most prominent of these studies are those of Owyang, Ramey, and
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Zubairy (2013) (ORZ) and Ramey and Zubairy (2014) (RZ). Using historical data
for the U.S. and Canada dating back to 1890, a narrative series of exogenous innova-
tions in military spending, and local projection estimation tools, they demonstrate
that government spending multipliers are no higher in times of high unemployment
relative to times of low unemployment. Nor are they any higher during periods where
the nominal interest rate is constrained by the zero lower bound (ZLB). This result
also features in the work of Hall (2009), Crafts and Mills (2013), Bognanni (2013)
(who actually finds larger fiscal multipliers in expansionary periods), and Barro and
Redlick (2011). This is to say nothing of the “expansionary austerity” strand of the
literature, headlined by Giavazzi and Pagano (1990) and discussed more recently
by Alesina and Ardagna (2013), wherein large fiscal retrenchments focused around
spending cuts are found to boost output growth.
With so much disagreement, there is yet more room for contribution to this
literature. I start by explaining why theoretically one might find larger government
spending multipliers in times of slack than in times of strength in Section 3.2. There
are several possible explanations, as I will discuss. In Section 3.3, I explain the data
with which I will work, and the estimation methodology behind impulse response
estimation and endogenous threshold estimation. I also will make a formal argument
as to why I only consider the post-World War II period as my sample for estimating
multipliers, especially given the existence of data that extends far past the Second
World War that Ramey and Zubairy (2014) use in their study. Section 4.3 contains
the results, while Section 3.5 contains a small number of extensions of the empirical
work, specifically looking at the components of GDP and the effect of tax changes.
17
Finally, Section 5.6 concludes the paper.
3.2 Theoretical Framework
In recent years, there has been an explosion of theoretically oriented papers seeking
to explain how government spending multipliers may be higher in “bad” economic
times relative to “good” (with a handful of different ways of defining bad and good
times). Many of these are of a New Keynesian bent, incorporating nominal rigidi-
ties in goods or labor markets (or both). These include studies that consider the
zero lower bound on nominal interest rates as the condition distinguishing states
of the world (i.e., whether the zero lower bound is binding or not). Other studies
consider tightness in the labor market as the trait defining states, while still others
focus on financial frictions that constrain economic activity more during recessions.
My empirical analysis does not rely on the specific details of any of the models dis-
cussed below, but the purpose of this section is merely to touch upon the various
mechanisms considered in the theoretical literature through which one can produce
state-dependent fiscal multipliers. I will consider each of these in turn.
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3.2.1 Zero Lower Bound
The effects of an increase in government purchases when the zero lower bound is
binding1 have been discussed at great length, for example in Christiano, Eichen-
baum, and Rebelo (2011), Woodford (2011), and Nakamura and Steinsson (2014).
The mechanism at work is actually quite simple. Essentially, when nominal interest
rates are held constant (as they would be when the ZLB is binding), an increase in
government purchases pushes up output, marginal cost, and, thus, inflation. Com-
bining this increase in inflation with the constant nominal interest rate leads to a
lower real interest rate, spurring an increase in private consumption and investment.
The result can be some very large government spending multipliers, as seen in Table
3.1.2
3.2.2 Labor Market Weakness
As ORZ and RZ consider whether government spending multipliers are greater dur-
ing periods when the unemployment rate is relatively high, it is important to consider
some theoretical underpinning for why unemployment rates lead to especially effec-
tive fiscal policy. One recent such paper is that of Michaillat (2014). Focussing specif-
ically on government employment (rather than government purchases as a whole),
Michaillat (2014) uses a search-and-matching model of the labor market to evaluate
1It may perhaps be more precise to say, instead of nominal interest rates being constrained by
the Zero Lower Bound, that nominal interest rates are held constant by the monetary authority,
the most salient example of this in recent times being a binding ZLB.
2Studies that give large, if unespecified, multiplier estimates at the ZLB include Wieland (2012)
and Farhi and Werning (2013).
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when increases in public hiring have their least negative effects on private employ-
ment. In this model, public employment increases always crowd out private employ-
ment. The paper considers two distinct steady states, one in which real wages are
high (which gives low aggregate labor demand, fairly flat quasi-labor supply, a low
degree of labor market tightness, and high unemployment) and one in which real
wages are low (which consequently leads to high aggregate labor demand, relatively
steep quasi-labor supply, great labor market tightness, and low unemployment). An
increase in public employment in the former state of the world leads to less crowding
out of private employment than an increase in the latter state.
The mechanism is as follows. As discussed in the paper, the government posts va-
cancies to attract and hire unemployed workers, which necessarily raises labor market
tightness. When unemployment is high, however, the increase in the number of pub-
lic workers can be relatively large, while the increase in labor market tightness that
results may be quite modest. The opposite would be the case when unemployment
is low. Crowding out is subsequently less when unemployment is high, relative to
when it is low. The interested reader should consult Figure 1 of Michaillat (2014) for
more details. Although this study does not consider the classic government spend-
ing multiplier that I am going to estimate, the result that unemployment declines
much more as a result of public hiring when it is initially high might imply that
the unemployment rate is an important initial condition for evaluating the expected
effectiveness of a given fiscal stimulus more generally.3
3Gordon and Krenn (2014) argue that the unemployment rate is a less attractive threshold
variable for distinguishing states of the economy than the output gap, pointing to 1941, where they
cite evidence that capacity constraints were being reached in several sectors of the economy, despite
slack labor markets. More on this argument follows below.
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3.2.3 Credit Spreads
A third strand of the literature hypothesizes that credit market frictions may also
generate differential effects of spending. Canzoneri et al. (2012) develop a model in
which government spending proves more effective during recessions by bringing down
spreads between the interest rates on saving and borrowing. In this model, financial
frictions (represented by the aforementioned spread) respond more to increases in
output when they are relatively large. Thus, when the government increases pur-
chases during a recession (when the spread is likely to be larger), the results is a
more substantial reduction in the credit spread than if the same purchases took
place during an economic expansion. This gives rise to a financial accelerator mech-
anism such that the large decrease in the credit spread leads to continued increases
in output, which in turn give further reductions in the spread, and so on. This effect
is muted when the spread is already low. Canzoneri, et al. (2013) compute a fiscal
multiplier during recessions of 2.25, compared to a multipler value less than 1 during
expansions.
There are other papers that seek channels through which government spending
could boost output differentially across states. In a very interesting recent paper,
Sims and Wolff (2013) develop a model in which government spending has differ-
ent impacts on output and welfare depending not only on whether the economy
is in recession at the time the spending hits, but also depending on whether that
recession was precipitated by a negative aggregate demand shock or a negative aggre-
gate supply shock. Gal´ı, Lo´pez-Salido, and Valle´s (2007) generate large government
spending multipliers in a New Keynesian model by introducing a large proportion of
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rule-of-thumb consumers, who consume all of their income in each period. If times
of economic weakness are prone to induce liquidity constraints for a greater number
of economic agents, then this model could also produce higher multipliers in those
times.
3.3 Data and Empirical Methodology
This section discusses the data that will be employed in my study, and I also explain
how I estimate fiscal multipliers in different states of the economy.
3.3.1 Data
Most of the data used in this study comes from the dataset made available by ORZ.
It includes U.S. quarterly data spanning 1890 through 2010 on real gross domestic
product, real government consumption and investment, the unemployment rate, and
the GDP deflator. While the data for these variables for the post-World War II period
come from the standard sources, ORZ need to construct the data for earlier years.
The interested reader can learn how this data was constructed by consulting their
data appendix, but since I only use postwar data, I do not discuss their extended data
here. For all results presented below, I also considered estimating on the full historical
sample considered by ORZ and RZ, and their findings hold throughout. While it
is an interesting question as to why the results should differ so much depending on
whether one starts the estimation before or after World War II, such a question is
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beyond the scope of this paper. For 1947 to 2010, the data on government current
tax receipts come from the St. Louis Federal Reserve FRED database.4
The key variable used in ORZ and RZ, which I will be making use of as well, mea-
sures the change in the expected present value of military spending due to exogenous
political and military events overseas. The intuition behind using this variable was
first discussed in Ramey and Shapiro (1998), and it has since been expanded in both
detail and length of the time series in Ramey (2011b) and ORZ. Full details of the
variable’s construction can be found in Ramey (2011b), but the general idea is that
by combing through contemporary news accounts, Ramey (2011b) was able to put
together a narrative variable that identified when events occurred that led to a con-
temporary change in expected future government spending. In that study, she shows
that this variable Granger causes innovations to government spending identified via
Cholesky decompositions in a vector autoregression (VAR), as is a common way of
identifying government spending shocks in the literature (see, for example, Blan-
chard and Perotti (2002)). This suggests that the public had reason to expect these
changes to spending and had possibly already begun reacting to them. If then, the
objective is to measure the reaction of various macroeconomic variables to a shock to
government spending, it is important to know when economic agents learned of the
shock. Not doing so could lead to underestimating the government spending multi-
plier by failing to attribute movements in economic variables that occurred before
the spending was actually implemented to the spending shock, or it could lead to
overestimating the government spending multiplier by underestimating the size of
4Series ID: W054RC1Q027SBEA
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the total spending package in the period in which it first shows up in the data (by
not taking account of future related spending).
Another advantage of utilizing this variable as the key indicator of changes in
spending is the fact that realizations of the series are likely exogenous to the contem-
poraneous state of the economy. Several key events marked by the variable include
the fall of France to Nazi Germany (1940:2), the invasion of South Korea by Com-
munist forces from the North (1950:3), the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan (1980:1),
and the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks (2001:3). It also includes periods of
expected declines in military spending, such as the end of World War II and the
Cold War. These, and the other events described by the narrative variable, were all
plausibly unrelated to the state of the U.S. economy at the time that they occurred.
In the empirical work to follow, the variable takes the form of the change in the
expected present value of military spending as a proportion of lagged nominal GDP.
The variable is plotted in Figure 3.1. Although the figure displays the entire time
series of the military news shock, I use this opportunity to reiterate that my analysis
will cover only the postwar period.
3.3.2 Empirical Methodology: Impulse Response Estima-
tion via Local Projections
My estimation strategy is very similar to that employed in ORZ and RZ, with a few
modifications that I will show have significant ramifications for the results. Following
ORZ and RZ, as well as Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012a) and Auerbach and
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Gorodnichenko (2013), I will use the Jorda` (2005) local projection method for esti-
mating impulse response functions of output and government spending in response
to a shock to government spending, represented by the narrative military spending
variable. The strengths of the Jorda` (2005) local projection method are discussed at
length in RZ, but among these are the ease with which it can be adapted to state
dependent models, compared to, for example, structural vector autogressions, and
its relative robustness to misspecification.
To compute the government spending multiplier, I will first estimate impulse
response functions for the growth rate in output and government spending. The
general forms for the regressions are as follows,
(yt+h − yt−1)
yt−1
= It−1 ∗ (αy,good,h + βy,good,hMilnewst +X ′t−1θy,good,h)
+ (1− It−1) ∗ (αy,bad,h + βy,bad,hMilnewst +X ′t−1θy,bad,h) + εy,t+h
(3.1)
(gt+h − gt−1)
yt−1
= It−1 ∗ (αg,good,h + βg,good,hMilnewst +X ′t−1θg,good,h)
+ (1− It−1) ∗ (αg,bad,h + βg,bad,hMilnewst +X ′t−1θg,bad,h) + εg,t+h,
(3.2)
for h = 1, 2, ..., 20, which indexes the number of quarters after the spending shock
that each regression considers. Note that a separate regression is run for each hori-
zon, h, and the impulse response function is a plot of the coefficients on Milnewst
over time. Here, yt and gt are the levels of output per capita and government spend-
ing per capita, respectively. I follow Hall (2009) and Barro and Redlick (2011)
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in specifying the dependent variables so that multipliers at each horizon of inter-
est can be calculated directly from appropriate combinations of the coefficients on
the military spending news shocks (βy,good,h, βy,bad,h, βg,good,h, βg,bad,h). That is, the
accumulated government spending multiplier at horizon H can be calculated as∑H
h=1 βy,i,h∑H
h=1 βg,i,h
, i ∈ good, bad.5 Xt is a vector of control variables. Here lies the first
important distinction of my work from that of ORZ and RZ. The control vector in
their work includes log levels of output and government spending per capita.6 In ad-
dition, their specification has a quartic deterministic trend. In this study, the control
vector comprises first differences of the logs of these variables and does away with
the deterministic trend. The inclusion of the deterministic trend implicitly imposes
that output and government spending per capita are trend stationary, and, since
the question of whether or not there is a unit root in output is far from settled,7
it seems as though allowing for a stochastic trend might be informative. In fact, in
their seminal paper, Blanchard and Perotti (2002) run their model considering both
deterministic and stochastic trend specifications.
I will also add some other control variables to the right hand side of my estimating
equations. I will include lagged values of the shock, since, in some periods, it may be
reasonable to believe that expectations-altering events may themselves cause agents
to expect further such events in the future. Also, I will include lags of the three month
5Further discussion of the advantages of specifying the dependent variables this way can be
found in RZ.
6An earlier version of RZ also includes log levels of tax revenues per capita. My model includes
these as well.
7See for example the literature starting with Nelson and Plosser (1982) and continuing with
Perron (1989), Zivot and Andrews (1992), Diebold and Senhadji (1996), Murray and Nelson (2000),
Murray and Nelson (2002), Murray and Nelson (2004), and Papell and Prodan (2004), just to name
a few.
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T-bill rate, so as to take account of the critique of Rossi and Zubairy (2011), who
argued that when estimating the effects of fiscal policy, it is essential to control for
monetary policy, and vice versa. Note also that serial correlation of the error terms
is necessarily induced due to the overlapping nature of the dependent variables, so I
will apply the correction of Newey and West (1987) to address this.
The indicator variable It distinguishes between the good and bad states of the
economy. It takes on a value of 1 when the economy is in its “good” state, and it
takes on a value of 0 when the economy is in its “bad” state. In the benchmark
analyses of ORZ and RZ, the economy is considered to be in a good state when the
unemployment rate is less than 6.5 percent. In this study, I will take that distinction
as my starting point, but I will also consider an alternative way of defining good and
bad states of the economy according to the unemployment rate,8 as I will discuss in
the next subsection.
In principle, Equations 3.1 and 3.2 are estimated via ordinary least squares for
each horizon, so that, if, as in this case, the longest horizon is twenty quarters, one
would estimate a total of forty regressions (twenty each for output growth and gov-
ernment spending growth). Calculating government spending multipliers, however,
requires combining the coefficients on the military news variable across some subset
of these forty regression equations. In order to conduct inference on the multiplier
8Gordon and Krenn (2014) argue that the output gap is a better indicator variable to use to
distinguish between good and bad states of the economy, as opposed to the unemployment rate.
Other commenters have made this argument to me as well. I also used various measures of the
output gap to distinguish between times of high and low slack in the economy. The results are mixed
and rather imprecise, but a common pattern was that output gaps that tended to attribute more
of the fluctuations in output to the permanent component of output, such as the decomposition of
Beveridge and Nelson (1981), tended to produce higher multiplier estimates in the high slack state.
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statistics themselves, including testing if they are higher in bad times relative to good
times, I will need to get an idea of the covariance between the relevant coefficients
across the forty equations. To do so, I will stack each of the forty regression equations
in a seemingly unrelated regressions-like framework. Let Xi,h represent the matrix
of right hand side variables for each regression equation i = y, g and h = 1, 2, ..., 20,
and Γi,h and i,h represent the associated coefficient vectors and error vectors, re-
spectively. Also let yh and gh denote the vector of left hand side variables for each
horizon as well. Then, I run the system regression

y1
y2
...
y20
g1
g2
...
g20

=

Xy,1 0 · · · 0
0 Xy,2 · · · 0
...
...
. . .
...
0 0 · · · Xg,20


Γy,1
Γy,2
...
Γg,20

+

y,1
y,2
...
g,20

. (3.3)
By estimating the regressions in this framework, I can not only construct impulse
response functions by plotting the coefficients on the military news variable, but can
conduct inference on calculated multiplier statistics as well.
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3.3.3 Empirical Methodology: Endogenous Threshold Esti-
mation
ORZ and RZ use the unemployment rate as their threshold variable for distinguish-
ing between good and bad states of the economy, and they set 6.5 percent as their
threshold level. Of course, there is no theoretical significance attached to 6.5 per-
cent.9 This raises the question of whether some other level of the unemployment rate
might prove a more meaningful threshold. In other words, by arbitrarily setting the
threshold level at 6.5 percent, are some “good” periods being inappropriately thrown
in with the “bad” ones, or vice versa?
To address this question, I will make use of the sample splitting technique of
Hansen (2000). This paper takes its cue from the literature examining estimation of
structural breaks and their associated sampling distributions. The intuition behind
this technique is essentially as follows. For each possible value of the threshold
variable, which in this case is the unemployment rate, the algorithm estimates the
regression as though that value were the true threshold value. It then chooses the
threshold level that minimizes the sum of squared errors. Hansen (2000) also develops
a distribution theory associated with this procedure, so that I can determine if there
are significant threshold effects in each regression and construct a confidence interval
around the estimated threshold in the unemployment rate.
9ORZ and RZ cite recent comments by former Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke
to the effect that unemployment would have to fall below that level before monetary pol-
icy could be tightened. In fact, more recent comments by Bernanke’s successor, Janet
Yellen, indicate that the “threshold” below which policy may be tightened has shifted lower.
See http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-03-19/fed-links-rate-outlook-to-range-of-data-drops-6-
5-threshold.html
29
In a similar exercise, Jorda` (2005) estimates thresholds in several candidate vari-
ables looking only at the one-period ahead regression (h = 1). Because understanding
fiscal multipliers necessitates considering longer horizons than just one period ahead,
I estimate separate thresholds for each regression horizon (h = 1, 2, ..., 20) separately
and adopt as the threshold value of the unemployment rate the median of the twenty
estimated values.10
3.3.4 The Post-WWII Period
One of the main contributions of ORZ and RZ is to construct historical quarterly
data on GDP and government spending in the United States that dates back to the
late nineteenth century. By doing this, they argue that they are better able to exploit
considerable variation in a number of key variables, including government spending,
by taking account of such episodes as the two world wars and the Great Depression.
This method has the additional nontrivial advantage of nearly doubling the sample
size. While these episodes carry with them some caveats (such as rationing during
World War II or increased patriotism during the same time, which may have had
offsetting effects on output), through robustness checks, RZ demonstrate that their
results are not terribly sensitive to these issues.
I will argue that, while the longer data series is exceptionally useful and interesting
in its own right, for the purposes of measuring the government spending multiplier
during times of relatively high or low slack in the economy, it is not advisable to pool
10In practice, the estimated threshold values were the same for a substantial number of the
horizons.
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the prewar data with the postwar data. This is because it is very unlikely that the
prewar data series and the postwar series are derived from the same data generating
process. As Gorodnichenko (2014) shows in his discussion of RZ, the volatility of
government spending growth is of a much greater magnitude before the war. This
could be down to the time series process actually changing, or it could be because
of the volatility of the interpolator series used by RZ.11 Related to this point is the
argument that mixing interpolated data with more homogeneously collected data
after World War II can confound statistical tests, as shown byMurray and Nelson
(2000). The specification put forward in their paper also does not account for the
possibility of a structural break in the government’s share of output, a point made
by Gorodnichenko (2014) and Gordon and Krenn (2014).
A major question raised by RZ, however, is whether the military news instrument
has enough explanatory power for government spending in the postwar period, in
particular when unemployment is relatively high. This is especially salient, given
the use of the military spending news variable as an instrument and the means by
which multipliers are calculated. As stated above, the multiplier for a given state of
the economy is calculated as
∑H
h=1 βy,i,h∑H
h=1 βg,i,h
, i ∈ good, bad. To simplify notation and to
fix ideas, suppose that the coefficients come from a univariate regression of output
or government spending on the military news variable at any given horizon h = 1.
In that case, the multiplier is
Mult =
βy,i,1
βg,i,1,
i ∈ good, bad . (3.4)
11In fact, because of the interpolator series’ volatility, RZ warn against using a Cholesky decom-
position to identify government spending shocks in a VAR framework with this prewar data.
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Suppressing the notation indicating the state of the economy, this implies that
Mult =
∑T
t=1(Yt ×MilNewst)∑T
t=1(Milnews
2
t )
÷
∑T
t=1(Gt ×MilNewst)∑T
t=1(Milnews
2
t )
(3.5)
and, further, that
Mult =
∑T
t=1(Yt ×MilNewst)∑T
t=1(Gt ×MilNewst)
. (3.6)
This expression shows clearly that the use of the military spending news variable
and the local projections method in this way leads to an instrumental variables
interpretation of the multiplier. Thus, the explanatory power of the news variable
for future growth in government spending is a critical element of the analysis.
To evaluate the strength of the instrument, RZ present a series of tests showing
the F-stats for regressions of the form
Gt = α + β1Milnewst−1 + β2Milnewst−2 + β3Gt−1 + β4Gt−2 + β5Yt−1 + β6Yt−2 + trend+ εt,
(3.7)
where Gt is the log of per capita government spending in year t, Yt is the log of per
capita output in year t, and Milnewst is the identified news shock to military spend-
ing. They find that the instrument relevance of the military spending variable (as
measured by the F-stat) is very low in the postwar period with high unemployment.
In the whole sample, the F-stat for the news variable in bad times clears ten.12 RZ
cite the relative weakness of the military spending news shock as an instrument as a
key reason for putting less weight on the postwar results they present in their paper.
Gorodnichenko (2014), however, points out that while the instrument relevance is
12See Table 1 of Ramey and Zubairy (2014).
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weak in the very short term, it is fairly strong in the medium term. This is impor-
tant, because the multipliers that RZ construct (and that I will construct in this
paper) depend on the reaction of government spending not only within a year, but
over the course of several years.
Table 3.2 gives the F-Statistics for the null hypothesis that the military spending
instrument has no explanatory power for the growth in government spending over
horizons of two and four years (the horizons over which I will construct multiplier
estimates). RZ consider a cutoff of 10 for sufficient instrument relevance. It can be
seen from the table that when unemployment is relatively low,13 the military news
instrument has fairly good explanatory power for government spending growth, with
F-Stats of 13.75 at two years and 66.45 at four years. In contrast to the findings of
RZ, however, even when unemployment is relatively high, the instrument has decent
explanatory power, with a statistic of 15.34 at a four year horizon, greater than that
for the low unemployment state at two years. With this evidence in hand, I continue
considering only the postwar period.
3.4 Results
In this section, I will present my estimation results, first considering specifications in
which I use the ORZ and RZ threshold value of the unemployment rate (6.5 percent),
and then estimating the threshold endogenously.
13The definition of unemployment as relatively high or low is determined by the endogenously
estimated unemployment rate which is discussed further in Section 3.4.2. Also, the first stage
regression is exactly that of Equation refgbench.
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3.4.1 Fixed Unemployment Threshold
Here, I will estimate four specifications in which I used the fixed unemployment rate
threshold. First, I will employ exactly the same specification as in ORZ and RZ.
The first modification will be to allow stochastic rather than deterministic trends.
In the third specification, I augment the control variable set with lagged values of
the three month T-Bill and the military news shock. In the fourth, I allow only
the coefficients on the constant and the curent military news shock (which is the
coefficient of interest) to switch across states.
3.4.1.1 Replicating Owyang, Ramey, and Zubairy (2013) and Ramey and
Zubairy (2014)
The first specification is nearly identical to that used in ORZ and RZ.14 Estimat-
ing the regression system on the dataset that begins in 1948, the results are rather
erratic. Output rises in response to a news shock, but not significantly, when un-
employment is relatively low. On the other hand, when unemployment is above the
threshold, there is an insignificantly negative fall in GDP over the first four years,
after which it begins to rise. The reaction of government spending is measured more
precisely, but, even here, the results may raise eyebrows. In the high unemployment
state, for example, government spending begins to fall after about two and a half
years. When unemployment is low, spending lurches sharply higher before slowing
14More precisely, the differences from RZ are slight, because I include tax revenue in the condi-
tioning set on the right-hand side, which is not done in ORZ but is the case in older drafts of RZ.
Also, I do not have exactly the data they have, as their study extends the sample an extra couple of
years. Also, RZ control for only two lags of the various right-hand side variables, whereas I control
for four.
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down almost as abruptly after six quarters. The estimated multiplier statistics also
seem incredible, especially for the high unemployment state. These can be found in
Table 3.3. Over two years, one gets a multiplier of -2.11, significantly negative at the
90 percent confidence level. There is no theoretical model of which I am aware that
produces such large negative multipliers. The model that does come closest to pro-
ducing such a figure may be that of Baxter and King (1993), who, in a neoclassical
model, find a multiplier on government purchases of -1.1. There are some differences
between their model and the circumstances that likely prevail in the sample that
I study. The multiplier that arises from that paper is not assigned to periods of
relatively weak activity, and the spending they consider is permanent and financed
by contemporaneously higher distortionary labor taxes. These conditions are not
likely to describe the military spending shocks recovered in times of relatively high
unemployment. Adding to the confusion, the same multiplier measured over a four
year period is extremely large at 32.886, which is similarly unjustified by any con-
ventional theoretical model, and the confidence interval around this figure is so large
as to be effectively uninformative.
As I will show below, imposing the trend stationarity assumption seems to be a
source of the volatile impulse response functions found. When one allows stochastic
trends, the coefficient estimates are much more well behaved, leading to multiplier
estimates more in line with theoretical predictions. I discuss these in the next sub-
section.
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3.4.1.2 Stochastic Trends
At this point, I will modify the regression specification slightly, so as to assume
stochastic trends as opposed to deterministic trends. In effect, this means that rather
than including four lags of log levels of real output per capita and real government
spending per capita, as well as deterministic time trends, in the control vector (as is
the strategy pursued in ORZ and RZ), I will include four lags of first differences of
real output per capita, real government spending per capita, and real tax revenues
per capita. A reason for taking this approach is that, if there is a unit root in these
series, then including lagged log levels and a deterministic trend produces a system
subject to the Nelson and Kang (1981) critique, in that the cyclical components of
the series are incorrectly specified. This could potentially confound the estimation
results if the resulting conditioning set includes spurious data.
To justify specifying the right hand side variables in differences as opposed to
levels, Table 3.4 presents results from unit root tests in the main control variables.
I use DF-GLS tests for a unit root, which Elliott, Rothenberg, and Stock (1996)
demonstrate to have power that approaches the asymptotic power envelope. Table
3.4 gives the results of these tests. As can be seen from the table, the hypothesis of a
unit root cannot be rejected in any of these series. This suggests that the appropriate
specification for the regressions is one in which these control variables are specified
in first differences without a deterministic time trend.
The impulse response functions for output and government spending in high- and
low-unemployment states are found in Figure 3.3. Looking at the impulse responses
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for the period beginning from 1948, it appears that employing a difference-stationary,
as opposed to a trend-stationary, approach produces results that make much more
intuitive sense, especially in the high-unemployment state. That is, neither the
output growth impulse response nor the government spending impulse response turns
quickly negative in response to a positive shock to spending. The output response also
appears to be more precisely estimated. Even in the low-unemployment state, the
shape of the government spending impulse response function is somewhat smoother.
It does not have the sharp upturn and steep decline seen when deterministic trends
are used. It is interesting that the difference-stationary specification seems to make
such a difference when considering only the relatively homogenously collected data
of the postwar period, especially in light of the observation of Murray and Nelson
(2000) about the difficulty of rejecting the unit root hypothesis when looking at
quarterly postwar data.
Table 3.5 contains the multiplier statistics for the difference-stationary speci-
fication. For both time horizons considered, the low unemployment multiplier is
significantly less than unity at the 90 percent confidence level. Low unemployment
multipliers are 0.414 at a two-year horizon and 0.541 at a four-year horizon. In
the high-unemployment state, the difference is marked. The multiplier statistics are
much more well-behaved in the difference-stationary specification compared to the
trend-stationary specification. Although the multiplier at the two-year horizon is
still fairly low at 0.224, it is no longer significantly negative, a result that had very
little theoretical justification. At the four-year horizon, one gets a value of 1.392,
which is not statistically different from 1, but is at least significantly positive, and is a
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much more plausible value than a fiscal multiplier over 30 found in the deterministic
trend regressions, as well as falling within the plausible range over which “reasonable
people can argue” given by Ramey (2011a) and Ramey (2012). One cannot reject
the equality of the two-year multiplier across high- and low-unemployment states,
but there is more evidence of a larger high-unemployment multiplier at the four-year
horizon, although it is still not significant at the 90 percent confidence level. The
better behavior of the multiplier statistics, especially in the postwar sample, leads
me to conclude that the difference-stationary specification is the more informative,
more appropriate specification.
3.4.1.3 Expanded Control Sets
In this section, I augment the difference stationary specifications by including four
lags of the military spending news variable and four lags of the three month T-bill
rate as controls. I include lags of the military spending news variable only out of
an abundance of caution, because although Ramey (2011b) and ORZ constructed it
so as to only include changes in the expectations of future military spending, which
should necessarily control for the information already in hand, it is clear from looking
at a plot of the variable (See Figure 3.1) that some periods in history, such as the
years leading up to and including World War II or the years during the Vietnam
conflict, were more susceptible to these shocks than others. By including lags, I
hope merely to control for the political environment in which the shocks hit. I
include lags of the T-Bill so as to to control for the stance of monetary policy at the
time of the spending shock. The importance of taking account of monetary policy
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when investigating the macroeconomic effects of fiscal shocks is emphasized in such
papers as Rossi and Zubairy (2011), Davig and Leeper (2011), Ilzetzki, Mendoza,
and Ve´gh (2013), and Zubairy (2014). The other rationale for including the T-Bill
rate has to do with concerns about omitted variable bias. In the construction of
the military spending news variable, Ramey (2011b) uses contemporary Treasury
bond rates to discount spending changes expected to take place in the future. These
interest rates are highly likely to be correlated with the state of the economy at the
time the spending shock hits, and are also likely to influence the paths of output
and government spending going forward. Since a higher interest rate will produce
a smaller spending shock and could be a dampening influence on output growth, I
would expect a downward bias in the coefficient on military news.
The impulse response functions for this expanded specification are found in Fig-
ure 3.4. Especially at shorter horizons, the downward bias suspected in the coefficient
on the military spending news variable seems to be evident. By controlling for the
lagged T-Bill rate and lagged news variable15, I find considerable differences in both
the impulse response functions and the multiplier statistics over the high- and low-
unemployment states of the world. In the low-unemployment state, output rises
modestly, but its increase is not statistically significant at most horizons. Govern-
ment spending rises strongly, moreso than does output, and is precisely estimated,
leading to small multiplier statistics. At the two-year horizon, I get a multiplier of
0.456, and at four years, I get 0.488. See Table 3.6.
In the high-unemployment state, output responds strongly positively to a military
15Including lagged first differences of the T-Bill rate instead of levels does not affect the results
(A unit root cannot be rejected in the T-Bill rate in the data).
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news shock, especially at longer horizons, although even at two-year horizons, the
reaction is stronger than that of government spending. The response trajectory is
significant at the 90 percent confidence level for both variables. Again, Table 3.6
contains the multiplier statistics. At two years, the fiscal multiplier is 3.572, with
a 90 percent confidence interval of 2.480 to 4.663. At four years, it is 3.094, with
a confidence interval of 2.383 to 3.804. The differences between the government
spending multipliers in the low- and the high-unemployment states are large and
significant. Thus, the results I get for the postwar sample contradict those found in
ORZ and RZ, and they are in line with many of the large fiscal multipliers found in
New Keynesian theoretical models, like those referenced in Table 3.1.
3.4.1.4 Parsimonious Specification
In this section, I experiment with a more parsimonious specification, in which only
the constant and the coefficient on the military spending news variable is allowed to
switch across the states of the economy. The primary purpose of this exercise is as a
robustness check, to test the sensitivity of the results to the particular specification,
in which all of the variables’ coefficients switch across the regime. In particular,
this will be useful when I conduct endogenous threshold estimation, where I will be
more interested in targeting threshold effects for only the military spending news
variable. On one hand, conducting the estimation this way allows me to economize
on degrees of freedom, although I lose the ability to condition the spending shock
on state-dependent control sets. This may matter if mean reversion properties differ
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across the two states. The regression system now takes the form
(yt+h − yt−1)
yt−1
= It−1 ∗ (αy,good,h + βy,good,hMilnewst)
+ (1− It−1) ∗ (αy,bad,h + βy,bad,hMilnewst) +X ′t−1θy,h + εy,t+h
(3.8)
(gt+h − gt−1)
yt−1
= It−1 ∗ (αg,good,h + βg,good,hMilnewst)
+ (1− It−1) ∗ (αg,bad,h + βg,bad,hMilnewst) +X ′t−1θg,h + εg,t+h.
(3.9)
I continue to use the expanded control set introduced in Section 3.4.1.3. Figure 3.5
contains the impulse response functions. Here, it is the case that the results are
not quite robust to restricting the number of coefficients that switch, at least at
shorter horizons. First, looking at the impulse response functions, I see little change
in the shape of the response, but it is less precisely estimated, especially in the high-
unemployment state. I cannot even say that the output response is significantly
positive at short to medium-term horizons. Multipliers in low-unemployment states
rise slightly, but there is little qualitative difference compared to the specification
allowing all coefficients to change. In the high-unemployment state, the results are
more sensitive. The two-year integral multiplier drops from 3.572 to 1.278, and it is
no longer statistically different from 1. In fact, the lower bound on the 90 percent
conffidence interval is not much higher than zero. Thus, I also cannot reject that
the multiplier at a two year horizon is the same in the high- and low-unemployment
states of the world. At a four-year horizon, the results are more robust. By the four-
year point, the output impulse response is significantly positive, and the integral
multiplier is still a quite large 2.284, close to the theoretical multipliers displayed in
Table 3.1. It is also the case that the hypothesis of equally sized multipliers in the
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high- and low-unemployment states can be rejected with 90 percent confidence.
In this section, then, my findings of larger fiscal multipliers in “bad” states of the
economy relative to “good” states of the economy are somewhat muted, although,
again, this particular specification imposes common mean reversion dynamics in both
high- and low-unemployment states.
My next objective to apply the Hansen (2000) sample splitting method to endoge-
nously estimate the threshold level of the unemployment rate distinguishing between
good and bad states of the economy.
3.4.2 Multipliers with Endogenous Threshold Estimation
In this section, I turn to one of the main contributions of this paper, which is endoge-
nously estimating the threshold level of the unemployment rate that distinguishes
“good” times from “bad” times, using the method decribed in Hansen (2000). In so
doing, I will employ three alternative specifications. The first specification will find
the least squares estimate of the threshold level of the unemployment rate allowing
the entire coefficient vector to switch between the regimes. The second, employing
the more parsimonious specification seen in Section 3.4.1.4, estimates the threshold
level allowing only the coefficient on the military spending shock to change. The
third estimates the threshold level with only the military spending coefficient chang-
ing, but then conducts impulse response estimation allowing all of the coefficients to
switch across the threshold level estimated using only the military spending shock.
In other words, I take the following approach. In the notation of Hansen (2000) (See
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his equations (1)-(2)), I estimate
yi = θ
′
1xi + ei, qi ≤ γ (3.10)
yi = θ
′
2xi + ei, qi > γ, (3.11)
and the procedure detailed in Hansen (2000) gives the least squares estimate of γ. In
Specification (1), the vector xi includes all of the independent variables, including the
military spending news shock, when estimating γ. Then, the actual impulse response
estimation follows Equations 3.1 and 3.2.16 In my Specification (2), I estimate γ
using only the military spending news variable in the vector xi as well as a constant.
Then, impulse response estimation follows the parsimonious model represented by
Equations 3.8 and 3.9. Finally, in Specification (3), I estimate the threshold with an
xi vector containing only a constant and the military spending news shock, as in the
second model, but I estimate impulse responses using Equations 3.1 and 3.2. I do
this, because I may only be interested in finding the level of the unemployment rate
across which the reactions of output and government spending to the military news
shock differ (thus, I include only the military news shock in the threshold estimation).
Conditional on this estimated threshold, however, I may still want to include the full
control vector that contains lags of output growth and the nominal interest rate,
among others. The potential problem that could arise in the first specification is
that the threshold estimation may be confounded by different coefficients on, say,
lagged output growth, which would be the case if there is a high-growth phase of
16It should be noted that threshold estimation is conducted with output growth as the depen-
dent variable, and the government spending regressions use the threshold level of unemployment
estimated from the output regression.
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the business cycle following recessions (see, for example, Kim and Murray (2002)
and Kim, Morley, and Piger (2005)). This third specification allows me to avoid this
problem.
There may be some doubt about using the unemployment rate as the threshold
variable in this procedure. In developing a distribution theory on the estimation of
the threshold variable, Hansen (2000) assumes that the threshold variable is strictly
stationary (See Assumption 1.1 in Hansen (2000)), ruling out trend-stationary and
integrated processes. A unit root in the unemployment rate cannot be rejected
with conventional tests, but, because it is bounded from above and below, it cannot
technically be an integrated process. This is the argument advanced in King and
Morley (2007). Also, Nelson and Plosser (1982) exploit the presumed stationarity of
the unemployment rate as a benchmark against which to compare their results from
unit root tests on other macroeconomic series. For this reason, I feel confident using
it as the threshold variable in this context.
Table 3.8 gives the bootstrapped “asymptotic p-values” (using the terminology
of Hansen (1996)) for the null of no threshold effect in a linear regression specified
as in Equation 3.1 (Specification (1)), or as a simple regression (yt+h−yt−1)
yt−1
= It−1 ∗
(αy,good,h+βy,good,hMilnewst)+(1−It−1)∗ (αy,bad,h+εy,t+h (for Specifications (2) and
(3)). Following Hansen (1996), the purpose of conducting this procedure is to get
some evidence that threshold effects exist in these processes, which would provide
some support for estimating the threshold level of the unemployment rate. I run the
threshold effects test at each horizon h = 1, 2, ..., 20 individually. There are certainly
problems associated with this approach. Specifically, one of the assumptions made
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in Hansen (1996) is that the error terms are independent and identically distributed,
or at the least form a martingale difference sequence (See Corollary 2 in Hansen
(1996)). When the horizon is longer than one, this condition is clearly violated.
Still, for Specifications (2) and (3), I can still reject the null hypothesis of linearity
at conventional significance levels when the horizon is only one period, when the
conditions laid out in Hansen (1996) are most likely to be satisfied. I consider this
as justification for estimating the least squares threshold level.
Table 3.9 gives the least squares estimates of γ, the threshold level of the unem-
ployment rate across which output growth responds differently to a military spending
news shock, estimated following the procedure of Hansen (2000). As when testing
for the existence of threshold effects, the threshold was estimated separately for each
horizon h = 1, 2, ..., 20. In order to estimate impulse responses to a shock that hits
in one coherent state of the world, I must choose one threshold level in order to esti-
mate the benchmark equation system, so I will take the median estimated threshold
across horizons for each specification. That is, for Specification (1), I will use an un-
employment rate of 5.14, and for Specifications (2) and (3), I will use 5.71, which, as
can be seen from Table 3.9 are these median values. The impulse response functions
for the three specifications are found in Figures 3.6 to 3.8.
Specification (1) offers the strongest evidence against the notion that fiscal mul-
tipliers could be greater during periods of high unemployment, as the results of ORZ
and RZ stand up to endogenous threshold estimation. When looking at the post-
war sample only, in general, the responses are not very precisely estimated, but there
seems to be a stronger response of output to a spending shock when unemployment is
45
below the endogenously estimated threshold level of 5.14. Whether unemployment
is above or below the threshold, government spending exhibits a greater response
than output, leading to small government spending multipliers and no significant
differences between the multipliers across states. The estimated multiplier statistics
for this specification, as well as the next two, can be seen in Table 3.10.
As argued above, however, it is possible that Specification (1) is not capturing
the dynamics that are at the heart of this question. For example, if the process
governing output growth is asymmetric, responding differentially to its own lags
depending on whether the economy is in recession, it is possible that the endogenous
estimation of the threshold unemployment rate is picking up these effects, rather than
differences in its reaction to the military spending shock. That is, this specification
may be taking account of asymmetric mean reversion effects in output, as opposed to
different reactions to the military news shock. Besides this, from Table 3.8, it is not
clear that there are meaningful threshold effects in the regression when it is specified
this way. This leads me to consider Specifications (2) and (3), which both estimate
the threshold unemployment rate by only considering a switching coefficient on the
spending shock (and which offer evidence of threshold effects). I find that the results
from these specifications look more like the main results presented in Section 3.4.1.2,
Section 3.4.1.3, and Section 3.4.1.4.
Looking at Specification (2), I recover large multipliers in the high-unemployment
state of the economy. When I estimate the threshold level of the unemployment
rate using only the military spending shock and the impulse responses using the
framework represented by Equations 3.8 and 3.9, the government spending multiplier
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is 1.605 after two years and 1.678 after four years, both significantly greater than
unity at the 90 percent confidence level. I cannot say that the high-unemployment
state multiplier is significantly greater than the low-unemployment state multiplier
at a two-year horizon, but I can say so at a four-year horizon.
If I consider instead Specification (3), which meshes the threshold estimation
introduced in Specification (2) and the impulse response estimation of Specification
(1), the fiscal multipliers are even larger.17 At two years, when unemployment is
above the estimated threshold level, the government spending multiplier is 1.808,
and at four years, it is 1.918. These are both significantly greater than 1, and they
are both significantly greater than the multipliers when unemployment is below the
threshold at each respective horizon. What is more, these estimates are in line with
the theoretical multiplier predictions introduced in Section 3.2. It is clear from the
impulse response functions given in Figure 3.8 that output rises significantly when
unemployment is above the threshold, while, for most horizons, it does not do so
when unemployment is below the threshold. In this case, the multiplier is 0.274 at
two years, and 0.427 at four years. Even as government spending rises more when
unemployment is above, as opposed to below, the threshold, its response is dwarfed
by that of output.
At this point, it must be acknowledged that the confidence intervals reported for
each multiplier estimate are constructed via the delta method for nonlinear com-
binations of parameter estimates, and are conditioned on the estimated threshold
17Using this estimated threshold, there are 51 non-zero observations of the military news variable
when unemployment is relatively low and there are 18 non-zero observations when unemployment
is relatively high.
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estimate being the “true” level of the unemployment rate that distinguishes between
good and bad times in the economy. Of course, this “true” threshold is a latent
variable (and potentially even nonexistent). It may be appropriate to construct con-
fidence intervals taking into account this uncertainty on the threshold unemployment
rate level. Table 3.11 replicates Table 3.10, but replaces delta method confidence in-
tervals with Bonferroni-type bounds, as suggested by Hansen (2000). Essentially, I
estimate multiplier values for every threshold level of the unemployment rate within
the confidence intervals displayed in Table 3.9 and report the highest and lowest
values. Clearly, especially for the bad state of the economy, inference becomes much
more difficult, with the confidence intervals spanning a wide range of possible values.
This is due to the fact that, as the candidate threshold level of the unemployment
rate gets larger, the number of nonzero observations of the military spending news
shock in the bad state of the economy becomes quite small. Recall that there are
only 18 when the point estimate of the unemployment rate threshold is considered
(for Specifications (2) and (3)).
Figures 3.9 and 3.10 show the responses of output and government spending
to military spending shocks equal to the median that actually occurred in each of
the high and low unemployment states. The purpose of this exercise is merely to
demonstrate that the multiplier statistics estimated in this paper are not the product
of finding the right specification. Rather, a relatively granular look at the data reveals
that output responds more forcefully to a military spending shock in a period of high
unemployment. Figure 3.9 displays the case of relatively high unemployment. The
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magnitude of the median (non-zero) shock is 0.23% of lagged GDP.18 The plot shows
that, after a short spike upwards, government spending declined, hitting a trough
of 6% below the level prevailing the period before the shock, before stabilizing at
around 3% lower. Output grew 4% in the year after the shock (although not as
quickly as government spending), and it plateaued at a level about 6% higher than
its level in the period before the news hit the economy. In this particular case, then,
it seems as though the multiplier was negative.
Figure 3.10 illustrates the case of a shock that occurred when unemployment was
above the threshold. Its magnitude is equal to the median size of all shocks that
were realized when unemployment was relatively high, about 0.36% of GDP.19 After
the realization of this news, both government spending and output grew rapidly,
each around 20% over five years, in contrast to the sequence that followed a shock
during a period of low unemployment. What is more, the unemployment rate in
the economy before this period was about 5.9%. This means that RZ would have
counted this shock as having taken place during a relatively non-slack state, since the
unemployment rate was below their cutoff. In my paper, with endogenous threshold
estimation, it is included among periods of high slack. This provides further evidence
of the usefulness of the endogenous threshold estimation technique.
With these results, I can place my study in between the findings of RZ and those
18Based on the narrative provided by Valerie Ramey on her website (Ramey (2014)), it appears
that this spending shock (1952:Q3) refers to a newly established determination to maintain relatively
high security spending after the end of the Korean War, which had not been expected.
19This shock occurred in 1962:Q1, and, from Valerie Ramey’s narrative, was driven predominantly
by tensions with Cuba (this period is sandwiched by the Bay of Pigs invasion the prior spring and
the Cuban Missile Crisis, which occurred later in the year) and the Kennedy Administration’s goal
of putting a man on the moon.
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of Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012b) and Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012a).
While ORZ and RZ find multipliers below unity in all states of the world, I find
significantly different multipliers in the two states I consider, where the fiscal mul-
tipliers in good times is positive but small (less than one), and the multiplier in
bad times is above one and significantly so. Although Auerbach and Gorodnichenko
(2012b) and Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012a) find larger “bad” state multipli-
ers (above two), they find negative “good” state multipliers, which is also not very
compelling. I would argue that the results presented here are consistent with the
growing theoretical literature on state dependent effects of fiscal policy,unlike RZ,
but that give multiplier values in times of low slack that do not seem implausibly
low either. Table 3.12 shows the multiplier values from my preferred specification
(endogenous threshold estimation (Specification 3) with stochastic trends, monetary
policy, and expanded interactions) alongside those of RZ and Auerbach and Gorod-
nichenko (2012b) and Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012a).
3.5 Extensions
This section will attempt to extend the analysis somewhat, with a look at what
components of private activity are driving multipliers greater than one when the
unemployment rate is relatively high. Also, I consider the other side of fiscal stimulus,
specifically whether tax changes have differential effects according to the state of the
economy. To do this, I will exploit the narrative tax series constructed by Romer
and Romer (2010).
50
3.5.1 Consumption and Investment Multipliers
Multipliers that reach above the level of unity imply that some component of private
activity is also increasing in response to the government spending shock, in addition
to government spending itself. That is, some measure of private activity is being
“crowded in.” In many empirical studies looking at aggregate fiscal multipliers, such
as Blanchard and Perotti (2002), researchers tend to find a positive response of pri-
vate consumption, with negligible or negative effects on private investment. In fact,
several theoretical papers have emerged that seek to explain this positive consump-
tion response, since the negative wealth effect of a government spending shock tends
to depress private consumption in standard neoclassical and New Keynesian models.
With this in mind, this subsection seeks to examine whether large multipliers in
high-unemployment periods are also due to a large positive consumption response.
To do so, I employ Specification (3) used in Section 3.4.2, which takes the endoge-
nously estimated threshold unemployment rate for output, letting only the military
news shock enter the threshold estimation equation, but letting all right-hand side
variables have switching coefficients in the main regression for consumption or in-
vestment. I consider the responses of consumption of nondurables and services, con-
sumption of durable goods, and gross private domestic investment. The regression
equations are exactly those of Equations 3.1 and 3.2, only with the macro variable of
interest substituting for output on the left hand side of the regressions. The results
are found in Table 3.13 and in Figure 3.11, Figure 3.12, and Figure 3.13.
When unemployment is relatively low, a government spending shock as identified
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by the military spending news variable causes a short-run significant decline in con-
sumption of nondurables and services (hereafter referred to only as “consumption”),
with the response becoming insignificantly different from zero after about two and a
half years. When unemployment is relatively high, the impact response of consump-
tion is significantly positive, but it wears off quickly. The estimated response is briefly
significantly negative in the medium term, before rising in the long run (after about
four years), but at this horizon, it is imprecisely measured. Consumption multiplier
statistics are about -0.41 after two years and -0.22 after four years when spending hits
an economy with relatively low unemployment, and about -0.10 after two years and
-0.20 after four when the unemployment rate is fairly high when spending shocks the
economy. The differences between good- and bad-state consumption multipliers are
insignificant at both horizons. Thus, in contrast to much of the empirical literature,
I find significantly negative government spending multipliers on private consump-
tion in the medium term no matter the state of the economy. This finding actually
accords with the hypothesized negative wealth effects of government spending put
forth by a standard neoclassical model.
The situation is different for private investment and for durables consumption,
however. In periods marked by both relatively low and relatively high unemploy-
ment, private investment responds positively to a government spending shock (at
least in the short term), although it response has a much greater magnitude when
unemployment is high. In relatively good times, the medium- and long-run responses
are a bit choppy, whereas they are relatively steady in bad times. In the long run, the
reaction of investment to a government spending shock at a time of relatively high
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unemployment is significantly positive at the ten percent level. A similar pattern
can be seen in the response of durable goods consumption. It is significantly positive
on impact in times of fairly low unemployment, though it turns negative within a
couple of years. In times of high unemployment, durable goods consumption rises
fairly steadily, until its response is significantly positive in the long run. When I com-
pute government spending multipliers on investment, they are insignificantly different
from zero at both the two- and four-year horizons when unemployment is relatively
low, but the high unemployment investment multiplier is 0.60 after two years and
significant. The multipliers on durables consumption are significantly negative at
both two and four years in times of low unemployment, but positive (significantly so
at four years) in times of high unemployment.
Although a positive investment response to government spending is not a uniform
prediction, it could make sense in the context of a negative wealth effect, which
lowers private consumption and raises labor supply, thus increasing the marginal
productivity of capital and returns on investment. Considering that investment and
durables consumption are more likely to be responsive to interest rate fluctuations,
these results also support the notion that real interest rates do not rise as much in
response to a government spending shock when unemployment is higher (that is,
when there is greater spare capacity), although one cannot tell from these results
whether that is a deliberate response of the monetary authorities or not. The main
point is that the general equilibrium effects that tend to dampen the multiplier in
standard neoclassical models seem to be mitigated when unemployment is relatively
high.
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3.5.2 The Response to Tax Changes
Romer and Romer (2010) introduce a narrative series of tax changes that is simi-
lar in spirit to the military spending news variable introduced by Ramey (2011b).
By combing through various forms of the legislative record, they identify all legis-
lated changes in the tax code since World War II. Their sample extends to 2007.
Importantly, the authors identify the motivation behind each tax change and clas-
sify them into four groups, two of which they call endogenous (such as efforts to
finance a spending change or to conduct countercyclical policy) and two of which
they call exogenous (efforts to deal with an inherited budget deficit or to boost long
run growth). Their analysis suggests that an exogenous increase in tax revenues of
one percent lowers output by three percent over three years, a highly contractionary
effect. They, however, look at the effect of tax changes on the economy averaged
over all states. In this subsection, I will see whether their identified exogenous tax
changes have differential effects according to the state of the economy in which they
were enacted. 20
In their paper, Romer and Romer (2010) specify their tax changes in three differ-
ent ways, including and excluding retroactive changes and in present value terms. I
will estimate multipliers using all three specifications. The equations that I estimate
are very similar to the equations estimated using the military spending news shock,
20I am indebted to Joshua Hausman and Galina Hale, who each suggested this line of inquiry to
me.
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and are expressed as
(yt+h − yt−1)
yt−1
= It−1 ∗ (αy,good,h + βy,good,hTaxShockt +X ′t−1θy,good,h)
+ (1− It−1) ∗ (αy,bad,h + βy,bad,hTaxShockt +X ′t−1θy,bad,h) + εy,t+h
(3.12)
(Tt+h − Tt−1)
yt−1
= It−1 ∗ (αg,good,h + βg,good,hTaxShockt +X ′t−1θg,good,h)
+ (1− It−1) ∗ (αg,bad,h + βg,bad,hTaxShockt +X ′t−1θg,bad,h) + εg,t+h,
(3.13)
where TaxShockt is the exogenous legislated change in taxes identified by Romer
and Romer (2010) in any of their three specifications, and Tt is real tax receipts per
capita. The tax shock is scaled as a percentage of GDP, and I can construct tax
multipliers in the same way as I construct government spending multipliers. The
results can be found in Table 3.14 and Figure 3.14, Figure 3.15, and Figure 3.16.
The most precise results come from the specification involving the tax shock
without retroactive tax changes, although the patterns are generally similar across
all three specifications. A look at Figure 3.14 implies that tax changes are broadly
neutral when the economy is in a state of low unemployment. Output declines ini-
tially, but over the longer term, its response is insignificant. Tax receipts themselves
do not respond positively to the tax change. This gives tax multipliers insignificantly
different from zero when unemployment is relatively low. When unemployment is
relatively high, however, one sees a significant decline in output in response to an
exogenous tax increase, especially in the long term. The multiplier on taxes is -2.23
at two years and -3.63 at four years when the tax change is imposed in a time of
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relatively high unemployment. This suggests that the dramatic contractionary re-
sponse found by Romer and Romer (2010) is driven by the economy’s reaction to tax
changes in a state of relatively high unemployment. Tax changes are fairly benign
for the economy when unemployment is relatively low.
3.6 Conclusion
In this paper, I have revisited the question of whether government purchases of
goods and services are more effective in raising output (as evaluated by the govern-
ment spending multiplier) when the economy is weak relative to when it is strong.
Extending the framework developed by Owyang, Ramey, and Zubairy (2013) and
Ramey and Zubairy (2014), I use the Hansen (2000) sample splitting technique to
endogenously estimate the threshold level of the unemployment rate in postwar U.S.
data. In addition, I change the estimating equation to include stochastic trends,
as opposed to deterministic trends, and control for the monetary policy stance. In
so doing, I find evidence for larger government spending multipliers in times of eco-
nomic weakness, unlike Owyang, Ramey, and Zubairy (2013) and Ramey and Zubairy
(2014), on the order of 1.6 to 1.9, which are significantly higher than one in most
specifications and significantly higher than the associated multiplier in times of eco-
nomic strength. Unlike Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012b) and Auerbach and
Gorodnichenko (2012a), the multipliers in good times are positive, if small.
In addition, I find that consumption has a small, possibly negative response to
government spending no matter the state of the economy, but that investment has
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a significantly positive multiplier on government spending when it is undertaken in
a time of high unemployment. I also find a significantly negative tax multiplier in
times of high slack, but an insignificant multiplier when the economy is operating
closer to capacity.
It may be interesting in the future to further explore the possibility of more than
two states relevant to the fiscal multiplier calculation. This notion is theoretically
justified in the work of Sims and Wolff (2013), who construct a model in which
output multipliers vary not only according to whether there is slack in the economy
or not, but also according to the source of the slack. In their model, recessions
caused by aggregate demand shock experience relatively small output multipliers,
while those caused by aggregate supply shocks experience larger output multipliers.
The opposite is true of what they call “welfare” multipliers, a metric that attempts
to take into account whether economic agents are actually any better off as a result
of the increase in government spending. That is, it tries to take into account the
utility that agents extract from public spending or the disutility they might get
from working more.21 The possibility of a third regime to consider when thinking
about fiscal multipliers is also hinted at in Fazzari, Morley, and Panovska (2013) and
Hausman (2013). The sample size difficulties engendered by splitting the time series
into a larger number of states do pose a barrier, however. One may also want to
think about possible interactions with income inequality or government debt. A final
future avenue that may be pursued is the possible extent to which the military news
variable considered here (and arguably the best identified shock to spending in the
21The relative lack of attention to the effects on utility or welfare of increased government ex-
penditures is also noted by Mankiw and Weinzierl (2011).
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literature) might suffer from allocation bias, of the type considered in Angrist, Jorda`,
and Kuersteiner (2013) and Jorda` and Taylor (2013). That is, are some periods in
history more susceptible to receiving a military spending news shock? I leave all of
this to future research.
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Table 3.1: Theoretical Multipliers when the ZLB Binds
Fiscal Multiplier
Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2011) 3.7
Eggertsson (2010) 2.3
Nakamura and Steinsson (2014) 1.7
These figures report government spending multipliers in benchmark versions of each
paper’s model. In the case of Nakamura and Steinsson (2014), the figure reported is
from their model in the working paper where household preferences are separable in
consumption and leisure. With nonseparable preferences, the model gives a multiplier
of 8.73.
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Table 3.2: Explanatory Power of Military Spending Shock for Future Government
Spending
State Horizon F-Stat
Good 2 years 13.75
Bad 2 years 4.51
Good 4 years 64.44
Bad 4 years 15.34
The table gives F-Statistics for the null hypothesis that the coefficients on the military
spending news shock of Ramey (2011b) and Owyang, Ramey, and Zubairy (2013) are
jointly zero for government spending growth in the state of the economy and over the
horizon indicated. Good states and bad states are determined by an unemployment
rate of 5.71, which is the threshold level endogenously estimated in Section 3.4.2.
Table 3.3: Fiscal Multipliers: ORZ,RZ Specifications
Horizon Multiplier Confidence Interval
Sample: 1948 to 2010
Low Unemployment 2 years 0.176 [-0.224,0.575]
High Unemployment 2 years -2.11 [-3.977, -0.244]
Low Unemployment 4 years 0.619 [0.183, 1.056]
High Unemployment 4 years 33.505 [-141.317, 208.327]
Difference 2 years -2.289 [-5.022, 0.451]
Difference 4 years 32.886 [30.352, 35.420]
The table gives integral multipliers, calculated as (
∑H
h=1 βy,j,h)/(
∑H
h=1 βg,j,h) for j =
good, bad and H = 8, 16. Confidence intervals are for the 90 percent significance
level, calculated via the delta method for nonlinear combinations of coefficients. The
parameter estimates come from the least squares regression of Equation 3.3, with
Newey-West standard errors. The Newey-West lag parameter is 20.
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Table 3.4: DF-GLS Tests of Main Time Series Variables
Real GDP Real Government Spending Real Tax Revenues
DF-GLS Stat −2.555 −1.223 −2.531
Lag Length 2 8 8
The table gives DF-GLS test statistics for the variables indicated in each column.
Lag length is selected by according to Ng and Perron (1995). The maximum number
of lags is 8. The null hypothesis for each regression is that the series has an autore-
gressive unit root, while the alternative hypothesis is trend stationarity. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and
∗ indicate rejection of the null hypothesis at the 1, 5, and 10 percent levels.
Table 3.5: Fiscal Multipliers: Stochastic Trend Specifications
Sample: 1948 to 2010
Low Unemployment 2 years 0.414 [0.236,0.592]
High Unemployment 2 years 0.224 [-0.718, 1.165]
Low Unemployment 4 years 0.541 [0.431, 0.652]
High Unemployment 4 years 1.392 [0.741, 2.043]
Difference 2 years -0.190 [-1.873, 1.493]
Difference 4 years 0.851 [-0.020, 1.721]
The table gives integral multipliers, calculated as (
∑H
h=1 βy,j,h)/(
∑H
h=1 βg,j,h) for j =
good, bad and H = 8, 16. Confidence intervals are for the 90 percent significance level,
calculated via the delta method for nonlinear combinations of coefficients. Parameter
estimates are from the least squares regression of Equation 3.3, with Newey-West
standard errors. The Newey-West lag parameter is 20.
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Table 3.6: Fiscal Multipliers: Expanded Control Set
Sample: 1948 to 2010
Low Unemployment 2 years 0.456 [0.231,0.682]
High Unemployment 2 years 3.572 [2.480, 4.663]
Low Unemployment 4 years 0.488 [0.344, 0.632]
High Unemployment 4 years 3.094 [2.383, 3.804]
Difference 2 years 3.115 [1.566, 4.665]
Difference 4 years 2.606 [1.925, 3.286]
The table gives integral multipliers, calculated as (
∑H
h=1 βy,j,h)/(
∑H
h=1 βg,j,h) for j =
good, bad and H = 8, 16. Confidence intervals are for the 90 percent significance level,
calculated via the delta method for nonlinear combinations of coefficients. Parameter
estimates are from the least squares regression of Equation 3.3, with Newey-West
standard errors. The Newey-West lag parameter is 20.
Table 3.7: Fiscal Multipliers: Parsimonious Specification
Sample: 1948 to 2010
Low Unemployment 2 years 0.528 [0.366,0.689]
High Unemployment 2 years 1.278 [0.254, 2.301]
Low Unemployment 4 years 0.562 [0.448, 0.677]
High Unemployment 4 years 2.284 [1.335, 3.233]
Difference 2 years 0.750 [-1.334, 2.834]
Difference 4 years 1.721 [0.605, 2.837]
The table gives integral multipliers, calculated as (
∑H
h=1 βy,j,h)/(
∑H
h=1 βg,j,h) for j =
good, bad and H = 8, 16. Confidence intervals are for the 90 percent significance level,
calculated via the delta method for nonlinear combinations of coefficients. Parameter
estimates are from the least squares regression of Equation 3.3, with Newey-West
standard errors. The Newey-West lag parameter is 20.
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Table 3.8: Bootstrapped Asymptotic P-Values for Null of No Threshold Behavior
Horizon Spec. (1) Spec. (2),(3)
1 0.296 0.078
2 0.149 0.001
3 0.127 0.000
4 0.065 0.001
5 0.023 0.000
6 0.007 0.000
7 0.009 0.000
8 0.010 0.000
9 0.006 0.000
10 0.008 0.000
11 0.028 0.000
12 0.016 0.000
13 0.003 0.000
14 0.000 0.000
15 0.000 0.000
16 0.002 0.000
17 0.015 0.000
18 0.048 0.000
19 0.067 0.000
20 0.140 0.000
The table gives P-Values for a test of the null that there is no threshold in a linear
regression under homoskedasticity, as in Hansen (1996). Specification (1) tests for a
threshold in an equation system as in Equations 3.10 and 3.11 with all independent
variables included in the xi vector. Specifications (2) and (3) include only the military
spending news variable in the xi vector.
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Table 3.9: Least Squares Estimate of Threshold Unemployment Rate
h (quarters) Spec. (1) Spec. (2),(3) h (quarters) Spec. (1) Spec. (2),(3)
1 5.76 5.71 11 5.03 5.16
[5.71, 6.62] [4.74, 7.03] [4.67, 5.27] [4.96, 6.12]
2 5.71 5.71 12 5.03 5.16
[5.47, 6.03] [5.04, 6.15] [4.67, 5.16] [4.97, 6.38]
3 5.48 5.71 13 5.03 5.88
[4.97, 6.03] [4.99, 6.15] [4.96, 5.16] [5.13, 6.38]
4 5.49 5.16 14 5.03 5.88
[3.95, 5.94] [4.96, 6.15] [4.97, 5.26] [5.16, 6.38]
5 5.49 5.16 15 5.11 5.88
[4.97, 5.62] [4.97, 5.71] [4.97, 5.26] [5.16, 6.44]
6 5.16 5.16 16 5.11 5.88
[4.97, 5.29] [4.97, 5.48] [4.97, 5.26] [5.76, 6.50]
7 5.16 5.16 17 5.12 5.88
[5.13, 5.29] [4.96, 5.35] [4.97, 5.16] [5.76, 6.50]
8 5.16 5.16 18 5.03 5.88
[5.13, 5.27] [4.97, 5.35] [4.96, 5.26] [5.76, 6.50]
9 5.16 5.16 19 5.11 5.88
[5.13, 5.29] [5.00, 5.35] [4.96, 5.26] [5.76, 6.50]
10 5.16 5.16 20 5.11 5.88
[4.96, 5.29] [4.97, 5.35] [4.96, 5.26] [5.76, 6.44]
The table gives least squares estimates of γ in equation system given by Equations
3.10 and 3.11, estimated using Hansen (2000) procedure under homoskedasticity.
Results allowing heteroskedasticity were almost identical. 95% confidence regions
for the threshold level are in brackets. Details on the three specifications are found
in the text.
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Table 3.10: Fiscal Multipliers: Endogenously Estimated Unemployment Thresholds
Spec. (1) Spec. (2) Spec. (3)
Low Unemployment 2 years 0.281 0.557 0.274
[-0.573, 1.135] [0.380, 0.733] [-0.024, 0.573]
High Unemployment 2 years 0.201 1.605 1.808
[0.093, 0.308] [1.065, 2.146] [1.413, 2.202]
Low Unemployment 4 years 0.791 0.587 0.427
[0.234, 1.349] [0.465, 0.710] [0.251, 0.603]
High Unemployment 4 years 0.350 1.678 1.918
[0.263, 0.438] [1.301, 2.055] [1.603, 2.232]
Difference 2 years -0.081 1.049 1.534
[-0.928, 0.767] [-0.740, 2.837] [0.223, 2.844]
Difference 4 years -0.441 1.091 1.491
[-1.023, 0.141] [0.174, 2.008] [0.769, 2.213]
The table gives integral multipliers, calculated as (
∑H
h=1 βy,j,h)/(
∑H
h=1 βg,j,h) for
j = good, bad and H = 8, 16. Confidence intervals (in brackets) are for the 90
percent significance level, calculated via the delta method for nonlinear combina-
tions of coefficients. Parameter estimates are from the least squares regression of
Equation 3.3, with Newey-West standard errors. The Newey-West lag parameter is
20. Specifications (1), (2), and (3) are detailed in the text.
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Table 3.11: Fiscal Multipliers: Endogenously Estimated Unemployment Thresholds
Spec. (1) Spec. (2) Spec. (3)
Low Unemployment 2 years 0.281 0.557 0.274
[-1.172, 0.510] [0.268, 0.845] [-1.088, 0.510]
High Unemployment 2 years 0.201 1.605 1.808
[-5.596, 3.572] [-5.739, 93.150] [-130.407, 99.344]
Low Unemployment 4 years 0.791 0.587 0.427
[-1.087, 0.959] [0.035, 0.710] [-0.922, 0.959]
High Unemployment 4 years 0.350 1.678 1.918
[-0.036, 4.424] [-14.590, 2.884] [-0.976, 4.424]
Difference 2 years -0.081 1.049 1.534
[-6.106, 3.115] [-6.273, 92.641] [-130.833, 98.918]
Difference 4 years -0.441 1.091 1.491
[-0.630, 3.914] [-15.137, 2.299] [-1.493, 3.914]
The table gives integral multipliers, calculated as (
∑H
h=1 βy,j,h)/(
∑H
h=1 βg,j,h) for j =
good, bad and H = 8, 16. Confidence intervals (in brackets) are Bonferroni bounds
taking into account uncertainty in the true threshold unemployment rate, constructed
using the 95% confidence intervals on the OLS estimate of the threshold. Parameter
estimates are from the least squares regression of Equation 3.3, with Newey-West
standard errors. The Newey-West lag parameter is 20. Specifications (1), (2), and
(3) are detailed in the text.
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Table 3.12: Comparison of State Dependent Multiplier Estimates
Paper Horizon Good State Multiplier Bad State Multiplier
Current Study 2 years 0.274 1.808
Current Study 4 years 0.427 1.918
Ramey and Zubairy (2014) 2 years 0.79 0.69
Ramey and Zubairy (2014) 4 years 0.96 0.76
Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012b) 5 years -0.33 2.24
Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012a) 5 years -0.20 0.46
The table gives the preferred multiplier estimates at the horizons indicated for the
given papers. The multipliers from this paper are those estimated from Specification
(3) with endogenously estimated threshold unemployment, stochastic trends, and
monetary policy. See Table 3.10. The multipliers for Ramey and Zubairy (2014)
come from their Table 2. The multipliers for Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012b)
come from their Table 1. The multipliers for Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012a)
come from their Table 1.
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Table 3.13: Government Spending Multipliers on Consumption and Investment
Nondurables and Services Investment Durables
Low Unemployment 2 years -0.411 -0.165 -0.162
[-0.519, -0.302] [-0.347, 0.017] [-0.234, -0.090]
High Unemployment 2 years -0.103 0.595 0.144
[-0.270, 0.064] [0.167, 1.023] [-0.050, 0.337]
Low Unemployment 4 years -0.216 -0.125 -0.116
[-0.283, -0.148] [-0.214, -0.036] [-0.161, -0.071]
High Unemployment 4 years -0.209 0.183 0.269
[-0.375, -0.043] [-0.194, 0.559] [0.074, 0.465]
Difference 2 years 0.308 0.760 0.305
[-0.298, 0.912] [-0.635, 2.155] [-0.403, 1.014]
Difference 4 years 0.006 0.308 0.385
[-0.401, 0.414] [-0.633, 1.248] [-0.176, 0.946]
The table gives integral multipliers, calculated as (
∑H
h=1 βy,j,h)/(
∑H
h=1 βg,j,h) for
j = good, bad and H = 8, 16. Confidence intervals (in brackets) are for the 90
percent significance level, calculated via the delta method for nonlinear combina-
tions of coefficients. Parameter estimates are from the least squares regression of
Equation 3.3, with Newey-West standard errors. The dependent variables now are
the change in real personal consumption expenditures on nondurables and services
per capita (Column 1), the change in real gross private domestic investment per
capita (Column 2), and the change in real personal consumption expenditures on
durable goods (Column 3). The regression equations are as expressed in Equation
3.1 and Equation 3.2 The Newey-West lag parameter is 20.
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Table 3.14: Tax Multipliers: Romer and Romer (2010) Narrative Tax Series
Tax Shock (1) Tax Shock (2) Tax Shock (3)
Sample: 1948 to 2007
Low Unemployment 2 years 0.506 0.730 1.232
[-0.054, 1.065] [0.425, 1.036] [0.963, 1.501]
High Unemployment 2 years -2.229 -6.028 -11.603
[-3.591, -0.866] [-10.215, -1.841] [-31.866, 8.661]
Low Unemployment 4 years 0.028 0.737 1.215
[-0.353, 0.410] [0.568, 0.907] [0.991, 1.439]
High Unemployment 4 years -3.628 -18.161 14.667
[-5.667, -1.590] [-42.865, 6.544] [0.458, 28.877]
Difference 2 years -2.734 -6.758 -12.834
[-3.307, -2.162] [-7.088, -6.428] [-13.095, -12.574]
Difference 4 years -3.657 -18.898 13.452
[-4.058, -3.255] [-19.086, -18.709] [13.214, 13.691]
The table gives integral multipliers, calculated as (
∑H
h=1 βy,j,h)/(
∑H
h=1 βg,j,h) for
j = good, bad and H = 8, 16. Confidence intervals (in brackets) are for the 90
percent significance level, calculated via the delta method for nonlinear combina-
tions of coefficients. Parameter estimates are from the least squares regression of
Equation 3.3, with Newey-West standard errors. The Newey-West lag parameter is
20. Tax Shock (1) refers to the tax shock of Romer and Romer (2010) excluding
retroactive changes. Tax Shock (2) refers to the tax shock of Romer and Romer
(2010) including retroactive changes. Tax Shock (3) refers to the tax shock of Romer
and Romer (2010) in present discounted value terms.
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Figure 3.1: An Exogenous Shock to Government Spending
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The figure gives the change in expected present value of military spending as a share
of lagged nominal gross domestic product, as constructed first in Ramey (2011b) and
then extended in Owyang, Ramey, and Zubairy (2013).
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Figure 3.2: Impulse Response Functions, ORZ Specification
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The figure shows impulse response functions for real output and real government
spending per capita in response to a military spending news shock of Ramey (2011b)
and Owyang, Ramey, and Zubairy (2013) equal to one percent of GDP. The sample
is 1948-2010, and the specification is nearly identical to that employed in Ramey
and Zubairy (2014). The dashed lines represent 90 percent confidence intervals. The
number of observations in the low-unemployment state are 187 when h = 1 and 176
when h = 20. In the high-unemployment state, they are 61 when h = 1 and 53 when
h = 20. The number of observations decline due to the particular specification of
the dependent variable, which necessitates dropping one additional observation as
the horizon increases.
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Figure 3.3: Impulse Response Functions, Stochastic Trends
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The figure shows impulse response functions for real output and real government
spending per capita in response to a military spending news shock of Ramey (2011b)
and Owyang, Ramey, and Zubairy (2013) equal to one percent of GDP. The sam-
ple is 1948-2010, and the specification allows stochastic rather than deterministic
trends. The dashed lines represent 90 percent confidence intervals. The number
of observations in the low-unemployment state are 187 when h = 1 and 176 when
h = 20. In the high-unemployment state, they are 61 when h = 1 and 53 when
h = 20. The number of observations decline due to the particular specification of
the dependent variable, which necessitates dropping one additional observation as
the horizon increases.
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Figure 3.4: Impulse Response Functions, Expanded Control Set
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The figure shows impulse response functions for real output and real government
spending per capita in response to a military spending news shock of Ramey (2011b)
and Owyang, Ramey, and Zubairy (2013) equal to one percent of GDP. The sample is
1948-2010, and the specification allows stochastic rather than deterministic trends.
It augments the control set with four lags of the military spending news variable
and the three month T-Bill rate. The dashed lines represent 90 percent confidence
intervals. The number of observations in the low-unemployment state are 187 when
h = 1 and 176 when h = 20. In the high-unemployment state, they are 61 when
h = 1 and 53 when h = 20. The number of observations decline due to the particular
specification of the dependent variable, which necessitates dropping one additional
observation as the horizon increases.
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Figure 3.5: Impulse Response Functions, Parsimonious Specification
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The figure shows impulse response functions for real output and real government
spending per capita in response to a military spending news shock of Ramey (2011b)
and Owyang, Ramey, and Zubairy (2013) equal to one percent of GDP. The sample is
1948-2010, and the specification allows stochastic rather than deterministic trends. It
augments the control set with four lags of the military spending news variable and the
three month T-Bill rate. Only the constant and the coefficient on the military news
variable switch between regimes. The dashed lines represent 90 percent confidence
intervals. The number of observations in the low-unemployment state are 187 when
h = 1 and 176 when h = 20. In the high-unemployment state, they are 61 when
h = 1 and 53 when h = 20. The number of observations decline due to the particular
specification of the dependent variable, which necessitates dropping one additional
observation as the horizon increases.
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Figure 3.6: Impulse Response Functions, Endogenously Estimated Threshold:
Specification (1)
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The figure shows impulse response functions for real output and real government
spending per capita in response to a military spending news shock of Ramey (2011b)
and Owyang, Ramey, and Zubairy (2013) equal to one percent of GDP. The sample is
1948-2010, and the specification allows stochastic rather than deterministic trends.
It augments the control set with four lags of the military spending news variable
and the three month T-Bill rate. The dashed lines represent 90 percent confidence
intervals. Specification (1) is detailed in the text. The threshold level of the un-
employment rate is endogenously estimated at 5.14. The number of observations in
the low-unemployment state are 105 when h = 1 and 96 when h = 20. In the high-
unemployment state, they are 143 when h = 1 and 133 when h = 20. The number
of observations decline due to the particular specification of the dependent variable,
which necessitates dropping one additional observation as the horizon increases.
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Figure 3.7: Impulse Response Functions, Endogenously Estimated Threshold:
Specification (2)
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The figure shows impulse response functions for real output and real government
spending per capita in response to a military spending news shock of Ramey (2011b)
and Owyang, Ramey, and Zubairy (2013) equal to one percent of GDP. The sample is
1948-2010, and the specification allows stochastic rather than deterministic trends. It
augments the control set with four lags of the military spending news variable and the
three month T-Bill rate. The dashed lines represent 90 percent confidence intervals.
Specification (2) is detailed in the text. The threshold level of the unemployment
rate is endogenously estimated at 5.71. The number of observations in the low-
unemployment state are 157 when h = 1 and 147 when h = 20. In the high-
unemployment state, they are 91 when h = 1 and 82 when h = 20. The number
of observations decline due to the particular specification of the dependent variable,
which necessitates dropping one additional observation as the horizon increases.
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Figure 3.8: Impulse Response Functions, Endogenously Estimated Threshold:
Specification (3)
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The figure shows impulse response functions for real output and real government
spending per capita in response to a military spending news shock of Ramey (2011b)
and Owyang, Ramey, and Zubairy (2013) equal to one percent of GDP. The sample is
1948-2010, and the specification allows stochastic rather than deterministic trends. It
augments the control set with four lags of the military spending news variable and the
three month T-Bill rate. The dashed lines represent 90 percent confidence intervals.
Specification (3) is detailed in the text. The threshold level of the unemployment
rate is endogenously estimated at 5.71. The number of observations in the low-
unemployment state are 157 when h = 1 and 147 when h = 20. In the high-
unemployment state, they are 91 when h = 1 and 82 when h = 20. The number
of observations decline due to the particular specification of the dependent variable,
which necessitates dropping one additional observation as the horizon increases.
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Figure 3.9: Example for a Military Spending Shock in a Low Unemployment State
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The figure shows the time paths of output (crossed line) and government spending
(circled line) after the realization of a military spending news shock of median size
when unemployment is relatively low. The magnitude of the shock is 0.23% of GDP.
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Figure 3.10: Example for a Military Spending Shock in a High Unemployment State
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The figure shows the time paths of output (crossed line) and government spending
(circled line) after the realization of a military spending news shock of median size
when unemployment is relatively high. The magnitude of the shock is 0.36% of GDP.
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Figure 3.11: Impulse Response Functions: Consumption
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The figure shows impulse response functions for real personal consumption expen-
ditures of nondurables and services and real government spending per capita in re-
sponse to a military spending news shock of Ramey (2011b) and Owyang, Ramey,
and Zubairy (2013) equal to one percent of GDP. The sample is 1948-2010, and
the specification allows stochastic rather than deterministic trends. It augments the
control set with four lags of the military spending news variable and the three month
T-Bill rate. The dashed lines represent 90 percent confidence intervals. The thresh-
old level of the unemployment rate is that estimated for Specification (3) for the
output regression.
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Figure 3.12: Impulse Response Functions: Investment
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The figure shows impulse response functions for real gross private domestic invest-
ment and real government spending per capita in response to a military spending
news shock of Ramey (2011b) and Owyang, Ramey, and Zubairy (2013) equal to one
percent of GDP. The sample is 1948-2010, and the specification allows stochastic
rather than deterministic trends. It augments the control set with four lags of the
military spending news variable and the three month T-Bill rate. The dashed lines
represent 90 percent confidence intervals. The threshold level of the unemployment
rate is that estimated for Specification (3) for the output regression.
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Figure 3.13: Impulse Response Functions: Durable Goods Consumption
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The figure shows impulse response functions for real durable goods consumption and
real government spending per capita in response to a military spending news shock
of Ramey (2011b) and Owyang, Ramey, and Zubairy (2013) equal to one percent
of GDP. The sample is 1948-2010, and the specification allows stochastic rather
than deterministic trends. It augments the control set with four lags of the military
spending news variable and the three month T-Bill rate. The dashed lines represent
90 percent confidence intervals. The threshold level of the unemployment rate is that
estimated for Specification (3) for the output regression.
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Figure 3.14: Impulse Response Functions: Romer and Romer (2010) Tax Shock,
Excluding Retroactive Changes
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The figure shows impulse response functions for real output and real tax receipts per
capita in response to a tax shock of Romer and Romer (2010) (excluding retroactive
changes) equal to one percent of GDP. The sample is 1948-2007, and the specification
allows stochastic rather than deterministic trends. It augments the control set with
four lags of the military spending news variable and the three month T-Bill rate.
The dashed lines represent 90 percent confidence intervals. The threshold level of
the unemployment rate is endogenously estimated at 4.69, according to Specification
(3) discussed in Section 3.4.2.
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Figure 3.15: Impulse Response Functions: Romer and Romer (2010) Tax Shock,
Including Retroactive Changes
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 EXOGERETRORATIO
The figure shows impulse response functions for real output and real tax receipts per
capita in response to a tax shock of Romer and Romer (2010) (including retroactive
changes) equal to one percent of GDP. The sample is 1948-2007, and the specification
allows stochastic rather than deterministic trends. It augments the control set with
four lags of the military spending news variable and the three month T-Bill rate.
The dashed lines represent 90 percent confidence intervals. The threshold level of
the unemployment rate is endogenously estimated at 4.46, according to Specification
(3) discussed in Section 3.4.2.
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Figure 3.16: Impulse Response Functions: Romer and Romer (2010) Tax Shock,
Present Value Terms
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The figure shows impulse response functions for real output and real tax receipts per
capita in response to a tax shock of Romer and Romer (2010) (present value terms)
equal to one percent of GDP. The sample is 1948-2007, and the specification allows
stochastic rather than deterministic trends. It augments the control set with four
lags of the military spending news variable and the three month T-Bill rate. The
dashed lines represent 90 percent confidence intervals. The threshold level of the
unemployment rate is endogenously estimated at 4.45, according to Specification (3)
discussed in Section 3.4.2.
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Chapter 4
The Uncertain State-Dependent
Government Spending Multiplier
4.1 Introduction
As the economy in the United States has suffered from weak growth in recent years,
conventional monetary policy has been unable to provide much in the way of stimulus,
with nominal interest rates pinned to the “Zero Lower Bound.” This has led to an
explosion of research into whether fiscal policy can “pick up the slack,” as it were,
with a special focus on whether government spending multipliers are state-dependent.
The empirical strand of literature extends back at least to Perotti (1999), although
the bulk of the studies are more recent.
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Theoretically, much research can be classified according to the neoclassical tra-
dition, with one of the more famous papers being Baxter and King (1993), or the
new Keynesian variety, such as Rotemberg and Woodford (1992). These studies do
not consider any state-dependence in the government spending multiplier, that is
whether the increase in output for a one dollar increase in government purchases of
goods and services varies along with economic conditions. After all, with the Federal
Reserve unable to lower interest rates any further and resorting to methods of uncer-
tain efficacy, this is the question that policy makers would like to know the answer
to. If fiscal stimulus is undertaken in a time of recession or a time of relatively low
capacity utilization, might it not be more powerful in boosting output? Particu-
larly in the new Keynesian class, however, a number of new models have appeared
that attempt to provide some support for this notion, using a number of different
propagation mechanisms.1 Although the prediction of most of these models is that
government purchases have a much higher multiplier when economic times are bad,
empirically, the evidence for this is less certain.
Even without taking possible state-dependence into account, estimating the effect
of government purchases on output is fraught with difficulty. Ramey (2011a) dis-
cusses a large number of empirical studies, conducted using a wide range of method-
ologies, and concludes that the average government spending multiplier over all time
periods and states of the economy is likely to fall somewhere between 0.8 and 1.5.
When state-dependence is taken into account, the econometrician must decide among
a bevy of options as to how to best estimate this statistic. This paper will address
1See, for example, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2011), Sims and Wolff (2013), Gal´ı,
Lo´pez-Salido, and Valle´s (2007), and Denes, Eggertsson, and Gilbukh (2013) among many others.
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whether, among these choices, some decisions systematically lead to higher or lower
multiplier estimates in a state-dependent context.
To this end, I have identified eight dimensions along which any attempt to mea-
sure the government spending multiplier in good times and in bad may vary. These
include whether to adopt deterministic or stochastic time trends, the strategy for
identifying fiscal shocks, whether or not to account for monetary policy, the choice
of variable to demarcate good times and bad times, whether the level of that vari-
able demarcating good and bad times is estimated or imposed ex ante, the particular
sample period, how to estimate the impulse response functions, and whether to allow
the coefficients on all variables in the regression equation to switch with the state of
the economy, or only a select number. By no means is this an exhaustive list of the
possible empirical methodologies to choose from, of course, and I will not examine
every one. The goal of this paper is primarily to find out the general extent to which
specification matters in answering this question. As a large number of studies have
come to different conclusions (with some finding evidence for large differences in the
multiplier between good and bad times and some finding no evidence that the mul-
tiplier is ever above unity, no matter the economy’s condition), it seems appropriate
to investigate if certain specification assumptions seem to bias multiplier estimates,
in either state of the economy, in one direction or another.
A major inspiration for this study is Sala-I-Martin (1997), who estimates four
million regressions of economic growth to find if any certain variables are significant
more often than others.2 Like in that paper, I will estimate a large number of pairs
2In the context of estimating the effects of fiscal policy, Engemann, Owyang, and Zubairy (2008)
also do something similar.
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of government spending multipliers,3 2112 to be exact, with each estimate differing
from the one before only by one specification choice. With these in hand, I can
learn whether some specifications are prone to over- or under-stating the multipliers
relative to other choices via regression analysis. This will not shed any light on the
“true” multipliers, but it can at least inform how the results of any one paper would
look if minor adjustments to the specification were made. From a theoretical per-
spective, Coenen et al. (2012) and Kormilitsina and Zubairy (2013) perform exercises
in a similar spirit by easy examining the predictions of a large number of models for
the effect of fiscal shocks.
I find that, on average, fiscal multipliers in the “good” state are lower than mul-
tipliers in the “bad” state overall. I also find that the choices for trend specification,
identification strategy, sample period, and impulse response estimation systemat-
ically nudge the government spending multiplier in one direction or another, no
matter the state of the economy. The choice of threshold variable that distinguishes
good and bad times matters in some instances, while the inclusion of the monetary
policy stance and the decision to let all coefficients switch or not do not seem to have
consistent effects.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 discusses the various
dimensions along which I will vary my multiplier specifications, as well as the data
to be considered. Section 4.3 presents the results, and Section 5.6 offers a brief
discussion and conclusion.
3A pair comprises a good state multiplier and a bad state multiplier.
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4.2 Specification Choices
The majority of the data for this study comes from the historical data set assembled
by Ramey and Zubairy (2014). It includes quarterly data on real GDP and real
government spending, as well as the military spending news variable developed by
Ramey (2011b) and Owyang, Ramey, and Zubairy (2013), in the United States from
1890 to 2010. I augment the data set with a series for real quarterly tax revenues,
which spans 1929 to 2010.4 Because I always include tax revenues in my regressions,
the earliest start date in any analysis is 1929. Also, I obtain from the St. Louis
Federal Reserve Economic Database as well as the NBER Macrohistory Database
time series on the three-month Treasury bill rate, which I will use to proxy for
monetary policy.5 Similarly, data on the Ten-Year Treasury interest rate comes from
both of these sources as well.6 Data on the Moody’s AAA and BAA corporate bond
yields are retrieved from the St. Louis Federal Reserve. The rest of this section
concerns the dimensions along which I will make specification choices.
4To generate a quarterly real tax revenues series for the period from 1929 to 1946 (before the
government began recording tax receipts on a quarterly basis, I first seasonally adjusted the monthly
federal surplus series from the NBER Macrohistory Database, and use this seasonally adjusted data
to interpolate the annual NIPA series (W054RC1Q027SBEA) via the Denton method. This follows
Owyang, Ramey, and Zubairy (2013) and Ramey and Zubairy (2014). Please note that the series
is actually tax receipts, although I may refer to it as “tax revenues” in the course of the paper.
5The Treasury bill data 1929:I to 1934:I comes from the Macrohistory database, and all of the
subsequent observations come from the St. Louis database.
6Observations from 1929 to 1943 are from the Macrohistory database series m13033a, and those
from 1944 to 1953:I are from the Macrohistory database series m13033b. Subsequent observations
come from the St. Louis Federal Reserve.
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4.2.1 Time Trends
The first specification choice to be made is whether to include determinisitic time
trends, such as a linear, quadratic, or even quartic time trend, or to somehow account
for differences over time with some kind of stochastic trend. For example, Ramey
(2011b), Ramey and Zubairy (2014), Alloza (2014) and Fisher and Peters (2010)
estimate their regressions or vector autoregressions with time trends corresponding
to the lengths of their respective samples. Other studies, such as Fazzari, Morley,
and Panovska (2013) and Jorda` and Taylor (2013) rather put all of their dependent
and independent variables in first differences. In some cases, both approaches are
employed, either separately (Blanchard and Perotti (2002)) or within the same equa-
tion system (Riera-Crichton, Ve´gh, and Vuletin (2014)). In some cases, stochastic
trends are employed, but expressed not as first differences, but as deviations of the
series from the Hodrick-Prescott filtered trend, such as in Jorda` and Taylor (2013)
or Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2014).
It is worthwhile to consider why this might make a difference in the estimation
of government spending multipliers. Ramey (2011b) and Ramey and Zubairy (2014)
make the argument that demographic changes over time have stimulated dynamics
in hours per capita, which a linear or quadratic trend might well control for. There
are, however, reasons to worry about the use of these trends. Nelson and Kang
(1981) point out that detrending a time series that contains an autoregresive unit
root with a linear trend generates spurious cycles. Thus, in a regression context,
the detrended right hand side variables do not control for any cyclical fluctuations,
and, in fact, the information contained in them is likely to be inaccurate, leading
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to imprecise estimates. A very similar problem aﬄicts other popular time series
filters, such as the Hodrick-Prescott filter and the Baxter-King filter, as discussed in
Cogley and Nason (1995), Murray (2003), and Nelson (2006). For these reasons, it
seems perilous to use deterministic time trends or various “atheoretical” time series
filters to control for the passage of time, and the safest route may be to use first
differencing. On the other hand, Gospodinov, Herrera, and Pesavento (2013) show
that, in the case of VARs, small deviations from an exact unit root in the relevant
time series can produce spurious results when difference-stationary restrictions are
imposed.
In this paper, I consider specifying trends using the deterministic method and
the first differenced method, as these are the most popular in the literature. Half,
then, of the pairs of multipliers I will present will be estimated with quadratic trends
(for the shorter samples) or quartic trends (for the longer samples), and the other
half will measure all nonstationary variables in first differences.
4.2.2 Identification Strategy
The difficulty of identifying truly exogenous fiscal shocks has been considered at
length in the literature. To the extent that governments run countercyclical fiscal
policy, one might imagine that there is not much in the way of government purchases
that is actually unrelated to the state of the economy and is not predictable by
private agents. Thus, there have been a number of proposals put forward to facilitate
identification. In this study, I will discuss three of the more popular ways, although
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there have been other strategies as well.
Perhaps the most venerable procedure is that adopted first in Blanchard and
Perotti (2002), who specify a vector autoregression that includes output, govern-
ment spending, and tax revenues. While a number of VARs have been utilized that
include all manner of different variables in addition to these three (or, in some cases,
instead of tax revenues), the vast majority rely on the same basic logic. By order-
ing government spending first in the VAR, ahead of output, one implicitly makes
the assumption that, while output might respond contemporaneously to a change in
spending, government spending cannot respond to output without at least a lag of
one period. On its face, this seems quite reasonable, as, in most advanced economies,
and in the United States in particular, the legislative process required for authoriz-
ing new government purchases often takes a nontrivial amount of time. With this
assumption in hand, the fiscal shock is identified as the structural innovation to gov-
ernment spending in the VAR (which is identical to the reduced form innovation
when government spending is ordered first). Among the studies identifying fiscal
shocks in this way are Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012b), Ilzetzki, Mendoza, and
Ve´gh (2013), and Gordon and Krenn (2014).
Ramey (2011b) puts forth a forceful and convincing argument that this may
not be the best scheme for identifying shocks. She shows that the innovations in
government spending from a vector autoregression are likely to be anticipated, as
the hypothesis that they cannot be predicted by the war dates identified in Ramey
and Shapiro (1998) is strongly rejected. If these spending innovations are expected
by the public at large, it is likely that their behavior has already begun to adjust to
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them, throwing off the timing of the effects of interest. This is also a problem with
empirical studies that take an annual frequency, such as Barro and Redlick (2011) and
Hall (2009), and why Owyang, Ramey, and Zubairy (2013) and Ramey and Zubairy
(2014) go to such pains to construct a historical data set that converts pre-World
War II data to a quarterly frequency. With this in mind, Ramey (2011b) introduces
a variable that pinpoints as well as possible, using contemporary news sources, when
the public’s expectations on government spending changed. This series only takes
into account spending changes that are a result of some political or military event
exogenous (as much as possible) to the economy of the United States, so as to avoid
entanglements with endogenous counter- or pro-cyclical spending policy that might
bias results. While Ramey (2011b) constructs such a series for the United States,
Owyang, Ramey, and Zubairy (2013) do so for Canada, and Crafts and Mills (2013)
do so for the interwar United Kingdom. The advantage of using this variable in
identifying government spending shocks is hinted at above. It captures changes in
expectations of spending, to which economic agents will react, and it is plausibly
exogenous to current economic conditions. In many of the studies in this literature,
if the Ramey (2011b) military news variable is not used as the primary government
spending shock, it is often used at least as a robustness check.
The embrace of this method of identifying shocks is not universal, however. Fisher
and Peters (2010) point out that, necessarily, the military news variable can cover
only a limited number of observations, that it tends to feature mostly spending in-
creases and only a few spending decreases, and that it is subject to what Ramey
(2011b) readily admits are “judgment calls.” Yang, Fidrmuc, and Ghosh (2014) even
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raise doubts about the series’ exogeneity and argue that the kind of government
spending spurred by such events is not typically the kind of spending that a govern-
ment may want to pursue to stimulate the economy, a point echoed by Clemens and
Miran (2012). Perhaps the most frustrating aspect of this particular variable is that
it is, again almost necessarily by its very nature, limited to the United States. The
United States is in a unique position in that it has been an active and preeminent
military power over the last one hundred years, but has seen relatively little damage
to its territorial productive capacity. These are the attributes that make the mil-
itary news variable feasible, but also that constrain it. The Canadian and British
series mentioned above, bu contrast, do not see the same variation over time as the
American series. Cross-country studies, therefore, like Auerbach and Gorodnichenko
(2012a), Ilzetzki, Mendoza, and Ve´gh (2013), and Jorda` and Taylor (2013) cannot
easily take advantage of its benefits.
To get around this potential problem and to make use of the controls for anticipa-
tory effects promised by this variable, other papers have inserted the Ramey (2011b)
news variable into a VAR and used it to uncover orthogonalized government spend-
ing innovations not predicted by it. This method appears in Fazzari, Morley, and
Panovska (2013) and Rossi and Zubairy (2011). In this paper, I will examine the rel-
ative output of using each of these three candidate identification schemes, evaluating
the extent to which any of them might produce higher or lower multiplier estimates
in either state of the world. Perhaps moreso than in any other dimension, however,
the set of identification strategies I am examining is not exhaustive. Less prominent
methods include the use of policy propensity scores in Jorda` and Taylor (2013), sign
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restrictions in Mountford and Uhlig (2009) and Canova and Pappa (2007), error cor-
rection models in Candelon and Lieb (2013), forecast errors in Blanchard and Leigh
(2013), or excess returns on defense contractors in Fisher and Peters (2010). Each of
these present their own distinct trade-offs, and, while it is beyond the scope of this
paper to consider them each in more detail, all may warrant further attention.
4.2.3 Monetary Policy
Despite the fact that many studies have emphasize the importance of the monetary
policy stance for the effects of fiscal policy, such as in Davig and Leeper (2011) or
Zubairy (2014), inclusion of monetary variables in estimation systems is nowhere near
uniform. Biolsi (2015) shows, however, that controlling for the prevailing short-term
interest rate makes a major difference for multiplier estimates in the postwar United
States, especially for “bad times” multipliers. This may be because the monetary
authority may be making an explicit choice to accomodate the supposed stimulating
effects of government purchases or to offset their possible inflationary effects. In
fact, Romer and Romer (2014) show that the likely cause of differences in the effects
of increases in transfer payments and tax cuts is the Federal Reserve’s differing
responses to them. Of course, given proper identification of the fiscal shock, it is likely
to be contemporaneously orthogonal to monetary policy. Although its importance
has been emphasized, but its inclusion in empirical work is still relatively rare, this
paper will directly test whether monetary policy variables (specifically, the short-
term interest rate) have a systematic impact on estimates of the state-dependent
government spending multiplier. Half of the multiplier pairs presented will control
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for the interest rate on three-month Treasury bills, and half will not.
4.2.4 Threshold Variable
Conceptually, the difference between “good” economic times and “bad” economic
times is fairly clear, especially in the context of general equilibrium models, where
the modeller can introduce negative technology shocks or negative aggregate demand
shocks that jolt a system from its steady state. In practice, however, there is plenty
of debate as to how to separate times of low slack from times of high slack. Auerbach
and Gorodnichenko (2012b), Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012a), Auerbach and
Gorodnichenko (2013), and Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2014) use a seven quar-
ter moving average of GDP growth to sort periods into times of “expansion” and
times of “recession,” but Ramey and Zubairy (2014) offer a critique of this decision,
arguing that the relevant variable that would determine whether fiscal policy might
be effective or not is how much spare capacity is available, not whether the amount
of spare capacity is increasing or decreasing. This is because it is the amount of
underutilized resources that will produce crowding out of private activity or not. To
this end, they adopt the unemployment rate as their threshold variable. Gordon and
Krenn (2014) agree with Ramey and Zubairy (2014) in principle, but assert that
the more correct measure of slack in the economy is the output gap, noting that at
the start of World War II, constraints on productive capacity started to bind long
before the unemployment rate sank to a level that one might associate with tight
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labor markets.7 The “output gap,” however, can be an elusive concept, and it re-
lies on a proper measurement of long term, or potential, output. Relative to the
unemployment rate, this particular variable can be subject to a large degree of mea-
surement error and disagreement. This can be seen in the proliferation of output gap
candidates, such as the deviation of output from the Congressional Budget Office’s
measure of potential GDP, the deviation of output from its trend as measured by the
filter of Hodrick and Prescott (1997), the deviation of output from its long run value
as measured by the decomposition of Beveridge and Nelson (1981), or any of the
other output gap measurements considered by Morley and Piger (2012). The CBO
measure is limited by the fact that it does not extend past 1949, while the potential
problems with the Hodrick-Prescott filter are noted above. The Beveridge-Nelson
decomposition tends to produce very small cyclical components by attributing most
fluctuations in output to permanent movements. Of those considered by Morley and
Piger (2012), some are symmetric and some are asymmetric, and the possibility of
structural breaks in the time series adds an additional measure of uncertainty.
Other researchers have pointed to a related, though distinct, indicator that may
drive differences in the effects of government spending, which is the degree of credit
tightness. Canzoneri et al. (2012) develop a model that features a financial interme-
diation mechanism that generates credit frictions and a financial accelerator. The
idea is that increased government purchases boost output in the first order, and this
output gain lowers credit spreads. Reductions in credit spreads stimulate a greater
7Kuhn and George (2014) develop a DSGE model in which the extent to which capacity con-
straints bind on firms affects the value of the government spending multiplier, thus formalizing the
notion of a multiplier dependent on the output gap.
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output response when the spreads are initially very large than when they are small.
This implies that in addition to the unemployment rate and the output gap, credit
spreads might also determine the magnitude of the government spending multiplier.
To capture this, I will employ the difference between the Moody’s AAA corporate
bond yield and the ten-year Treasury yield, as well as the difference between the
Moody’s BAA bond yield and the Treasury yield and the difference between the
AAA yield and the BAA yield. Gilchrist, Yankov, and Zakraj˘sek (2009) also use
these differences between corporate and government bond yields to characterize the
state of credit frictions.
In this paper, then, I consider eleven different variables to distinguish between
the “good” state of the economy and the “bad” state of the economy. They are
the unemployment rate, the CBO output gap, the Beveridge-Nelson output gap, an
output gap computed via an unobserved components (UC) model, an output gap
computed via the model of Hamilton (1989), a “bounceback” model along the lines
of Kim, Morley, and Piger (2005), an output gap computed using the “plucking”
model of Kim and Nelson (1999), the model-averaged output gap of Morley and
Piger (2012), and the three credit spreads mentioned above.
4.2.5 Estimated vs. Imposed Thresholds
Given a certain economic indicator that the econometrician will use to distinguish
between good and bad times, he or she will then be faced with the choice of deter-
mining what levels of that indicator might point to a particular time period being in
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the good or bad state. It could be that there is no one level of the threshold variable
that separates good times from bad times, but rather the level is time-varying. This
is the motivation behind using the cyclical component of Hodrick-Prescott filtered
data as the threshold variable. Even if a single, time-invariant level is chosen, one
must decide whether to impose a threshold level ex ante or estimate the appropri-
ate level. In this paper, I will compare multipliers from systems with an imposed
threshold level to those that come from an estimated level.
Ramey and Zubairy (2014), in their analysis of state-dependent multipliers using
the unemployment rate, set 6.5% as the threshold for their benchmark analysis, with
this value motivated by former Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke’s comments
that unemployment below this level would signal that the central bank could again
start tightening monetary policy. Other papers that rely on detrending, such as
Jorda` and Taylor (2013), may distinguish good times from bad times to according
to whether the threshold variable is above or below trend, or, as in Mittnik and
Semmler (2012), whether output growth is above or below average. There are com-
pelling reasons in all of these cases for the values chosen, but it is not clear that
this chosen value gives the best evidence for possible differences in the effects on
output of a change in government purchases. This is the motivation behind esti-
mating the threshold level endogenously. Of the previous literature, one of the more
prominent studies to take this route is Fazzari, Morley, and Panovska (2013), who
use Bayesian techniques in a threshold vector autogression to compare models using
different threshold variables and different levels of each variable, ultimately choosing
the model with the best fit. In this paper, I will use the least squares method of
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Hansen (2000) to identify the level of each threshold variable that offers the best
evidence for state-dependence.
I do not take account of smooth transition models here, even though they have
been employed heavily in Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012b), Auerbach and
Gorodnichenko (2012a), Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2013), Auerbach and Gorod-
nichenko (2014), Bachmann and Sims (2012), and Riera-Crichton, Ve´gh, and Vuletin
(2014). Although smooth transition models have several advantages, such as allow-
ing the effect of purchases to vary with the degree of slack or recession in a way that
discrete regimes cannot and potentially exploiting more information for the regime
with fewer observations, they may suffer from the fact that they deliver parameter
estimates that only apply to the two extreme cases of the world, which, in prac-
tice, may have delivered only a small number of observations. Also, they rely on a
transition function that may have an arbitrary degree of smoothness. In this way,
interpreting the results of smooth transition models may not be as straightforward
as interpreting those of discrete regime models, which I will study in this paper. In
any event, smooth transition models are another popular way to estimate state de-
pendence in the multiplier that only add to the uncertainty produced by the models
considered here.
4.2.6 Sample
One of the main contributions of Ramey and Zubairy (2014) was the introduction of
newly constructed quarterly series on real GDP and real government spending in the
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United States that dates back to 1889. The primary benefit is that it allows these
authors to exploit much more variation in government spending (by including the
periods of World War I and World War II) and more periods of deep recession and
of ultra-loose monetary policy. In fact, they argue that the instrument relevance of
their military spending news series in times of high unemployment depends vitally
depends on the inclusion of this older data. Other papers that consider military
spending as their primary instrument for government purchases, such as Barro and
Redlick (2011) and Hall (2009), also are certain to make use of observations that
cover some of the biggest fluctuations in spending and output in U.S. history, which
provide helpful identifying variation.
There are drawbacks to this approach, however. Several authors have pointed
out concerns associated with using heavily interpolated data, as that in Ramey and
Zubairy (2014). Murray and Nelson (2000), for example, assert that interpolated
data on output can bias the results of unit root tests. Gorodnichenko (2014) also
questions whether it is appropriate to pool the data before 1947 (when most of
the quarterly NIPA series begin) with that after 1947, considering the much higher
volatility of measured spending before World War II, possible regime changes, and
the possibility that interpolation of the data has attenuated the differences between
good times and bad times. Therefore, any study of this question must navigate the
trade-off presented by obtaining more information when using all of the data against
the more homogenous character of the data after 1947.
In this study, I will consider two starting dates for all models, one being 1947 (the
shorter sample) and one being 1929 (the longer sample). I start my longer sample
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in 1929, because this is when the annual NIPA series on tax receipts begin, and all
of the models I consider will control for tax receipts on the right hand side. In this
way, I lose the variation provided by the First World War, but maintain the much
bigger fluctuations represented by the Great Depression and World War II.
4.2.7 Impulse Response Estimation
In recent years, the use of the Jorda` (2005) local projection technique for estimating
impulse response functions, especially in this particular context, has become very
prevalent. This method has been applied in, among others, Auerbach and Gorod-
nichenko (2012a), Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2013), Ramey and Zubairy (2014),
and Riera-Crichton, Ve´gh, and Vuletin (2014). Essentially, utilizing this method
amounts to running a series of regressions,
yt+1 = α1 + β1Shockt + εt+1 (4.1)
yt+2 = α2 + β2Shockt + εt+2 (4.2)
... (4.3)
yt+H = αH + βHShockt + εt+H . (4.4)
The impulse response function is then the series β1, β2, . . . , βH , which can then be
plotted. Two series of regressions are run with first output growth and then growth
in government spending as the dependent variables. There are several advantages as-
sociated with constructing impulse responses in this manner. First, there is no shape
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imposed on the response as there is when iterating recursively on the coefficients of
an estimated vector autoregression. It is also robust to misspecification of the VAR,
and it is well suited to nonlinear estimation environments. In particular, as noted
by Ramey and Zubairy (2014), local projections do not compel the econometrician
to have variables specified in exactly the same way on the left hand and right hand
sides of the regression equation.
Doing so allows calculating multipliers directly from coefficients by specifying the
dependent variables as Yt+h−Yt−1
Yt−1
(for output growth) and Gt+h−Gt−1
Yt−1
(for spending
growth). This is because both regression equations are specified in the same units
(a proportion of GDP). The integral government spending multiplier at the two year
horizon, for example, is then merely
∑8
h=1 βy,h∑8
h=1 βg,h
. Contrast this with the conventional
method of computing multipliers in a VAR, in which one calculates elasticities of
output growth and government spending with respect to the shock and then scale
the elasticity ratio by the sample average of Y/G. Ramey and Zubairy (2014) demon-
strate that this method can give biased results if the Yt/Gt ratio changes much over
time.
There are, however, concerns associated with this estimation technique, however.
For example, especially at longer horizons, the estimated responses can become er-
ratic with large standard errors complicating inference. Also, the specific nature
of the dependent variables necessarily induces serial correlation in the error terms,
which must be corrected in some manner. This estimation procedure also requires
the use of long horizon regressions, which Sizova (2015) (2013) warns could be mis-
leading. Finally, there need not be any smooth transition from the estimate of βh to
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βh+1, leading to unintuitive jumps in the impulse response function. These concerns
argue for the use of some sort of vector autoregression.
Since a standard linear VAR is incapable of producing state dependent multiplier
estimates, I need to introduce some kind of nonlinearity. I do so by specifying
a threshold vector autoregression, so as to keep within the spirit of the rest of the
multiplier pairs, which rely on a threshold variable to distinguish between good times
and bad times.8 Threshold VARs are used in Fazzari, Morley, and Panovska (2013),
with the impulse responses modelled using Bayesian techniques. In this paper, I will
simulate Generalized Impulse Response Functions (GIRFs), as in Koop, Pesaran,
and Potter (1996). GIRFs allow for impulse responses to differ according to the sign
and size of the identified shock and provide a convenient way of allowing for feedback
between states of the economy. They also control for dependence on the history of
shocks to the system, which might influence the subsequent dynamics. A downside
to employing GIRFs is that the threshold VAR will deliver only ratios of elasticities
of output and spending to the shock and a (possibly bias-inducing) scaling factor
will have to be applied to compute multipliers.
In this paper, half of the multiplier pairs I estimate will be calculated with the
Jorda` (2005) local projection technique, and the other half will use threshold VARs
and GIRFs.9
8Although Smooth Transition Vector Autogressions (STVARs) have been used heavily in recent
years Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012b), Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012a), Auerbach and
Gorodnichenko (2013), Bachmann and Sims (2012), Caggiano et al. (2014)), they are ill-suited
to the use of threshold variables, and so I do not consider them in this analysis. It is worth
noting, however, that STVARs represent another possible way to arrive at very different estimated
multiplier pairs.
9The code for calculating GIRFs is the same as that used in Schmidt (2013) (2013) and was
generously provided by the author of that paper.
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4.2.8 Expanded vs. Parsimonious Specifications
Each empirical specification will sort all observations into a “good” state and a “bad”
state. Given that there is a question of which macro variables to include on the right
hand side of each estimating equation (as discussed in Section 4.2.3, for example), a
related issue concerns whether all or only a subset of these control variables ought
to have switching coefficients. On the one hand, it may be desirable to allow only
the coefficient on the estimated fiscal shock to switch, or, in the case of identifying
fiscal shocks via orthogonalizing reduced form residuals to uncover structural shocks,
only the coefficients on the government spending variable to switch. To that extent
that the difference in the economy’s response to an exogenous shock to spending is
uncorrelated with the other control variables, this more parsimonious specification
will allow more precise estimates of the effects of the spending shocks and conserve
on degrees of freedom. On the other hand, restricting the coefficients on control
variables such as lagged GDP log levels or growth to have identical coefficients no
matter the initial state of the economy risks missing out on important mean reversion
dynamics that may be state specific. This will be a problem if GDP has a high-growth
“recovery” phase following recessions, as suggested by the work of Beaudry and Koop
(1993), Kim, Morley, and Piger (2005), and Morley and Piger (2012). To that end,
half of the multiplier pairs that I compute will restrict all control variables to have
constant coefficients so as to take advantage of improved parsimony, and the other
half will allow for regime-specific mean reversion dynamics.
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4.3 Results
In this section, I consider the results of the analysis, starting by taking an overview of
the effects of all of the specification choices, predominantly via the use of regression
analysis. After that, I will conduct a Monte Carlo exercise to evaluate more closely
the arguments behind specification of the time trend.
4.3.1 Regression Analysis
After estimating the state-dependent multipliers across all of the dimensions listed
above, it seems appropriate to first take stock of their basic statistical characteristics.
Figure 4.1 shows the density plots of the two-year good-state multiplier, the two-year
bad-state multiplier, the four-year good-state multiplier, and the four-year bad-state
multiplier. Table 4.1 gives the associated summary statistics. The picture painted
by these two reports is that of a wildly variable distribution for each of the types
of multipliers considered. In all cases, the mean multiplier estimate is negative (and
at the two year horizon, it is negative with a very large absolute value), though the
median estimate is positive and below unity. The standard deviation is in the range
of about 350 in each case. The maximum and minimum estimates suggest that some
methods of calculating the state-dependent multiplier can deliver figures of nearly
10000 or as low as -4500. This suggests that an extra dollar of government spending
can produce $10000 in extra ouput or reduce output by as much as $4500. It is
difficult to regard these notions as anything but absurd. The skewness and kurtosis
calculations strongly reject that the distributions of estimates are normal, which is
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supported by just a quick glance at the histograms in Figure 4.1. Here, one can see
a stacking of estimates at around zero, with very long tails stretching to both the
left and the right.
With so many estimates well outside conventional theoretical (and even empirical)
bounds, I start my analysis by considering if there are certain specification choices
that are more likely to deliver extreme values. A multiplier estimate is considered to
be “extreme” if it is higher than the 90th percentile of the relevant distribution or
lower than the 10th percentile of the same. By the eighth and ninth columns of Table
4.1, any two year multiplier above 5.34 for the good state or 5.87 for the bad state
or below -2.24 for the good state or -4.03 for the bad state is considered “extreme.”
Simiarly, at the four year horizon, this term applies to good state multipliers above
7.88 or below -0.54 and to bad state multipliers above 10.70 or below -2.84. I then
run regressions of the following equations,
Extremei = α + β Choicei + εi (4.5)
ExtremeHighi = α + β Choicei + εi (4.6)
ExtremeLowi = α + β Choicei + εi , (4.7)
where Extremei is a dummy indicator that takes on a value of 1 if the multiplier
estimate is extreme, as defined in the preceding paragraph, and 0 otherwise. Choicei
is a dummy indicator that takes on a value of 1 if the estimation that resulted in a
given multiplier estimate employed a given specification choice. For example, in the
regressions that consider the effect of using the unemployment rate as the threshold
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variable on the likelihood of getting an extreme estimate, Choicei switches on when
the multiplier estimate used an unemployment rate as the threshold and 0 when any
other variable was used. ExtremeHighi and ExtremeLowi are dummy indicators
that mark when a particular extreme estimate was especially high (above the 90th
percentile) or especially low (below the 10th percentile).
Tables 4.2 and 4.3 give the results of these regressions. The tables report only the
results on extreme values for the “good” state multiplier estimated at the two year
horizon, but the results for the “bad” state multiplier at the same horizon and for
both states at the four year horizon are quantitatively and qualitatively similar. A
number of things stand out from these regressions. The first is the observation that
the use of a deterministic time trend increases the probability of obtaining an extreme
estimate by 32 percentage points, a dramatic increase, compared to the use of a
stochastic trend. This is split about evenly between extremely positive and extremely
negative estimates. In the case of the two year good state multiplier, deterministic
trends are able to account for both the highest and lowest values reported in Table
4.1, and the standard deviation is 494.58, 41% higher than the standard deviation
for all of the multiplier estimates as a whole. This suggests that the employment of
a deterministic time trend requires careful specification of the other elements of the
regression if one is not to wind up with absurd multiplier estimates.
Table 4.3 shows that the use of generalized impulse response functions (as opposed
to the Jorda` (2005) local projection technique) brings with it similar dangers. It
increases the likelihood of an extreme estimate by 39 percentage points, again split
evenly between extremely high and extremely low figures. As Ramey and Zubairy
109
(2014) show, this could in part be due to the need to scale ratios of elasticities
up by an ex post scaling factor, a problem not encountered when one uses local
projections to estimate the impulse responses. The incorporation of the military
news variable introduced by Ramey (2011b) and extended by Ramey and Zubairy
(2014), whether it is used as the fiscal shock itself or in a vector autoregression
so as to purify standard orthogonalized government spending shocks of the likely
anticipation of future spending, also seems to increase the probability of an extreme
estimate somewhat, relative to the conventional structural shock popularized by
Blanchard and Perotti (2002).
Other specification choices have relatively modest impacts on the probability of
an extreme result. Accounting for monetary policy has almost no effect, as does
the use of a more parsimonious specification. Some threshold variables make an
extremely high estimate a bit less likely. Finally, although using the longer data
sample does not make an extreme estimate in general very much more likely, it does
raise the probability of an extremely high estimate, while reducing the probability
of a very low one. This implies that employing data from before World War II, on
average, may lead to higher multiplier estimates relative to using only postwar data.
When the extreme multiplier values are excluded, the distributions become some-
what more comprehensible, as can be seen in Figure 4.2. Still, they do not seem to
approximate a normal distribution. Whether one considers the two year or four
year horizon or the good or bad state, there is an evident rightward skew to these
distributions. That is, no matter how one chooses to estimate the state-dependent
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multiplier, large values (greater than unity) are much more likely than negative val-
ues, although it is still clear that the majority of estimates cluster just above zero.
Table 4.4 gives the summary statistics for the truncated distributions. From the ta-
ble, it is clear that the hypothesis of a normal distribution is clearly rejected. Some
patterns do emerge, however. The mean and median “bad” state multipliers at both
time horizons are greater than the associated “good” state multipliers. This accords
with the majority of the empirical literature on the subject (Auerbach and Gorod-
nichenko (2012b), Bachmann and Sims (2012), Nakamura and Steinsson (2014), and
others). Bad state multipliers are also more dispersed than good state multipliers,
as evidenced by their higher standard deviations. Multipliers tend to be larger at
the four year horizon than at the two year horizon, suggesting that the effects of
government spending shocks are fairly persistent. The rightward skew is also more
apparent at the four year horizon.
Before examining the effect of various specification choices on these more mod-
erate multiplier estimates, it may be useful to consider to what extent the trimming
of the distribution changed the relative frequencies over each dimension.10 Table
4.5 shows the new allocations across specification choices for each time horizon and
state of the economy, across which dimensions the breakdowns are fairly consistent.
In most cases, there is still a roughly equal number of multiplier estimates for each
specification choice, the exceptions being the choice of time trend and impulse re-
sponse estimator. There are more multiplier estimates with stochastic trends and
10Before truncating the distribution, all of the pairs of multiplier estimates were allocated equally
across each dimension. The only exceptions are that estimations conducted using the CBO output
gap and the model averaged output gap were not run using the longer sample period, due to a lack
of data (the former) and computational issues (the latter).
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Jorda` (2005) impulse response estimation, as it was shown above that deterministic
trends and generalized impulse responses were more likely to lead to extremely high
or low multiplier values. Even across these dimensions, however, there are enough
observations left to get a reasonable idea as to the overall effect on the multiplier
estimate within the bounds of the more theoretically plausible results.
As the next step in the analysis, I will look to see if any particular specifica-
tion choice systematically leads to higher or lower multiplier estimates. I will run
regressions of the following equation,
Multiplieri = α + β Choicei + εi , (4.8)
where Multiplieri refers to the actual multiplier estimate arrived at, and Choicei
refers to a specification choice as in the regressions above. These regressions are run
for each time horizon and state of the economy. I will run univariate regressions
of this sort as well as multivariate regressions in which all dimension choices are
included in the same regression.11 Since Choicei is a dummy variable taking on a
value of one if a given specification choice is employed, one can read the coefficient
β as the average increase or decrease in the multiplier engendered by that choice,
holding all other specification decisions constant. The results are in Tables 4.6 and
4.7.
When considering the tables, perhaps the most eye-catching feature is the fact
that in univariate regressions, using a deterministic time trend has no significant
effect on the magnitude of any version of the multiplier, but, when one includes the
11As the extreme multipliers are dropped, it is no longer necessarily the case that all of the
specification choices are orthogonal to each other, creating scope for possibly different coefficient
estimates in the univariate and multivariate regressions.
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other specification choices in the regression as well, it significantly magnifies every
kind of multiplier. I will discuss this issue more below.
It is also evident that the use of the military news variable used in Ramey (2011b)
and other studies also tends to amplify the multiplier in all states and at all horizons.
The military news variable primarily aims to capture the public’s anticipation of
future government spending changes. Therefore, identifying a spending shock via
the structural residuals from a VAR that includes government spending, output,
tax revenues, and potentially other variables, but not the military news variable
leaves one exposed to the possibility of spurious inference on the multiplier. In
principle, this bias could be either upwards or downwards. Failing to take account of
expectations of future spending could lead one to ignore behavioral changes before the
spending actually hits the economy but that nonetheless is caused by the spending
change. If these behavioral changes lead to gains in output, the multiplier estimate
will be biased downward, whereas if they cause output to decline, it will be biased
upward. The results in the third and fourth lines of Table 4.6 suggest that the
multiplier obtained via identification of structural shocks to government spending in
a VAR that excludes the military news variable is consistently understated.
Ignoring prewar data also seems to understate the multiplier at all horizons and in
all states of the world, relative to only looking at data from the postwar period. The
fifth line of Table 4.7 suggests that including observations from the Great Depression
and World War II adds anywhere from $0.18 to $0.80 to the estimate. This effect is
highly significant.
The final very salient point to note is that estimating impulse responses via the
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local projections method of Jorda` (2005) tends to reduce multipliers of every type
by a very large amount, with the smallest reduction being a full $1.73, relative to
estimation via generalized impulse response functions. This is even after exclud-
ing extreme multiplier estimates, which local projections reduced the probability of
by nearly forty percentage points (see Table 4.3). Since this approach to impulse
response estimation is much less likely to give implausibly high or low estimated
values, and even among the trimmed observations, gives more conservative values
on average, using this relatively flexible method (as in Auerbach and Gorodnichenko
(2012a) and Ramey and Zubairy (2014)) seems the more robust approach to finding
the state-dependent fiscal multiplier.12
Other specification choices seem not to matter as much. Inclusion of a monetary
policy variable or endogenous estimation of the threshold generally do not make a
significant difference for any type of multiplier. The same can be said for whether
or not one allows all regression coefficients to switch along with the state of the
economy.
One may very well be interested not so much in whether or not some specification
choices amplify or diminish both the good and bad states of the multiplier as in
whether they accentuate the differences between them. The only choice that seems
to do this is the choice of the threshold variable itself. In particular, the use of the
CBO output gap appears to drive down the multiplier in the bad state of the world by
about $0.35 (while having no impact on the good state multiplier). Similarly, when
12On average, when extreme values are dropped, the Jorda` (2005) local projection technique
deliver two year multipliers of 0.371 when the state is good and 0.438 when the state is bad,
whereas GIRFs deliver analagous two year multipliers of 2.103 and 2.321. These are very large
values, even theoretically.
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the unobserved components output gap (such as that in Clark (1987)) is employed
as the threshold variable, the good state multiplier tends to be boosted by between
$0.20 and $0.50. At the four year horizon, a similar effect can be seen by use of the
nonlinear unobserved components output gap and the model-averaged output gap of
Morley and Piger (2012). All of these differences are relative to the omitted category,
which in this case is the unemployment rate.
From the other side of the argument, variables that attempt to measure the
degree of credit tightness seem to push the bad state multiplier up and the good
state multiplier down, thus increasing the likelihood of concluding that the multiplier
is countercyclical. This is true for the AAA-10 Year spread and the BAA-10 Year
spread, but especially so for the BAA-AAA spread. The apparent reliance of the
difference between good and bad state multipliers on the choice of threshold variable
will be treated in greater detail below.
Next, I will consider if there are certain specification choices that are more likely
to result in multiplier estimates that are significantly greater than unity at the ten
percent level or significantly less than zero at the same level of confidence. This
will be done via regressions of the sort of Equation 4.8 only with dummy indicators
for whether or not a multiplier is greater than one at ten percent significance or
negative at ten percent significance taking the place of the dependent variable in the
regression. The results are tabulated in Tables 4.8 and 4.9.
First, I consider the probability of pushing multipliers significantly above one. It
is clear that the use of deterministic trends is anywhere from 25 to 29 percentage
points more likely to give a multiplier of any state or horizon above one, which is
115
not very surprising given that these sorts of trends resulted in more extreme multi-
pliers generally. Compared to not using the military news variable, using it makes
multipliers of any state or horizon much less likely to rise above one significantly.
The choice of threshold variable also influences the chance of getting multipliers
greater than one, particularly when evaluating the good state of the economy. One
is more likely to get a large, positive multiplier when times are good when the
threshold variable is the CBO output gap, the unobserved components output gap
(linear or nonlinear), the model averaged output gap, or the AAA or BAA spreads.
Bad state multipliers are less likely to be large and positive for the CBO output gap,
the Hamilton output gap, and the model averaged output gap, while interest rate
spreads tend to push them above unity.
The good state multiplier also tends to be larger when the longer historical sample
is used. Finally, estimating impulse responses via the Jorda` (2005) method puts
downward pressure on the likelihood of a multiplier above one no matter what kind
of multiplier is being considered.
As far as significantly negative government spending multipliers (for which there
is relatively little theoretical justification), again deterministic time trends makes
them statistically more likely in most cases. This accords with the notion that
multiplier estimates are generally just more likely to be extreme when the data is
detrended this way. For the most part, identifying one’s government spending shocks
using the narrative military news shock makes a negative multiplier less likely.
Although the inclusion of a monetary policy variable has not had a great impact
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in any of the experiments conducted to this point, it apparently does generate a
statistically more likely chance of getting a negative multiplier estimate, for any
kind of multiplier. Similarly, fixing the threshold level ex ante, although seemingly
not crucial decision for the most part, does apparently give a greater probability of
getting significantly negative bad state multipliers.
When thinking about the threshold variable itself, the bad state multiplier, espe-
cially at the four year horizon, is more likely to wind up significantly negative if one
uses the CBO output gap, the Beveridge-Nelson output gap, the Hamilton output
gap, the Bounceback output gap, the model averaged output gap, or the difference
between the AAA interest rate and the ten year Treasury interest rate to distinguish
between good and bad states of the economy. Use of the other two interest rate
spreads being considered is more likely to result in good state multipliere below zero
for any horizon.
Consistent with most of the results so far, the local projections IRF method
has a dampening effect, producing a greater probability of significantly negative
multipliers. Making use of pre-World War II data has the opposite effect. Finally,
at the two year horizon, allowing all regression coefficients to switch between states
makes the bad state multiplier more likely to be below zero and the good state
multiplier less likely to be so.
Of course, the objective that motivates any paper in this literature is to determine
whether the government spending multiplier is of greater magnitude when times
are “bad,” for any given specification. Thus, my next exercise is to evaluate if
the difference between good and bad state multipliers depends on the empirical
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specification. Table 4.10 reports summary statistics on the difference between the
multipliers for any given specification choice. The difference is specified as MultBad−
MultGood, so that positive numbers indicate a higher multiplier in bad times. The
table demonstrates that, generally speaking, at either horizon, the difference between
the multipliers in the two states tends to be fairly small. The median differences
cluster around zero, and, when extreme values are excluded, the bulk of them range
between −0.63 and about 1.5. There is a positive skew to the distribution when
extreme values are dropped, suggesting that multipliers estimated for bad states are
generally larger than those estimated for good states. This is consistent with the
summary statistics shown above for the good and bad state multipliers separately.
Table 4.11 displays the results from a regression very similar to that in Equation
4.8, in which the dependent variable is the difference between the bad state multiplier
for a given specification and its good state counterpart. As before, positive values
indicate a higher multiplier in the bad state of the world and extreme values have been
excluded. The table shows that using a deterministic trend dampens the difference
between each multiplier in a pair by about $0.085 at the two year horizon, significant
at the ten percent level, although its effect at the four year horizon is not statistically
significant. Relative to the use of a standard Cholesky decomposition identification
scheme as in Blanchard and Perotti (2002), including the military news variable,
whether on its own or as part of a VAR, amplifies the difference by between $0.23
and $0.38. Also, extending one’s sample back to 1929 tends to reduce the difference
at any horizon by a statistically significant amount. This seems to accord with the
observation that papers that make use of a greater amount of historical data (see,
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for example, Ramey and Zubairy (2014), Barro and Redlick (2011), or Crafts and
Mills (2013)) all find a lack of state dependence in their multiplier estimates. Other
choices, such as controlling for monetary policy or allowing all regression coefficients
to switch or even the use of local projections to calculate the impulse responses, do not
seem to influence the difference between any specification’s multiplier pair. Indeed,
considering impulse responses as calculated by the Jorda` 2005 method, multipliers
seemed to be driven lower for either state of the world, so it is not surprising that
using this technique would have an impact on their difference.
Choice of the threshold variable, on the other hand, has a considerable influence
on the likelihood of finding big differences between the good and bad state multipliers.
In particular, if one were to conduct the empirical analysis assuming that the CBO
output gap or that described by a linear or nonlinear unobserved components model
were the best variable to delineate good and bad times in the economy, then the
result would be finding a relatively small difference between the bad state multiplier
and the good state multiplier. One would therefore be likely to conclude that the
state of the economy does not matter much for the output effects of fiscal policy. The
opposite conclusion would be more likely reached if the chosen threshold variable were
the Beveridge-Nelson output gap or any of the interest rate spreads, as proposed by
Canzoneri et al. (2012). The interest rate spreads, in fact, can add close to a dollar
to the difference between the two multipliers.
The analysis in this section is not meant to suggest that any specification choice
is “right” or “wrong,” or that any of them lead to a bias of any kind. To make such
a statement would require knowledge of the true state dependent multiplier, which,
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of course, is not available. It is just meant to show that selection along any of these
dimensions is likely to have a material impact on the results of the analysis. To
make the problem that much more thorny, as can be seen from Section 4.2, there are
quite valid conceptual and practical reasons for any of the choices available to the
econometrician. The next subsection will deal more closely with a dimension that
seems to have an especially large effect, the time trend specification.
4.3.2 Monte Carlo Study of the Time Trend Assumption
In order to get a better handle on the consequences of assuming that the relevant time
series (specifically log GDP per capita and log government purchases per capita) are
stationary around a deterministic time trend or stationary only in first differences, I
undertake a Monte Carlo study similar in spirit to that of Christiano (1992). I start
by estimating the following two systems of equations for the period 1948 to 2010:
y1,t = A1y1,t−1 +B1Milnewst + C1trend+ t (4.9)
y2,t = A2y2,t−1 +B2Milnewst + εt . (4.10)
Here, y1,t is a vector containing the log of real per capita output and government
spending, while y2,t is a vector containing the first differenced specifications of the
same two variables. Milnewst = [Milnewst,Milnewst−1,Milnewst−2,Milnewst−3,Milnewst−4]′,
where Milnewst denotes the military news variable of Ramey (2011). The vector
trend = [t, t2]′ is a quadratic time trend, and the matrices A1, B1, C1, A2, B2 are
coefficient matrices. The vectors t and εt are error vectors for their respective
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systems. Note that the first system imposes a deterministic time trend, while the
second imposes a stochastic time trend. Table 4.12 includes the coefficient estimates
for these regressions. As is apparent from the inclusion of the military news variable,
this Monte Carlo simulation will take this as the identified shock to government
purchases. From System 4.9, the estimated errors have the following covariance
structure:
CovarDet =
0.0000803 0.0000208
0.0000208 0.0001512
 . (4.11)
From System 4.10, the estimated errors have this covariance structure:
CovarStoc =
0.0000817 0.0000239
0.0000392 0.0001436
 . (4.12)
I then simulate 500 different series of output and government spending assuming
a deterministic time trend with the coefficients in the first two columns of Table 4.12
and the covariance structure given by the matrix in Equation 4.11 as well as 500
different series of the two variables assuming a stochastic trend using the coefficients
in the second two columns of Table 4.12 and the covariance matrix in Equation 4.12.
I use the first four observations on output and government spending from the actual
data as initial conditions for each simulation. For the military news variable, I sample
with replacement from the observed series for each simulation. The deterministic
series simulations then have 248 observations each, while the stochastic series have
247 observations each, with one observation lost to differencing.
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For each simulation, once the data has been generated, I estimate a govern-
ment spending multiplier using the Jorda` (2005) estimation technique (as in Sec-
tion 4.2.7. First, I estimate a linear multiplier. That is, I do not allow for any
state dependence. For the deterministic processes, I estimate the multiplier by es-
timating the Jorda` (2005) regressions in log levels and including a deterministic
time trend and in log differences. I do the same for the difference-stationary pro-
cesses. Thus, I will produce four different multipliers in each simulation: a multiplier
estimated assuming trend-stationarity on actual trend-stationary data, one assum-
ing difference-stationarity on trend-stationary data, one estimated assuming trend-
stationarity on difference-stationary data, and one assuming difference-stationarity
on actual difference-stationary data.13
Histograms of the linear multiplier estimates are contained in Figure 4.3 and a
tabulation of the distributions is in Table 4.13. When examining the linear multiplier
estimates, a couple of different points stand out. First, conditional on the data
being generated by a particular process, there is not much difference in the central
tendency of the multiplier between estimations that impose trend-stationarity of the
data or difference-stationarity. For example, the median multiplier estimate when
the true processes have a deterministic time trend are 0.46 when one imposes a
quadratic trend and 0.50 when one does not. Similarly, if the true processes are
nonstationary, the median multipliers are between 0.74 and 0.80 no matter how they
are estimated. Secondly, when the data has a deterministic trend, the multiplier
estimates tend to be skewed to the left, as can be seen by some of the negative
13All of the multipliers reported will be at the two year horizon, so as to be consistent with the
results reported thus far. Multipliers at the four year horizon have similar implications.
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multiplier estimates with large magnitude, but there is a much less obvious skew
when the data is generated via a stochastic trend. Lastly, conditional on a data
generating process with a stochastic time trend, estimating the multiplier including
a deterministic trend leads to a slightly more diffuse distribution.
This paper is primarily interested in nonlinear estimation of the government
spending multiplier, so the next exercise considers estimation of a multiplier that
depends on the level of the unemployment rate at the time the spending hits the
economy. To incorporate this in my Monte Carlo analysis, for each set of simu-
lations, I also generate an unemployment series, which is randomly sampled with
replacement from the actual unemployment rate observations from 1948 to 2010.
For this exercise, I am obviously assuming that the econometrician is using the un-
employment rate as the threshold variable. I follow the same procedure as when
estimating the state dependent multipliers in the postwar period for an exogenously
imposed unemployment rate threshold. That is, observations where the lagged sim-
ulated unemployment rate is below the median in the sample, are considered to
have been observed in the “good state,” while those where the unemployment rate
is above the median are identified as being in the “bad state.” Table 4.14 contains
the distribution of multiplier estimates for the high- and low-unemployment states,
while a graphical respresentation can be found in Figures 4.4 and 4.5.
What can one learn from these results? Consider first the good state of the econ-
omy. In this case, if the true process is deterministic and a deterministic time trend
is used in estimation, the subsequent results are fairly well behaved. A relatively
symmetric and tightly spaced distribution centered around 0.50 emerges. If instead,
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estimation is executed in first differences, a long right tail arises, raising the possi-
bility of estimating some extremely large good-state multipliers. In fact, however,
the same phenomenon occurs when the true process is nonstationary and one runs
the regressions in first differences. Even if the process is nonstationary, applying
a time trend does not dramatically distort the distribution of multiplier estimates,
although there is a slightly greater probability (relative to when the true process
is trend-stationary) of arriving at a negative multiplier of a fairly large magnitude.
These results imply, therefore, that applying a linear or quadratic time trend to the
data does not have an especially strong effect on the estimates of the good state
multiplier even when it is inappropriate to do so.
Next, I look at the estimates for the bad state of the economy. Here, the results are
generally less sanguine. Applying a deterministic time trend where it is appropriate
to do so raises the possibility of extremely negative estimates, as a long tail extends
to the left. When the true process is deterministic and stochastic trend estimation is
applied, a problem of opposite sign if more muted degree emerges, as the tail extends
to the right. The most well-behaved results seem to be when the true process follows
a non-stationary process, but deterministic methods are applied to detrend it. This
produces the most compact distribution, with the median estimate around 0.68. Still,
stochastic estimation applied to a stochastic process performs fairly well also.
The preceding exercise assumes that there are an equal number of an observations
in both the good and bad states of the economy. When, however, ones estimates
the threshold delineating the two states endogenously, it is quite possible that one
regime, usually the one representing bad states of the economy, will have a much
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smaller number of observations. To address this possible concern, I repeat the above
state-dependent simulation exercise setting the threshold for the bad state at the
66th percentile of the unemployment rate distribution. See Table 4.15 and Figures
4.6 and 4.7 for the results of this exercise.
When the threshold unemployment rate that distinguishes the states of the econ-
omy is shifted upward, one can see that estimation of the good state multiplier is not
greatly affected by choice of the time trend specification no matter the true data gen-
erating process. When one considers the bad state of the economy, however, usage of
deterministic time trends seems to increase the likelihood of extreme multiplier val-
ues, regardless of the true process. This confirms the empirical findings. Estimating
the multiplier using first differences is not totally immune to this problem, though.
Very large positive and negative values are still fairly likely.
The results of this subsection offer very modest evidence that specifying the local
projections regressions using a deterministic time trend can lead to lower precision
in estimation of the multipliers. Still, it would be inappropriate to assume that
a stochastic trend specification will eliminate this problem. Perhaps due to the
relatively small number of observations, especially when one is splitting the sample,
and the long horizon regressions being relied upon (which places even more pressure
on the data), it could be that, no matter the technique used to estimate the impulse
responses, the results can be very erratic. In the concluding section, I will revisit
what this simulation exercise might mean for the estimation of government spending
multipliers in different states of the world.
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4.4 Conclusion: Does the Specification Matter?
This paper has sought to answer why, for all of the empirical research devoted to
finding if the government spending multiplier is state dependent, there is yet so little
consensus on the issue. Papers that make different specification assumptions across
a number of dimensions come to different findings on the issue. For example, two
of the most well-known papers on the issue, Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012b)
and Ramey and Zubairy (2014), have diametrically opposed conclusions, with the
former finding that the multiplier is very large during recessions and almost zero
during expansions and the latter finding no difference at all in the multiplier for the
two different states of the world. I have estimated over two thousand pairs of good-
and bad-state multipliers in an attempt to see if any particular specification choice
leads to systematically higher or lower estimates.
I find that there some choices that are more likely to result in an extremely high
or low multiplier, such as imposing a deterministic time trend or estimating impulse
responses via the use of generalized impulse response functions. Multipliers tend to
be higher when fiscal shocks are identified using narrative methods or when data from
before World War II are included. One’s choice of the macroeconomic variable that
distinguishes between good and bad states of the world has a clear effect on whether
or not there is a statistically significant difference between the multipliers estimated
for the good state and the bad state. A Monte Carlo exercise seeks to understand
the consequences of how the time trend is specified, and in general it appears that
deterministic time trends lead to more extreme values even when the true data
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generating process is stationary around a deterministic trend, although estimated
one’s regressions in first differences do not solve these problems completely.
This paper shows that using aggregate time series methods to answer this question
leads to serious questions about the robustness of the results to different specifica-
tions. Such a finding argues for using more disaggregated data, such as at the state,
county, or even individual household or firm level so as to draw sharper conclusions
with simpler, more robust techniques. This is the tack taken by such studies as
Nakamura and Steinsson (2014), Fishback, Horrace, and Kantor (2005), or Cohen,
Coval, and Malloy (2011). Future research may do well to continue along these lines,
making use of more data observations and more plausibly exogenous spending shocks
so as to arrive at more precise estimates. Even if aggregate data is used, model av-
eraging methods, such as those employed by Durlauf, Navarro, and Rivers (2014),
may need to be employed.
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Table 4.1: Summary Statistics for State-Dependent Multiplier Estimates
Horizon State Mean Median Std. Dev. Max Min 90th Pct 10th Pct Skewness Kurtosis Normality P-Value
2 Years Good −7.84 0.51 349.74 9443.35 −3676.10 5.34 −2.24 17.71 525.37 < 0.001
2 Years Bad −8.81 0.56 353.94 9624.62 −3868.89 5.87 −4.03 17.85 540.64 < 0.001
4 Years Good −0.54 0.68 345.43 5889.49 −4585.90 7.88 −0.54 3.96 139.90 < 0.001
4 Years Bad −1.20 0.76 349.45 5865.37 −4587.39 10.70 −2.84 3.68 135.19 < 0.001
The table gives summary statistics for all multiplier estimates. Each set includes 1920 estimates.
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Table 4.2: Do Some Specification Choices Lead to “Extreme” Estimates?
Extreme (High or Low) Extremely High Extremely Low
Choice
Deterministic Trend 0.323∗∗∗ 0.146∗∗∗ 0.177∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.013) (0.013)
SVAR Identification −0.223∗∗∗ −0.098∗∗∗ −0.124∗∗∗
(0.015) (0.012) (0.011)
SVAR Identification (w/ Ramey news variable) 0.117∗∗∗ 0.056∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.016) (0.016)
Ramey news variable 0.105∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗ 0.063∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.015) (0.016)
Monetary Policy 0.004 0.013 −0.008
(0.018) (0.014) (0.014)
Exogenous Threshold 0.023 −0.027∗∗ 0.050∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.014) (0.014)
CBO Output Gap 0.042 0.026 0.015
(0.045) (0.034) (0.033)
Beveridge-Nelson Output Gap −0.042 −0.059∗∗∗ 0.016
(0.028) (0.016) (0.024)
Unobserved Component Output Gap 0.027 0.028 −0.001
(0.032) (0.025) (0.023)
Hamilton Output Gap −0.031 −0.047∗∗∗ 0.016
(0.029) (0.018) (0.024)
Bounceback Output Gap 0.009 0.039 −0.030
(0.031) (0.026) (0.020)
Nonlinear Unobserved Component Output Gap 0.009 0.039 −0.030
(0.031) (0.026) (0.020)
Model Averaged Output Gap −0.035 −0.083∗∗∗ 0.048
(0.039) (0.016) (0.037)
The table gives coefficients from a linear probability model regressing an indicator for the two year
good state multiplier being extreme in one of the ways described in the column headings on a dummy
indicator taking on a value of one when the specification choice indicated by the row heading was
used in computing that multiplier. Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard errors
are in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the one, five, and ten percent levels,
respectively.
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Table 4.3: Do Some Specification Choices Lead to “Extreme” Estimates? (ctd.)
Extreme (High or Low) Extremely High Extremely Low
Choice
AAA-10 Year Spread 0.096∗∗∗ −0.013 0.109∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.022) (0.030)
BAA-10 Year Spread 0.003 0.034 −0.030
(0.031) (0.025) (0.020)
BAA-AAA Spread −0.037 −0.007 −0.030
(0.029) (0.022) (0.020)
Unemployment Rate −0.037 0.016 −0.053∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.024) (0.018)
Long Sample 0.038∗∗ 0.142∗∗∗ −0.104∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.014) (0.013)
Jorda` IRF Estimation −0.392∗∗∗ −0.196∗∗∗ −0.196∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.013) (0.013)
Parsimonious Specification 0.008 0.006 0.002
(0.018) (0.014) (0.014)
The table gives coefficients from a linear probability model regressing an indicator for the
two year good state multiplier being extreme in one of the ways described in the column
headings on a dummy indicator taking on a value of one when the specification choice
indicated by the row heading was used in computing that multiplier. Heteroskedasticity
and autocorrelation robust standard errors are in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate
significance at the one, five, and ten percent levels, respectively.
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Table 4.4: Summary Statistics for State-Dependent Multiplier Estimates (Excluding Extreme Values)
Horizon State Mean Median Std. Dev. Max Min 90th Pct 10th Pct Skewness Kurtosis Normality P-Value
2 Years Good 1.02 0.51 1.32 5.34 −2.21 3.24 −0.10 1.28 3.84 < 0.001
2 Years Bad 1.16 0.56 1.55 5.74 −3.97 3.64 −0.28 0.75 3.13 < 0.001
4 Years Good 1.32 0.68 1.51 7.74 −0.53 3.40 0.12 1.80 6.29 < 0.001
4 Years Bad 1.44 0.76 2.04 10.68 −2.84 4.05 −0.52 1.43 6.20 < 0.001
The table gives summary statistics for all multiplier estimates. Each set includes 1536 estimates.
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Table 4.5: Specification Breakdown After Truncation of Multiplier Distribution
Two Years;
Good
Two Years;
Bad
Four Years;
Good
Four Years;
Bad
Choice
Deterministic Trend 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.40
Stochastic Trend 0.60 0.60 0.60 0.60
SVAR Identification (w/o Ramey News Variable) 0.40 0.40 0.39 0.40
SVAR Identification (w/ Ramey News Variable) 0.30 0.31 0.30 0.31
Ramey News Variable 0.30 0.29 0.31 0.29
Monetary Policy 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
No Monetary Policy 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
Exogenous Threshold 0.49 0.49 0.49 0.50
Endogenous Threshold 0.51 0.51 0.51 0.50
CBO Output Gap 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
Beveridge-Nelson Output Gap 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10
Unobserved Component Output Gap 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10
Hamilton Output Gap 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10
Bounceback Output Gap 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10
Nonlinear Unobserved Component Output Gap 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10
Model Averaged Output Gap 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05
AAA-10 Year Spread 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09
BAA-10 Year Spread 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10
BAA-AAA Spread 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10
Unemployment Rate 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10
Long Sample 0.44 0.43 0.46 0.46
Short Sample 0.56 0.57 0.54 0.54
Jorda` IRF Estimation 0.62 0.62 0.60 0.59
GIRF Estimation 0.38 0.38 0.40 0.41
Parsimonious Specification 0.50 0.50 0.51 0.51
Expanded Specification 0.50 0.50 0.49 0.49
The table gives the relative frequency of multipliers computed with each given specification
choice after dropping extreme value multipliers. Relative frequencies may not add to 1 due
to rounding.
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Table 4.6: Effect on Multiplier Estimates (Excluding Extreme Values)
Horizon 2 2 4 4 2 2 4 4
State Good Bad Good Bad Good Bad Good Bad
Regression Univ. Univ. Univ. Univ. Multiv. Multiv. Multiv. Multiv.
Choice
Deterministic Trend 0.023 −0.089 0.120 −0.035 0.572∗∗∗ 0.519∗∗∗ 0.652∗∗∗ 0.573∗∗∗
(0.071) (0.082) (0.082) (0.110) (0.051) (0.063) (0.064) (0.093)
SVAR Identification 0.044 −0.126 −0.141∗ −0.348∗∗∗
(0.071) (0.081) (0.079) (0.103)
SVAR Identification (w/ Ramey news variable) −0.272∗∗∗ 0.067 0.018 −0.040 0.189∗∗∗ 0.539∗∗∗ 0.528∗∗∗ 0.627∗∗∗
(0.070) (0.086) (0.087) (0.109) (0.059) (0.072) (0.074) (0.092)
Ramey news variable 0.221∗∗∗ 0.077 0.140∗ 0.447∗∗∗ 0.497∗∗∗ 0.583∗∗∗ 0.582∗∗∗ 0.946∗∗∗
(0.070) (0.086) (0.081) (0.125) (0.057) (0.075) (0.065) (0.112)
Monetary Policy −0.030 −0.032 −0.040 −0.119 −0.021 −0.019 −0.058 −0.124
(0.068) (0.079) (0.077) (0.104) (0.048) (0.061) (0.056) (0.081)
Exogenous Threshold −0.034 0.037 0.099 −0.005 0.004 0.083 0.119∗∗ 0.088
(0.068) (0.079) (0.077) (0.104) (0.048) (0.061) (0.056) (0.083)
CBO Output Gap −0.477∗∗∗ −0.635∗∗∗ −0.384∗∗∗ −1.056∗∗∗ −0.206 −0.358∗∗ 0.203 −0.348∗
(0.139) (0.160) (0.141) (0.207) (0.157) (0.157) (0.163) (0.208)
Beveridge-Nelson Output Gap 0.008 −0.052 −0.074 −0.091 −0.075 0.087 0.044 0.193
(0.109) (0.128) (0.107) (0.186) (0.097) (0.125) (0.107) (0.164)
Unobserved Component Output Gap 0.229∗ −0.031 0.379∗∗ 0.052 0.216∗∗ 0.048 0.503∗∗∗ 0.197
(0.130) (0.131) (0.156) (0.154) (0.105) (0.112) (0.122) (0.156)
Hamilton Output Gap 0.120 −0.094 −0.002 −0.187 0.046 0.066 0.110 0.124
(0.119) (0.127) (0.112) (0.175) (0.102) (0.112) (0.105) (0.156)
Bounceback Output Gap 0.038 −0.012 0.026 −0.060 0.036 0.074 0.077 0.054
(0.099) (0.135) (0.124) (0.165) (0.087) (0.120) (0.117) (0.174)
Nonlinear Unobserved Component Output Gap 0.076 −0.038 0.255∗ −0.046 0.057 0.058 0.341∗∗∗ 0.145
(0.116) (0.109) (0.146) (0.148) (0.099) (0.101) (0.124) (0.143)
Model Averaged Output Gap −0.137 −0.263 −0.112 −0.946∗∗∗ 0.033 −0.068 0.293∗∗ −0.293∗
(0.138) (0.185) (0.122) (0.207) (0.125) (0.145) (0.145) (0.175)
The table gives coefficients from a regression of the multiplier estimate at the time horizon and for the state of the economy given in
the column heading on a dummy indicator taking on a value of one when the specification choice indicated by the row heading was
used in computing that multiplier. Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard errors are in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗
indicate significance at the one, five, and ten percent levels, respectively.
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Table 4.7: Effect on Multiplier Estimates (Excluding Extreme Values, ctd.)
Horizon 2 2 4 4 2 2 4 4
State Good Bad Good Bad Good Bad Good Bad
Regression Univ. Univ. Univ. Univ. Multiv. Multiv. Multiv. Multiv.
Choice
AAA-10 Year Spread −0.143 0.332∗ 0.181 0.699∗∗∗ −0.001 0.548∗∗∗ 0.385∗∗∗ 0.899∗∗∗
(0.117) (0.183) (0.158) (0.228) (0.108) (0.193) (0.128) (0.201)
BAA-10 Year Spread −0.052 0.198 −0.033 0.563∗∗∗ −0.048 0.378∗∗∗ 0.063 0.749∗∗∗
(0.113) (0.130) (0.142) (0.195) (0.091) (0.137) (0.114) (0.195)
BAA-AAA Spread −0.050 0.300∗∗ −0.300∗∗∗ 0.431∗∗∗ −0.113 0.317∗∗∗ −0.169∗ 0.535∗∗∗
(0.109) (0.126) (0.116) (0.164) (0.091) (0.121) (0.102) (0.174)
Unemployment Rate 0.076 −0.085 −0.145 −0.232∗
(0.105) (0.115) (0.110) (0.127)
Long Sample 0.423∗∗∗ 0.176∗∗ 0.571∗∗∗ 0.802∗∗∗ 0.463∗∗∗ 0.209∗∗∗ 0.578∗∗∗ 0.699∗∗∗
(0.067) (0.078) (0.078) (0.104) (0.050) (0.065) (0.058) (0.090)
Jorda` IRF Estimation −1.733∗∗∗ −1.883∗∗∗ −1.879∗∗∗ −2.198∗∗∗ −1.954∗∗∗ −2.132∗∗∗ −2.125∗∗∗ −2.441∗∗∗
(0.066) (0.075) (0.074) (0.097) (0.060) (0.071) (0.069) (0.095)
Parsimonious Specification −0.119∗ −0.062 0.087 0.161 −0.094∗ −0.053 0.034 0.089
(0.067) (0.079) (0.077) (0.104) (0.048) (0.061) (0.055) (0.080)
The table gives coefficients from a regression of the multiplier estimate at the time horizon and for the state of the economy given in
the column heading on a dummy indicator taking on a value of one when the specification choice indicated by the row heading was
used in computing that multiplier. Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard errors are in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗
indicate significance at the one, five, and ten percent levels, respectively.
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Table 4.8: Effect on Multiplier Estimates (Excluding Extreme Values)
Horizon 2 2 4 4 2 2 4 4
State Good Bad Good Bad Good Bad Good Bad
Regression > 1 > 1 > 1 > 1 < 0 < 0 < 0 < 0
Choice
Deterministic Trend 0.258∗∗∗ 0.251∗∗∗ 0.294∗∗∗ 0.283∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.018 0.028∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) (0.010) (0.013) (0.007) (0.015)
SVAR Identification (w/ Ramey news variable) −0.095∗∗∗ −0.083∗∗∗ −0.060∗∗∗ −0.076∗∗∗ 0.049∗∗∗ 0.020 0.005 0.022
(0.014) (0.019) (0.017) (0.019) (0.013) (0.014) (0.010) (0.017)
Ramey news variable −0.075∗∗∗ −0.095∗∗∗ −0.038∗∗ −0.065∗∗∗ −0.027∗∗∗ −0.025∗ −0.022∗∗∗ −0.006
(0.015) (0.019) (0.018) (0.020) (0.008) (0.013) (0.007) (0.017)
Monetary Policy −0.003 0.004 −0.007 0.000 0.015∗ 0.031∗∗∗ 0.032∗∗∗ 0.029∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.009) (0.011) (0.007) (0.013)
Exogenous Threshold −0.006 −0.009 0.003 −0.021 0.020∗∗ −0.062∗∗∗ 0.011 −0.054∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.009) (0.011) (0.007) (0.013)
CBO Output Gap −0.006 −0.078∗∗ 0.112∗∗ −0.081∗∗ −0.007 0.106∗∗ −0.035∗∗∗ 0.184∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.033) (0.046) (0.037) (0.025) (0.045) (0.011) (0.052)
Beveridge-Nelson Output Gap −0.009 −0.014 0.022 −0.029 0.025 0.035 −0.011 0.093∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.032) (0.027) (0.034) (0.017) (0.023) (0.009) (0.028)
Unobserved Component Output Gap 0.095∗∗∗ 0.013 0.133∗∗∗ 0.000 0.000 0.031 −0.012 0.014
(0.030) (0.032) (0.032) (0.035) (0.014) (0.021) (0.009) (0.022)
Hamilton Output Gap 0.003 −0.031 0.023 −0.053∗ 0.019 0.035 −0.011 0.088∗∗∗
(0.025) (0.029) (0.027) (0.031) (0.016) (0.023) (0.009) (0.028)
Bounceback Output Gap 0.017 −0.016 0.056∗ −0.053 −0.002 0.037∗ 0.002 0.056∗∗
(0.026) (0.032) (0.031) (0.033) (0.013) (0.022) (0.013) (0.025)
Nonlinear Unobserved Component Output Gap 0.082∗∗∗ 0.006 0.113∗∗∗ 0.006 −0.007 −0.007 −0.004 0.019
(0.030) (0.032) (0.032) (0.035) (0.012) (0.017) (0.011) (0.022)
Model Averaged Output Gap 0.049 −0.050 0.118∗∗∗ −0.064∗ 0.027 0.100∗∗ −0.020 0.228∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.035) (0.046) (0.038) (0.030) (0.041) (0.016) (0.049)
The table gives coefficients from a regression of a dummy variable for whether or not the multiplier is significantly greater than 1
(left panel) or below 0 (right panel) at the time horizon and for the state of the economy given in the column heading on a dummy
indicator taking on a value of one when the specification choice indicated by the row heading was used in computing that multiplier.
Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard errors are in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the one, five,
and ten percent levels, respectively.
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Table 4.9: Effect on Multiplier Estimates (Excluding Extreme Values, ctd.)
Horizon 2 2 4 4 2 2 4 4
State Good Bad Good Bad Good Bad Good Bad
Regression > 1 > 1 > 1 > 1 < 0 < 0 < 0 < 0
Choice
AAA-10 Year Spread 0.028 0.195∗∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗ 0.154∗∗∗ 0.005 −0.003 0.012 0.100∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.045) (0.031) (0.044) (0.016) (0.021) (0.016) (0.049)
BAA-10 Year Spread 0.035 0.136∗∗∗ 0.052∗ 0.132∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗ −0.014 0.052∗∗ −0.008
(0.028) (0.041) (0.028) (0.043) (0.024) (0.018) (0.020) (0.021)
BAA-AAA Spread 0.000 0.038 0.002 0.051 0.063∗∗∗ −0.011 0.052∗∗ −0.024
(0.025) (0.036) (0.025) (0.040) (0.021) (0.017) (0.020) (0.018)
Long Sample 0.049∗∗∗ −0.025 0.048∗∗∗ −0.013 −0.070∗∗∗ −0.075∗∗∗ −0.043∗∗∗ −0.124∗∗∗
(0.014) (0.018) (0.015) (0.018) (0.009) (0.010) (0.008) (0.013)
Jorda` IRF Estimation −0.352∗∗∗ −0.288∗∗∗ −0.375∗∗∗ −0.317∗∗∗ 0.051∗∗∗ 0.084∗∗∗ 0.028∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.019) (0.017) (0.018) (0.007) (0.010) (0.005) (0.013)
Parsimonious Specification −0.005 −0.006 −0.030∗∗ −0.005 0.018∗∗ −0.026∗∗ −0.002 0.014
(0.013) (0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.009) (0.011) (0.007) (0.013)
The table gives coefficients from a regression of a dummy variable for whether or not the multiplier is significantly greater than 1
(left panel) or below 0 (right panel) at the time horizon and for the state of the economy given in the column heading on a dummy
indicator taking on a value of one when the specification choice indicated by the row heading was used in computing that multiplier.
Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard errors are in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the one, five,
and ten percent levels, respectively.
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Table 4.10: Summary Statistics for Difference Between State Dependent Multipliers
Horizon Extreme Values Included? Mean Median Std. Dev. Max Min 90th Pct 10th Pct Skewness Kurtosis
2 Years Yes −0.968 0.002 46.933 181.273 −2018.992 1.535 −0.944 −41.459 1782.697
2 Years No 0.191 0.030 0.954 5.653 −5.774 1.467 −0.702 0.663 8.784
4 Years Yes −0.667 0.000 26.203 582.511 −707.087 1.556 −1.872 −8.116 464.373
4 Years No 0.273 0.069 0.945 4.312 −4.909 1.502 −0.626 0.875 7.108
The table gives summary statistics the difference between good and bad state multiplier estimates. Positive
values indicate that the bad state multiplier is larger. When extreme values are included, there are 1920 pairs of
multipliers at each horizon. When extreme values are excluded, there are 1385 multiplier pairs at the two year
horizon and 1253 at the four year horizon.
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Table 4.11: Effect on Difference between Good and Bad State Multiplier Estimates
(Excluding Extreme Values)
2 Years 4 Years
Deterministic Trend −0.085∗ −0.050
(0.048) (0.051)
SVAR Identification (w/ Ramey news variable) 0.295∗∗∗ 0.378∗∗∗
(0.059) (0.063)
Ramey news variable 0.230∗∗∗ 0.287∗∗∗
(0.061) (0.060)
Monetary Policy 0.033 0.026
(0.048) (0.049)
Exogenous Threshold −0.020 −0.096∗
(0.048) (0.050)
CBO Output Gap −0.241∗ −0.185
(0.129) (0.140)
Beveridge-Nelson Output Gap 0.235∗∗∗ 0.221∗∗
(0.091) (0.089)
Unobserved Component Output Gap −0.182∗∗ −0.199∗∗
(0.078) (0.093)
Hamilton Output Gap 0.100 0.111
(0.097) (0.101)
Bounceback Output Gap 0.011 −0.022
(0.089) (0.096)
Nonlinear Unobserved Component Output Gap −0.171∗∗ −0.187∗∗∗
(0.076) (0.092)
Model Averaged Output Gap 0.023 0.045
(0.129) (0.141)
AAA-10 Year Spread 0.809∗∗∗ 0.726∗∗∗
(0.143) (0.147)
BAA-10 Year Spread 0.551∗∗∗ 0.528∗∗∗
(0.092) (0.105)
BAA-AAA Spread 0.424∗∗∗ 0.472∗∗∗
(0.072) (0.087)
Long Sample −0.306∗∗∗ −0.316∗∗∗
(0.052) (0.059)
Jorda` IRF Estimation −0.079∗ 0.024
(0.048) (0.051)
Parsimonious Specification −0.029 −0.067
(0.047) (0.049)
The table gives coefficients from a regression of the difference between the good and bad state
multipliers for the horizon in the column heading on a dummy indicator taking on a value of one
when the specification choice indicated by the row heading was used in computing that multiplier.
Heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation robust standard errors are in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗
indicate significance at the one, five, and ten percent levels, respectively.
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Table 4.12: Coefficient Estimates for DGPs for Monte Carlo Simulation
Deterministic Stochastic
Independent Variable GDP Govt Exp. GDP Govt Exp.
Constant 0.5795∗∗∗ −0.0764 0.0037∗∗∗ 0.0018∗
(0.178) (0.244) (0.001) (0.001)
GDPt−1 1.3076∗∗∗ 0.0599 0.3575∗∗∗ 0.0730
(0.064) (0.088) (0.064) (0.086)
GDPt−2 −0.2594∗∗ −0.0397 0.0892 −0.0208
(0.106) (0.145) (0.069) (0.093)
GDPt−3 −0.1394 −0.0394 −0.0183 −0.0697
(0.109) (0.150) (0.070) (0.094)
GDPt−4 0.0331 0.0478 −0.1245∗ 0.1981∗∗
(0.067) (0.092) (0.065) (0.087)
GovtExpt−1 −0.1107∗∗ 1.0961∗∗∗ −0.1279∗∗∗ 0.1044∗
(0.046) (0.063) (0.046) (0.062)
GovtExpt−2 0.1444∗∗ −0.0744 0.0181 0.0312
(0.070) (0.096) (0.046) (0.061)
GovtExpt−3 −0.0550 0.0691 −0.0521 0.0760
(0.070) (0.096) (0.044) (0.059)
GovtExpt−4 0.0172 −0.1152∗∗ 0.0477 0.0644
(0.040) (0.055) (0.040) (0.053)
Milnewst 0.0360
∗∗ −0.0420∗∗ 0.0371∗∗∗ −0.0364∗
(0.015) (0.020) (0.014) (0.019)
Milnewst−1 −0.0395∗∗ 0.1000∗∗∗ −0.0457∗∗∗ 0.1119∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.023) (0.017) (0.023)
Milnewst−2 0.0331∗ 0.0795∗∗∗ 0.0426∗∗ 0.0773∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.025) (0.018) (0.025)
Milnewst−3 0.0092 0.0942∗∗∗ 0.0080 0.0990∗∗∗
(0.018) (0.024) (0.018) (0.024)
Milnewst−4 0.0173 0.0602 0.0293∗ 0.0612∗∗∗
(0.016) (0.022) (0.017) (0.023)
TimeTrend 0.0004∗∗∗ 0.0000
(0.000) (0.000)
TimeTrend2 −0.0000∗∗ −0.0000
(0.000) (0.000)
The table gives coefficients from regressions of the equation systems given in Equations 4.9 and
4.10. The columns indicate the dependent variables and the trend specifications. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗
indicate significance at the one, five, and ten percent levels, respectively.
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Table 4.13: Distribution of Linear Multiplier Estimates)
DGP Estimation 5% 10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 95%
Deterministic Deterministic −1.36 −0.67 −0.03 0.46 0.89 1.42 2.08
Deterministic Stochastic −1.48 −0.59 0.02 0.50 0.97 1.70 2.32
Stochastic Deterministic −1.43 −0.52 0.14 0.74 1.53 2.66 4.28
Stochastic Stochastic −1.24 −0.42 0.24 0.79 1.42 2.44 3.84
The table gives the multiplier representing the percentile given by the column heading from 500 Monte Carlo simulations generated
by the process indicated in the first column and estimated assuming the process was generated as given by the second column.
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Table 4.14: Distribution of Nonlinear Multiplier Estimates (Median Unemployment Rate Distinguishes States))
DGP Estimation 5% 10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 95%
Good State
Deterministic Deterministic −6.36 −2.12 −0.25 0.45 1.16 3.52 7.89
Deterministic Stochastic −4.53 −1.51 −0.18 0.50 1.31 3.17 6.01
Stochastic Deterministic −7.97 −3.33 −0.24 0.80 2.11 5.20 9.49
Stochastic Stochastic −6.86 −2.35 −0.26 0.81 2.03 5.37 10.40
Bad State
Deterministic Deterministic −9.23 −4.98 −0.80 0.96 3.09 8.49 17.10
Deterministic Stochastic −5.36 −2.35 −0.40 0.41 1.33 2.68 5.50
Stochastic Deterministic −8.69 −3.66 −0.46 0.68 1.81 3.54 5.56
Stochastic Stochastic −5.14 −2.12 −0.14 0.80 2.04 4.09 8.20
The table gives the multiplier representing the percentile given by the column heading from 500 Monte Carlo simulations generated
by the process indicated in the first column and estimated assuming the process was generated as given by the second column. The
“good state” of the economy refers to observations when the lagged unemployment rate is below the median in the sample, while the
“bad state” refers to observations when the lagged unemployment rate is above the median in the sample.
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Table 4.15: Distribution of Nonlinear Multiplier Estimates (67th Percentile of Unemployment Rate Distinguishes
States))
DGP Estimation 5% 10% 25% 50% 75% 90% 95%
Good State
Deterministic Deterministic −3.20 −1.20 −0.27 0.38 1.01 2.25 5.01
Deterministic Stochastic −4.64 −1.40 −0.19 0.38 0.99 2.06 3.27
Stochastic Deterministic −3.64 −1.64 −0.18 0.73 1.63 4.12 7.79
Stochastic Stochastic −3.94 −1.60 −0.10 0.73 1.63 3.38 5.85
Bad State
Deterministic Deterministic −16.98 −8.03 −2.06 1.00 4.16 11.14 21.65
Deterministic Stochastic −7.16 −3.95 −0.70 0.44 2.07 6.25 15.31
Stochastic Deterministic −11.87 −4.38 −0.80 0.64 2.32 7.10 14.26
Stochastic Stochastic −8.66 −3.71 −0.58 0.76 2.22 6.66 15.27
The table gives the multiplier representing the percentile given by the column heading from 500 Monte Carlo simulations generated
by the process indicated in the first column and estimated assuming the process was generated as given by the second column. The
“good state” of the economy refers to observations when the lagged unemployment rate is below the 67th percentile in the sample,
while the “bad state” refers to observations when the lagged unemployment rate is above the 67th percentile in the sample.
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Figure 4.1: Density Plots of State-Dependent Multipliers
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Figure plots density of multiplier estimates for the time horizon and the state of the economy indicated.
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Figure 4.2: Density Plots of State-Dependent Multipliers
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Figure plots density of multiplier estimates for the time horizon and the state of the economy indicated. Multiplier
estimates in the top and bottom ten percentiles of the distribution have been excluded.
144
Figure 4.3: Monte Carlo Simulation, Linear Specification
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Figure plots density of multiplier estimates (not taking into account state depen-
dence) for the for the data generating process and estimation approach indicated.
Multipliers are computed at the two year horizon.
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Figure 4.4: Monte Carlo Simulation, Unemployment Rate below Median Level
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Figure plots density of multiplier estimates (not taking into account state depen-
dence) for the for the data generating process and estimation approach indicated.
Multipliers are computed at the two year horizon. The “good state” refers to obser-
vations when the unemployment rate is below the median in the sample.
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Figure 4.5: Monte Carlo Simulation, Unemployment Rate above Median Level
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Figure plots density of multiplier estimates (not taking into account state depen-
dence) for the for the data generating process and estimation approach indicated.
Multipliers are computed at the two year horizon. The “bad state” refers to obser-
vations when the unemployment rate is above the median in the sample.
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Figure 4.6: Monte Carlo Simulation, Unemployment Rate below 66th Percentile
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Figure plots density of multiplier estimates (not taking into account state depen-
dence) for the for the data generating process and estimation approach indicated.
Multipliers are computed at the two year horizon. The “good state” refers to obser-
vations when the unemployment rate is below the 67th percentile in the sample.
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Figure 4.7: Monte Carlo Simulation, Unemployment Rate above 66th Percentile
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Figure plots density of multiplier estimates (not taking into account state depen-
dence) for the for the data generating process and estimation approach indicated.
Multipliers are computed at the two year horizon. The “bad state” refers to obser-
vations when the unemployment rate is above the 67th percentile in the sample.
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Chapter 5
Local Effects of a Military
Spending Shock: Evidence from
Shipbuilding in the 1930s and
1940s
5.1 Introduction
What are the effects of government purchases on local economies, especially when the
aggregate economy is in a state of weakness? Normally, these effects are summarized
in terms of a “multiplier,” defined as the amount of extra output generated by an
additional dollar of government purchases. One of the benefits of examining fiscal
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multipliers at the local level is that one can observe a larger number of regions, who
are all subject to the same national monetary policy. This is helpful, because poten-
tially endogenous monetary policy changes can confound the estimation of aggregate
government spending multipliers. Knowledge of how purchases affect local economies
can also provide insight into the transmission mechanisms of government spending
on a broader scale. This is because one might expect purchases to impact the areas
in which the funds are directly spent most quickly and powerfully. Spillover effects
can also be important, because positive spillovers to neighboring areas are indicative
of a large multiplier overall, while negative spillovers to neighboring areas suggest
that the government’s activity is merely inducing a reallocation of resources from
one region to another. Another advantage of tackling this question at the local level
is that identification of federal spending shocks might be easier. Especially in a time
of war or the threat of war, it may be more plausible that the federal government is
not increasing spending solely in response to local area conditions.
This paper fills a gap in the literature on the effects of federal government spend-
ing at the local level by exploiting a previously understudied spending episode, the
Vinson-Trammell Act of 1934, which aimed to build the United States Navy up to
treaty limitations imposed at the end of World War I, and was a response to Japanese
naval expansion. Using historical sources, I am able to identify the counties receiving
shipbuilding contracts, and I track the evolution of their economies throughout the
1930s. In particular, I examine the responses of manufacturing output, employment,
and retail sales, among other outcomes. The timing of this act is fortuitous for me, as
the 1930s were a period in which nominal interest rates were pinned to the zero lower
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bound throughout. This is important, because during this period monetary policy
did not react to the fiscal shock with higher interest rates. Christiano, Eichenbaum,
and Rebelo (2011) argue that fiscal multipliers are particularly large when there are
no changes in interest rates to offset fiscal policy. In addition, Kuhn and George
(2014) show that occasionally binding capacity constraints can also produce coun-
tercyclicality of the government spending multiplier. As a point of comparison, I
also examine the local economies of areas building ships for the government during
World War II, when economic capacity was more constrained.
My results show that counties hosting shipyards in 1934 (the year the Vinson-
Trammell Act was passed) experienced relatively greater manufacturing output growth
and relatively greater retail sales growth in the latter part of the decade, compared to
counties not hosting shipyards. In particular, counties that hosted shipyards at the
time of the act’s passage saw an extra 12-13 percentage points of output growth over
the two-year periods from 1935-1937 and 1937-1939, relative to otherwise identical
counties that did not host shipyards. In addition, retail sales growth in these counties
was 3-4 percentage points higher in the latter half of the 1930s. There is evidence
that the naval spending spilled over into neighboring counties, boosting retail sales
growth there as well. At the household level, consumers in shipyard counties spent
more on consumption goods the more they were exposed to the naval spending. This
result holds even when controlling for the household’s income, which is consistent
with the idea that labor supply and consumption were complements in the utility
function. This is important, because Nakamura and Steinsson (2014) demonstrate
that such complementarity could be key to generating an aggregate multiplier greater
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than one. What is more, these effects generally do not hold for the period during
World War II, when shipbuilding activity really ramped up and when capacity con-
straints began to impede the economy. With regard to other economic variables, the
spending did not alter education choices on the extensive margin, but seems to have
had a negative effect on the resources devoted to schooling. The spending by the
government also alters the relative importance of the shipbuilding industry in these
counties, compared to other durable goods industries. These effects are robust to
controlling for the initial level of industrialization in the counties, the percentage of
the area that is classified as “urban,” and for New Deal spending at the county level.
Of course, for the purposes of policy, what is of interest is the actual aggregate
government spending multiplier. One of the drawbacks of conducting the analysis
at the county level is the difficulty of “scaling up” the local results. The results of
this paper are consistent with those of Nakamura and Steinsson (2014), who use a
multi-region DSGE model to translate their local results to an aggregate multiplier.
In the context of their model, the spending shock identified here may have had a
multiplier of around 9. Although this figure is huge, it is also worth considering that
in the depths of the Great Depression, with a vast amount of unused capacity and an
economy relatively closed to trade, it may not be out of the question. I also consider
other means of scaling the multiplier, and these give very different results, however.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 5.2 contains a brief literature
review. In Section 5.3, I discuss my empirical methodology, including background
information on the Vinson-Trammell Act of 1934, my method for identifying ship-
yard locations, the data, and my regression specifications. Results follow in Section
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5.4, and this is followed by an attempt to interpret the baseline local results as an
aggregate government spending multiplier in Section 5.5. Section 5.6 consludes.
5.2 Literature Review
The empirical literature on the output effects of government purchases has grown
rapidly in recent years, as many national and local governments have pursued fiscal
stimulus in an attempt to boost flagging economies. Still, there is little consensus
on whether this spending has been a net positive or if it has rather crowded out
private activity. Most papers have concentrated on aggregate government spending
multipliers, with an offshoot of the literature focusing on whether these output effects
depend on the condition of the economy in the period when the spending hits. See, for
example, Ramey (2011b), Barro and Redlick (2011), Auerbach and Gorodnichenko
(2012b), Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012a), and Auerbach and Gorodnichenko
(2013) among many others. Another substrand of this field has attempted to estimate
government spending multipliers at the local level. In the United States, this has
included multipliers on spending in the fifty states or at county level. In some studies,
the source of the spending is the federal government, while in others, the source of
the spending is the state government.
The literature estimating local government spending multipliers has exploited a
variety of indentification strategies in a handful of settings, and many have found
strong positive effects on local economies, although that is not a uniform conclusion.
Serrato and Wingender (2014) use population revisions after decennial Censuses to
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instrument for federal spending that is a function of county population, and they find
a local income multiplier of 1.57. Nakamura and Steinsson (2014) utilize military
procurement contracts, which indicate the particular U.S. state at the receiving end
of funding, to find an output multiplier of around 1.5. Hooker (1996) undertakes
a similar analysis to find that military spending cuts are particularly harmful to
state economies. Chodorow-Reich et al. (2012) use expansions in Medicaid funding
enacted in 2009 to estimate that for every extra $100,000 in transfers from the federal
government to the states, 3.8 job-years are created, including 3.2 in the private
sector. Shoag (2010) and Shoag (2013) identifies state government spending shocks
generated by windfalls in pension fund returns, and he finds an income multiplier
of 2.12 for the years 1987 to 2008 and a multiplier of 1.43 for the period of the
Great Recession. Fishback and Kachanovskaya (2010) and Fishback, Horrace, and
Kantor (2005) estimate the effect of New Deal grants (instrumented by a number of
political variables) on real per capita income at the state level and retail sales per
capita at the state and county level. They find an income multiplier just above 1
and a positive impact on retail sales for many types of grants. Acconcia, Corsetti,
and Simonelli (2014) use an Italian law which mandates the removal of local councils
upon evidence of Mafia infiltration. Such council dismissals were often associated
with dramatic declines in public investment, so they use dismissals as an instrument
to find a local multiplier of 1.2 and a longer-term multiplier of 1.8 for provinces in
Italy in the 1990s. Hausman (2013) takes a slightly different tack, examining the
impacts of the unexpected early payment of the 1936 Veterans’ Bonus to find that
many bonus recipients quickly went out and spent their windfall.
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Many papers have, however, produced dissenting views on the local effects of
government spending. Fishback and Cullen (2013) demonstrate that World War II
spending at the county level did not influence many economic indicators. Of course,
there are limitations to data availability in this period, and performing any analysis
on the U.S. economy during World War II is necessarily dealing with an economic
environment unlike any other in the nation’s history. Bruckner and Tuladhar (2014)
do not find a local government spending multiplier greater than one when looking at
the effects of central government spending in Japanese prefectures during the 1990s,
although they do find evidence that different kinds of spending produce different
results, as well as stronger effects when local economies are relatively weak. Clemens
and Miran (2012), taking advantage of heterogeneity in the stringency of balanced
budget requirements of U.S. states, find that the multiplier on investment spending
is likely less than one. Finally, Cohen, Coval, and Malloy (2011) use the ascendance
of local representatives to powerful positions on influential congressional committees
as an instrument for federal earmarks, and they find a significantly negative effect
on corporate investment by firms headquartered in those districts. They attribute
this negative impact to the government crowding out private activity.
This paper will take cues from a number of different studies. First, like Naka-
mura and Steinsson (2014), I will estimate the effects of a military spending shock
at the local level. To do so, I will make use of a spending program that has not
been greatly exploited to this point, the Vinson-Trammell Act of 1934, which gen-
erated a significant amount of naval shipbuilding during the Great Depression. The
Depression context differentiates my study from that of Nakamura and Steinsson
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(2014), who only study the period following World War II. I can also study a lower
geographical entity than they can (counties as opposed to states). The Depression
context ties my paper to that of Fishback, Horrace, and Kantor (2005), who also look
at county-level economic outcomes during the Depression. By focusing on the era
of the Great Depression, I am able to offer some insight on the question of whether
government spending is more effective at a time of severe economic weakness. I will
contrast my results from the Vinson-Trammell shipbuilding activity with those deriv-
ing from similar regressions on spending authorized by the United States Maritime
Commission (USMC) during World War II, which tended to take place at a time
when capacity utilization was higher. Also, this paper obtains some inspiration from
Hausman (2013) by seeking information on the effects of this shipbuilding from sev-
eral different sources, including a county level dataset assembled by Fishback et al.
(2011b),1 IPUMS samples from the 1930 and 1940 Censuses,2 the Study of Consumer
Purchases in the United States, 1935-1936, the County and City Data Book [United
States] Consolidated File: County Data, 1947-1977, and a listing of USMC spending
at various shipyards scattered across the country provided by Fischer (1946), as well
as further information on shipyard locations found in Lane (1951) and contemporary
newspaper accounts.
Unlike the work of Chodorow-Reich et al. (2012) or Hausman (2013), I will be
looking at the effects of government purchases, not transfers. Unlike Nakamura and
Steinsson (2014), the purchases that I study take place solely during a period of
1I wish to note that this citation refers to both the paper, “Information and the Impact of
Climate and Weather on Mortality Rates During the Great Depression,” as well as the associated
data set, “Weather, Demography, Economy, and the New Deal at the County Level, 1930-1940.”
2Ruggles et al. (2010).
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severe economic weakness. Unlike Fishback and Kachanovskaya (2010), I will be
able to delve to the county level, as opposed to the state level. Unlike Clemens and
Miran (2012) and Acconcia, Corsetti, and Simonelli (2014), I deal with increases in
government purchases, as opposed to cuts to government investment. Although my
paper is not the first to exploit military shipbuilding in this era (see, for example,
Thornton and Thompson (2001)), I am not aware of any others that explore its wider
effects.
5.3 Empirical Methodology
This section will outline the process for identifying a military spending shock and
estimating its local effects. First, I will describe the Vinson-Trammell Act of 1934.
Then, I will demonstrate how I identify shipyard (and neighboring) counties. The
third subsection will provide information on the various sets of data that I will
employ, and the fourth section will detail the regression specifications.
5.3.1 The Vinson-Trammell Act of 1934
The Washington Naval Treaty was signed in 1922 by representatives of the United
States, the United Kingdom, France, Italy, and Japan.3 The aim of the treaty was to
prevent the sort of arms race that was believed to have contributed to the outbreak of
the First World War nearly a decade earlier. The treaty placed limits on the amount
3The source for much of the information contained in this subsection is Cook (2004), Chapters
3 and 5.
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of tonnage that the signatories’ navies could employ, as well as limits on the types
of weapons that could be carried on naval vessels. In addition, many shipbuilding
programs that were underway in these countries were to be halted and scrapped.
The stipulations of the agreement were extended and reinforced in the London Naval
Treaty signed by the same five powers in 1930.
Throughout the 1920s and the early part of the 1930s, the United States Navy
did not build up to its treaty allowance. Cook (2004) reports that in the ten years
after the initial Washington Naval Treaty, the United States had built more than a
hundred fewer ships than any of the other signatories and a total of zero destroyers.
This inactivity was due partly to greater isolationist and pacifist sentiment and partly
to a lack of political will. President Hoover, for example, staunchly opposed naval
expansion. This was not the case in Japan, which had built its fleet up quickly
with more modern, capable ships. Some in the policy-making establishment, such as
Carl Vinson, a U.S. Senator from Georgia, had begun to get nervous about Japanese
intentions and started to agitate for increased naval spending. In late 1931, Japan
invaded Manchuria, in clear violation of several treaties it had signed, and in 1933, it
announced plans to increase spending on its navy by 25%. These concerns convinced
President Roosevelt “that a longterm building program was essential if the navy were
to keep pace with Japan.” (Cook (2004), p. 87).
What would become the Vinson-Trammell Act of 19344 was introduced by Sena-
tor Vinson in January of 1934 and passed Congress on 20 March 1934, to be signed
by President Roosevelt a week later. The bill authorized the government to build the
4Senator Park Trammell of Florida had authored a competing bill that he eventually dropped
to support Senator Vinson’s.
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Navy up to the country’s treaty allowances. The passage of the Vinson-Trammell
Act also raised expectations of future government spending, as it is listed as an ex-
ogenous spending news shock equal to about 1.5% of GDP in the series constructed
by Owyang, Ramey, and Zubairy (2013) and Ramey and Zubairy (2014).5 Although
there had been some appropriations to naval shipbuilding made as part of the 1932
National Industrial Recovery Act (which appropriations were also pushed by Senator
Vinson with eyes focused on the emerging Japanese threat), the spending that was
anticipated as a result of this bill was much larger. Also, unlike the 1932 bill, the
motivation behind the Vinson-Trammell Act was not economic revitalization.
Opposition to the passage of the bill came mainly from pacifists, who argued
that the supposed Japanese threat was an illusion manufactured by shipbuilders
so as to obtain government contracts. Cook (2004, Chapter 5) offers some specific
examples. Indeed, if that was the case, it would threaten the exogeneity of this
spending. Senator Vinson, the main proponent of the bill seems not to have believed
in this notion. He had been involved in a special audit into aircraft manufacturers
that examined whether they had made “excessive profits” from 1927 to 1933. No
evidence was ultimately found, but the senator was concerned enough to push for
a more formal investigation. On the possibility of the government being exploited
by private firms, Senator Vinson said, “We are not going to stand by and let the
Government be at the mercy of any private company; we are not going to be held
up. If they’re making too much, we’ll put a stop to it,” (Cook (2004), p. 96). In
fact, the bill included a provision limiting profits on shipbuilding contracts to ten
5The passage of the bill is not explicitly mentioned in either of these papers, but its inclusion is
indicated in the narrative of the data series available on Valerie Ramey’s website.
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percent (Lane (1951), p.798). It seems, then, unlikely that this spending program
was implemented so as to benefit shipbuilding firms.
Figure 5.1 shows annual real defense spending for every year from 1929 to 1940.
One can see a distinct jump that occurs in Fiscal Year 1935 (the first year for which
the Vinson-Trammell spending would be occurring). Fiscal 1935 saw a real increase
in defense spending of 26.7% compared to a year earlier. The following year saw a
further 14.2% increase. Average spending for the years from 1935 to 1939, before
the big spending shocks that would be associated with World War II, was 17.81
billion 2009 dollars, a 38.2% increase on average spending for the years from 1929
to 1934, the years before the implementation of the Vinson-Trammell Act. A visual
examination of the time series data for real defense consumption, real nondefense
consumption and current tax receipts suggests that much of this extra spending
for ships was initially financed by allocating funds away from nondefense items and
eventually by higher tax revenues. This interpretation is supported by calculations
of the average marginal tax rate by Barro and Redlick (2011), who show that taxes
were raised in 1934, 1935, and 1936. In any event, because these purchases were
financed at the federal level, one should expect that the shock should be interpreted
as a windfall for the counties hosting shipyards. While the shipyard counties receive
the entirety of the spending, they bear the cost relatively equally compared to other
counties in the country, whether the purchases are financed by a reallocation of
resources or higher taxes.
The first shipbuilding contracts awarded in conjunction with the bill were placed
in August of 1934. According to The New York Times, “plans have nearly all been
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completed so that work can start, not only in private but in government yards,
within a reasonable time.”6 The kinds of ships that Senator Vinson envisioned being
constructed required about three years for completion (Cook (2004), p. 96), so one
might expect that the spending beginning in 1935 and extending into 1936 would
have effects until the end of the decade.
5.3.2 Shipyard Locations
Identifying the locations of shipyards active at the time of the bill’s passage in 1934
will be key to understanding the effects of the spending. Although there is evidence
of further yards opening in the latter half of the 1930s, I exclude these from my
baseline analysis because of concerns that their opening may have been endogenous
to the spending. The central assumption that I will make in my empirical analysis
is that the counties that received the Vinson-Trammell spending did so because
of pre-existing shipbuilding facilities and not because of any other local economic
conditions.
My primary source for identifying shipbuilding locations around the country is the
fifth part of the first chapter of Lane (1951). Further information on yard locations
comes from contemporaneous newspaper sources, such as the article from The New
York Times referenced in Footnote 9. Figure 5.2 displays the geographical county lo-
cations of the identified shipyards, and Table 5.1 gives a listing of the counties. The
identified shipbuilding centers also include counties hosting major steel producing
6The New York Times, “Awards Contracts for 24 Warships,” 23 August 1934.
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facilities owned by the Bethlehem Steel Company, which also owned several ship-
yards. The locations of these facilities are also obtained from Lane (1951). I include
them on the presumption that any economic benefit as a result of this spending
shock accruing to counties hosting Bethlehem shipyards would also be experienced
by counties hosting the steel facilities supplying them. This is the reason for several
inland counties in Pennsylvania being included in the list of shipyard counties.
Since I will also estimate whether the supposed economic benefits spilled over
into neighboring counties, for each identified shipyard county, I gather a list of coun-
ties bordering it or that have strong economic links to it, as defined by the 1991
Contiguous County File.7
From examining the list of shipyard counties and eyeing the associated map, it
is the case that the shipyard counties cluster around urban areas, particularly in the
northeastern part of the country. Cities such as New York, Boston, Philadelphia,
Baltimore, Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Seattle are included,although other major
cities such as Chicago, Detroit, and St. Louis are not. Admittedly, this poses a
concern with regard to whether the effects that I will pick up are not rather due to,
for example, relatively faster growth in urban areas. I will attempt to demonstrate
that this is not the case by controlling for the percentage of each county that is
urban, as well as state fixed effects. On the other hand, none of the shipyards that
were open at the time of the bill’s passage were located in Georgia or Florida, the
home states of the senators for which it is named, which relieves any concern about
spending being allocated for politically motivated reasons.
7ICPSR Data Set 9835, United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census (1992).
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As a comparison, I will also be examining the effects on counties that hosted
USMC shipbuilding activity in the lead-up to and during World War II. I have
detailed data on ships purchased by the USMC from various yards around the country
between 1936 and 1946 from Fischer (1946). I will describe this data source in
greater detail in the next subsection, but at this point, I note that the Fischer
(1946) document lists 62 shipyards from which the USMC purchased ships. Figure
5.3 displays the locations of these yards, and Table 5.2 lists the affected counties.
One will note that there is much greater geographical heterogeneity in this group of
shipyard locations compared to the list of yards active earlier. As with the shipyards
active by 1934, counties that border those receiving USMC contracts are identified
with the help of the 1991 Contiguous County File.
5.3.3 Data
The data used to conduct the analysis in this paper comes from a number of different
sources. The primary dataset is that of Fishback et al. (2011b). This dataset is an
annual county level panel that covers the years from 1930 to 1940. It includes a
large number of variables, of which I will make use of a smaller subset. The data
set includes information on county population in 1930 and 1940 (as well as linearly
interpolated figures for the intervening years). It also has information on the number
of manufacturing establishments, along with the average number of employees at
each establishment, manufacturing output and value added, and wage payments to
manufacturing workers and average earnings. This manufacturing data is available
for the years 1931, 1933, 1935, 1937, and 1939. It also includes retail sales data
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for the years 1933, 1935, and 1939. The manufacturing data I will use as a county
level proxy for output, while the retail sales data will stand in for consumption. The
data set has variables for retail and wholesale employment, wholesale net sales, and
average retail and wholesale earnings for the years 1935 and 1939. Also included is
the number of automobile registrations for the years 1930, 1931, and 1936. Finally,
it has information on the number of tax returns filed in each county for every year
in the sample.
In addition to these series, which will provide the bulk of the outcomes I consider
in the analysis, this data identifies the percentage of each county which is “urban,”
and has an indicator for whether each individual county is located on the Great Lakes
or the Atlantic, Pacific, or Gulf coasts. These will help me to control for the urban
character of each county as well as whether or not it depends greatly on maritime
industries. It also has an interpolated series of New Deal spending for each county.
That is, there is information on total New Deal spending over the course of 1933 to
1939 in each county, and this sum is interpolated into an annual time series using
information on New Deal grants at the state level.
Similar to this data set from Fishback et al. (2011b) is the County and City Data
Book [United States] Consolidated File: County Data, 1947-1977.8 This second set
includes many of the same variables that are found in the above-mentioned dataset
including the number of manufacturing establishments, manufacturing output, man-
ufacturing value added, retail and wholsale sales, retail and wholesale employment,
8ICPSR Data Set 7736, United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census (2012).
165
and automobile registrations. The years covered by this set are those after the Sec-
ond World War (all of the variables listed have an observation between 1947 and
1949), so the value of this information is to see if the USMC shipbuilding activity
benefited recipient counties relative to counties without shipbuilding facilities during
the war. Although it is perilous to estimate effects spanning World War II due to
the unique circumstances surrounding the wartime economy, such as rationing and
greater government intervention, it may be useful to compare the effects of govern-
ment ship purchases in a time of relatively constrained capacity to those when the
economy is in the midst of a depression.
The third source of data to be employed is the Study of Consumer Purchases in
the United States, 1935-1936,9 which was also featured in Hausman (2013). That
paper contains extensive details on this survey, but it is worth noting here that it has
information on where households are located (which I use to map them to shipyard
counties, counties bordering shipyard counties, or counties unrelated to shipyards),
their income, their age, their race, and their expenditures on a large number of items.
The survey was conducted over the course of 1935 and 1936 and is meant to capture
expenditures in the preceding calendar year. There are problems with using this data,
since it is certainly not nationally representative and limited to urban areas, as noted
in Hausman (2013). The time span covered by the survey is at the very start of the
period seeing spending associated with the Vinson-Trammell Act of 1934. Critically,
I am able to identify the extent to which the household’s survey year overlaps with
9ICPSR Data Set 8908, U.S. Dept. of Labor. BLS. Cost of Living Division, U.S. Dept. of
Agriculture. BHE. Economics Division, U.S. Natural Resources Committee. Consumption Research
Staff. Industrial Section, U.S. Central Statistical Board, and U.S. WPA (2009).
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spending on naval vessels by relying on newspaper articles reporting on the awarding
of contracts. This provides crucial identification. Also, among the counties hosting
active shipyards at the time of passage, only New York City and Mobile, Alabama
are represented in this survey, although there are respondents living in a number of
counties bordering shipyard counties. I follow Hausman (2013) in constructing my
categories of consumption expenditure.
Next, I will extract information from the Census of Population for 1930 and
1940 on schooling so that I can estimate whether the spending shocks that I identify
changed individuals’ education choices.10 These files have information on the number
of individuals in each county in various age ranges, including people who are 14 or
15 years old, people who are 16 and 17 years old, and people who are from 18 to 20
years old, as well as the proportion of these people who are in school, for both 1930
and 1940.
From IPUMS 1% samples of the same two censuses, I also get an idea of the
industrial structure of each county.11 Specifically, I tabulate the number of peo-
ple in each county who are employed and calculate the number of employed people
who describe themselves as working in a certain industry. Each worker is classified
into one of 16 major categories, which break down further into 149 subcategories.
Again, I gather this information in both census years to see if the spending associ-
ated with the Vinson-Trammell Act impacted the industrial landscapes in shipyard
10Specifically, I obtain county level census data for 1930 and 1940 from “Historical, Demographic,
Economic, and Social Data: The United States, 1790-1970,” ICPSR Data Set 00003, Interuniversity
Consortium for Political and Social Research (2005).
11I employ 1% IPUMS samples, because 5% samples are not available for 1940, and I wish to
maintain consistency.
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counties, counties bordering shipyard counties, and counties unrelated to shipyards
differentially, a possibility noted in the model of Ramey and Shapiro (1998), where
government purchases tend to incentivize the usage of capital for military production
as opposed to civilian production.
The last bit of data is the list of ships built on United States Maritime Commission
contracts between 1936 and 1946, which comes from Fischer (1946). This document
lists the name and total nominal cost of each ship built in this period, as well as the
name of the firm that built it and its location. Using this file, I can construct the
total amount spent in nominal terms in each locality over the course of this decade.
Unfortunately, this file does not include the specific months or years over which each
ship was built, impeding the possibility of creating a real total cost for each county
or conducting a finer year-by-year analysis using this information. By consulting a
number of contemporary newspaper sources, I can assign a handful of ships to some
particular date using the name of the ship and the yard it was launched from. This
method seems to imply that a majority of the vessels contained in this document
were launched after 1940.12 Since they were built at a time when economic capacity
was beginning to be constrained by the build-up to U.S. entry into World War II (see
12For example, a series of articles from the Daily Boston Globe from July 1939 to November 1940
catalog the launch of most of the vessels built for the USMC (according to the Fischer (1946) file)
in the Boston area, but other articles name other ships in the file as being launched after 1940.
In any event, my identification strategy for the main part of my analysis rests on the shipyards
that were in operation in 1934, when the bill passed. This information comes from Lane (1951)
and some other newspaper sources. Whether the ships built at these yards were done so under
Vinson-Trammell or by the USMC should not be relevant to the question as long as these counties
receive spending solely due to the fact that they hosted shipyards in 1934. It is clear from Lane
(1951) that the expanded program of the USMC caused several new yards to open (in Houston and
Tampa, for example). This will raise problems when looking at the outcomes that span World War
II.
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Gordon and Krenn (2014)), I will seek to use the purchase of these ships to compare
the effects of government ship purchases in times of slack to the analogous effects of
spending when the economy is operating nearer its potential.
5.3.4 Regression Specification
With a varied set of outcomes with differing time observations, it is necessary for me
to estimate a number of different regressions. I will start by considering outcomes
available in the Fishback et al. (2011b) data set. For a number of variables related
to manufacturing, which have observations on the years 1931, 1933, 1935, 1937, and
1939, I estimate
∆Yit = α + β1Shipyard1934,i + β2BordersShipyard1934,i +
1939∑
t=1935
δtI(Y ear = t)
+
1939∑
t=1935
γ1,tShipyard1934,i ∗ I(Y ear = t) +
1939∑
t=1935
γ2,tBordersShipyard1934,i ∗ I(Y ear = t)
+X ′iΩ + ηit ,
(5.1)
where ∆Yit is the two-year growth rate in some manufacturing variable, such as real
manufacturing output or the number of manufacturing establishments, Shipyard1934,i
is a dummy indicator for whether or not county i hosted a shipyard at the time of
passage of the Vinson-Trammell Act of 1934, BordersShipyard1934,i is a dummy
variable indicating whether county i bordered a county with a shipyard in 1934,13
I(Year=t) is a series of dummies that stand in for time fixed effects and proceed
13In cases where a county hosted a shipyard and bordered another county also hosting a shipyard,
I coded the BordersShipyard1934 variable to be 0.
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in two-year intervals, and Xi is a vector of control variables including state fixed
effects, a dummy for whether the county is located on a coast, and whether the
county is relatively industrialized or urban.14 “Relatively industrialized” means that
its percentage of the population employed in manufacturing before passage of the
bill is greater than the national average in that year.15 For a county’s relative ur-
ban nature, I control for the percentage of the county considered urban in 1930.
With several of these variables being invariant over time, including the Shipyard1934,i
and BordersShipyard1934,i variables, county fixed effects would lead to identification
problems. At the same time, however, state fixed effects help control for the possi-
bility that relative strength or weakness of balanced budget rules at the state level
confound the results. When conducting the regression analysis, I first exclude the
top and bottom percentiles of the dependent variable so as to remove outliers. Then,
because I am interested in running this regression on a balanced panel, I drop any
county’s observations if it is missing data for any year in the sample.16
It is worthwhile to take a moment to consider how to interpret the coefficients
from this regression. The coefficient on the term Shipyard1934,i is identified only by
variation in the first two-year interval. Thus, one can read this coefficient as the
difference between the growth rates for shipyard counties and non-shipyard counties
for the years between 1931 and 1933, i.e. before the spending shock took place. The
14Given the heavy northeastern concentration of the shipyards, one might think that region fixed
effects would be more appropriate than state fixed effects, but inclusion of Census Bureau Region
or Division fixed effects did not impact the results.
15Effectively, this means the share of the population employed in manufacturing in 1933 must be
above the national average.
16The results are entirely robust to including large observations of the dependent variable and
allowing the panel to be unbalanced.
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coefficients on the three interactions between Shipyard1934,i and the fixed effects for
the intervals from 1933 to 1935, 1935 to 1937, and 1937 to 1939 are read as the
difference between the growth rates for shipyard and non-shipyard counties for these
respective time periods, holding everything else equal. An analogous interpretation
holds for all terms with the BordersShipyard1934,i variable. In a sense, one can
read this regression as a sort of disaggregated difference-in-difference specification.17
Because I do not have reliable data on where exactly among the shipyard counties
the spending was allocated, I use dummy variables in the regression. Thus, one can
interpret the effects that I uncover as an “Intention to Treat” (ITT) effect.
One possible threat to identification is that the shipbuilding industry was well
placed for a return to health after a particularly nasty few years at the beginning
of the Great Depression. It is hard to rule this idea out entirely, due to the relative
paucity of data before the act’s passage. I can show that when I only look at the
observations on manufacturing up to the year 1933, there is little evidence that
counties with shipyards were performing statistically differently from other counties.
As an attempt to refute this “mean-reversion” story, I also run regressions on pre-
1934 data only for the outcomes for which it is available. I also pursue an alternative
route using a “propensity score”-type of methodology.
A further robustness check includes a variable that captures the change in or
the level of New Deal spending for each year for which I have manufacturing data. I
define New Deal spending per county as the sum of grants and loans from a number of
17When a more conventional difference-in-differences specification is employed, the results are
broadly similar, but I cannot observe the detailed changes over time.
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programs, for which information is available in the Fishback et al. (2011b) data set.18
There is no annual data at the county level for New Deal spending. Fishback et al.
(2011a) interpolate a county-level series for this type of aid by using the total amount
of New Deal spending over the 1930s at the county level and state-level year-by-year
fluctuations. New Deal spending is likely to be endogenous as the explicit purpose of
the program was to help the economy emerge from the Depression. With this in mind,
I follow Fishback, Horrace, and Kantor (2005) by employing a set of instruments in a
Two-Stage Least Squares framework. As in that paper, my instruments for New Deal
spending are the standard deviation of the share of the vote going to the Democratic
Party in presidential elections from 1896 to 1928, voter turnout in the 1928 election,
the log of the area (in square miles) of the county, the latitude and longitude of its
county seat, and the share of the population that belonged to a church in 1926. It
is not clear ex ante whether New Deal spending should enter the regression in log
levels or in growth rates, so I try both specifications.
The next set of variables that I am interested in are those pertaining to con-
sumption, such as retail sales data. These variables are only available in the years
1933, 1935, and 1939, necessitating a somewhat simpler specification. The associated
18This includes Reconstruction Finance Corporation loans, Disaster Loan Corporation loans,
Public Works Administration Nonfederal loans, United States Housing Authority loan contracts,
Farm Credit Administration loans, Farm Security Administration Rural Rehabilitation loans, Farm
Security Administration Tenant Purchase loans, Rural Electrification loans, Home Owners Loan
Corporation loans, Federal Housing Administration Title 1 insured loans, Federal Housing Ad-
ministration Title 2 insured loans, Agricultural Adjustment Administration grants, Farm Security
Administration Rural Rehabilitation grants, Public Roads Administration completed grants, Public
Works Administration Nonfederal grants, Public Works Administration federal grants, Public Build-
ing Administration grants, Works Progress Administration grants, other works program grants, So-
cial Security Administration grants, United States Housing Authority Public House grants, Federal
Emergency Relief Administration grants, and Civil Works Administration grants.
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regression equation that I estimate is
∆Yit = α + β1Shipyard1934,i + β2BordersShipyard1934,i + δI(Y ear = 1939)
+ γ1Shipyard1934,i ∗ I(Y ear = 1939) + γ2BordersShipyard1934,i ∗ I(Y ear = 1939)
+X ′iΩ + ηit ,
(5.2)
where here, ∆Yit is the average annual growth rate since the last observation.
19
I(Y ear = 1939) is an indicator variable for observations in 1939, and the coefficient
on its interaction term with either the shipyard dummy variable or the shipyard
border dummy variable is the coefficient of interest. These four years that follow
1935 are the only information I have on the possibly differential behavior of retail
sales after the passage of the Vinson-Trammell Act. Like with the manufacturing
outcomes, I drop the top and bottom percentiles of the distribution of the dependent
variable and then also any counties missing data for one of the three years that in
which I have observations.
There are also several variables that only have observations in the years 1935
and 1939, including retail earnings, retail employment, wholesale earnings, wholesale
employment, and wholesale net sales. For these, the regression specification is yet
simpler, written as
∆Yi = α + β1Shipyard1934,i + β2BordersShipyard1934,i +X
′
iΩ + ηi . (5.3)
Now, the coefficients that I am interested in are those on the Shipyard1934,i and
19That is, for observations in 1935, ∆Yit =
ln(Y1935)−ln(Y1933)
2 , and for observations in 1939,
∆Yit =
ln(Y1939)−ln(Y1935)
4 .
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BordersShipyard1934,i variables themselves, as I simply have a cross-sectional re-
gression in differences. The dependent variables in this set of regressions are speci-
fied as ln(Yi,1939) − ln(Yi,1935). As with the previous two sets of regressions, outlier
observations are excluded from the regression, as well as (necessarily) any counties
that are missing data for either of the two years considered.
To place my results from this series of regressions in context and to get some kind
of an idea as to whether the results are different when the economy moves from the
very slack Great Depression period to the highly constrained World War II period, I
follow in the spirit of Fishback and Cullen (2013) by regressing another set of equa-
tions that are essentially identical in form to those in Equation 5.3, with the essential
difference being that the dependent variable measures the growth rate of some indica-
tor, such as population, manufacturing establishments, manufacturing value added,
sales or employment in the retail or wholesale sectors, or auto registrations, over a
time period spanning World War II. For example, for most of the listed variables, I
have an observation in 1933 or 1935 (before the passage of the spending bill or just
as the spending was being implemented) and an observation in some post-war year,
like 1947, 1948, or 1954. I will test the hypothesis that the growth rate in these
variables is greater in countries that hosted a shipyard by 1934. In addition, since I
have a clearer idea on the actual allocation of World War II spending on shipbuilding
from the Fischer (1946) data, I can run a very similar regression, specified as
∆Yi = α + β1ShipyardUSMC,i + β2BordersShipyardUSMC,i +X
′
iΩ + ηi , (5.4)
where now ShipyardUSMC,i and BordersShipyardUSMC,i are dummy variables indi-
cating that the given county hosted or bordered, respectively, a shipyard receiving
174
USMC contracts. Because I have data on how much was spent at each shipyard (at
least in nominal terms), a sister regression to Equation 5.4 that estimates the effects
of the government purchases on the intensive margin would be
∆Yi = α + β1ShipSpendingHost,i + β2ShipSpendingBorder,i +X
′
iΩ + ηi . (5.5)
In this equation, ShipSpendingHost,i gives the log of nominal spending on ships by
the USMC in that county. ShipSpendingBorder,i gives the log of total spending in all
counties bordering county i.
To investigate the effects of the Vinson-Trammell Act on other economic out-
comes, such as the proportion of children from various age groups in school or the
change in the percentage of the employed workforce working in a particular industry,
the specification used is that in Equation 5.3 and the dependent variables are the
change in the variable of interest (all of which come from Census data) between 1930
and 1940.
Finally, I run regressions based on the 1935-1936 Consumer Survey. I exploit
variation in the residence of the respondents (i.e., whether they live in a county
hosting a shipyard or not), as well as in the extent to which the schedule year
the household reports on overlaps with the initial burst of spending. Specifically, I
estimate an equation of the form,
Yi = α + β1Shipyard1934,i + β2BordersShipyard1934,i + β3Overlapi
+ β4Shipyard1934,i ∗Overlapi + β5BordersShipyard1934,i ∗Overlapi
+X ′iΩ + ηi .
(5.6)
175
Here, as before Shipyard1934,i and BordersShipyard1934,i refer to whether the re-
spondent household lives in a county hosting a shipyard or one of its bordering
counties, respectively. Yi denotes dollars spent in the past twelve months on some
consumption category. To construct the variable Overlapi, I take the difference be-
tween the end of the survey year for household i and the date when the first set of
contracts were awarded as part of the Vinson-Trammell Act of 1934, which, according
to The New York Times20, was 22 August 1934. This variable is measured in days.
The assumption underlying this variable’s construction is the following. The article
referred to makes plain that this set of contracts awarded was the first associated
with the new navy spending and that building would start “promptly.” Therefore, if
the household is reporting on consumption before this date, then that consumption
occurred without knowing when or where the new spending would be taking place.
Also, the article alludes to the fact that more contracts would be awarded later, so
to the extent that the household’s consumption year moves further from this date,
the more one might expect it to be influenced by the government spending. By in-
teracting this variable with whether or not the household lives in a county hosting
a shipyard or near a shipyard, I can examine the differential effect experienced by
households in shipyard counties exposed to greater amounts of spending relative to
those who do not live in shipyard counties and those who live in shipyard counties
but are exposed to smaller amounts of government spending. Following Ozer-Balli
and Sørensen (2013), I demean the Overlapi variable in the interaction term. Xi is
a vector of controls that include the age and age squared of the husband and wife
in the household, a dummy for whether the head of household is not white, and the
20The New York Times, “Awards Contracts for 24 Warships,” 23 August 1934.
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household’s income.21
5.4 Results
Before discussing the results, I report summary statistics on a number of key out-
comes that I will be examining in Table 5.3. The table shows that there was consid-
erable variation in these dependent variables, with many of the standard deviations
in growth rates far above the mean values. This is to be expected, given that the
sample period that I examine is one of the more volatile economic episodes in the
history of the modern United States. The table also illustrates the attractiveness of
winsorizing the data, given the substantial outliers on both the high and low ends of
the distributions. Next, I report the results of the regression analysis.
5.4.1 Results on Fishback et al. (2011b) Data
The data set constructed by Fishback et al. (2011b) contains a large number of
variables that are of interest for this study. I will start by examining outcomes
related to the manufacturing industry, for which the data has some of the best
detail. Following that, I will consider retail sales outcomes, for which the analysis
resembles a more conventional difference-in-differences framework, and conclude this
subsection with a treatment of a number of miscellaneous outcomes.
21The regression results are robust to the exclusion of the income term.
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5.4.1.1 Manufacturing Outcomes
I start by examining the results on growth in manufacturing output and manufac-
turing value added. Plots of the coefficients are found in Figures 5.4 and 5.6. These
regressions come from a specification of the regression with a full set of control
variables, excluding New Deal grants and loans. Results from a regression without
controls are very similar. From the plot, one can see that manufacturing output in
counties with shipyards grew over thirteen faster in the two years to 1937 than they
otherwise would have been expected to. This difference is significant at the one per-
cent confidence level. This is followed by growth of nearly identical magnitude and
significance in the following two year period to 1939. The figure for manufacturing
value added tells a very similar story. For neither outcome do I see significant effects
in bordering counties. The sum of the extra growth in shipyard counties between
1933 and 1939 is 32%, with an associated p-value of 0.053. If I only consider the
extra growth from 1935 to 1939, the sum is 28%, significant at the one percent level.
No significant effects are seen for border counties in Figures 5.5 or 5.7.
The results of these regressions imply that the effects of the spending on local
economies’ manufacturing output and value added were extremely large. This is
interesting in light of the fact that the entire economy was in a very dire state at
the time the spending bill was passed. By including time fixed effects, I am able
to disentangle the effects of spending on the treated counties from a more general
tendency on the part of the entire United States to recover from the trough of the
Depression. It is also interesting that there seems to have been no significant effect
on the manufacturing output of nearby counties, although the signs of the coefficients
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are positive (in the latter part of the decade). At least with regard to areas in very
close proximity, it is not apparent that the large output increases in shipyard counties
drew resources away from their neighbors. Below, I will consider how these effects on
output and value added may have also had an impact on employment, consumption,
and other variables.
Table 5.4 contains estimates from a battery of robustness checks applied to the
baseline regressions for manufacturing output. The first concern is that concurrent
with this increased spending on warships was the New Deal spending program insti-
tuted by the Roosevelt Administration. Many of the programs associated with the
New Deal were transfer payments, loans, and subsidies (not, as in the case of the
Vinson-Trammell Act studied here, purchases of goods and services. In any event,
it is beyond the scope of this paper to evaluate the effectiveness of the New Deal in
stimulating economic activity. My only concern is that, for some reason, New Deal
spending may have been systematically allocated to areas also likely to have ship-
yards. It is not clear, ex ante, whether when controlling for New Deal spending, the
spending should be specified in log levels or in log differences, especially considering
the biannual nature of my observations on manufacturing variables.22 Therefore, I
try both specifications, as well as one that controls for the sum of New Deal spending
over the two year interval. What is clear is that New Deal spending is endogenous, as
it was allocated to areas suffering from weaker economic activity. I follow Fishback,
Horrace, and Kantor (2005) then in using an instrumental variables approach. The
22Specifying the New Deal spending in log levels seems to be the more natural approach, given
the temporary nature of the programs, but this risks throwing out information on spending that
took place in the intervening year.
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instrument set for total New Deal grants and loans is that described in Section 5.3.4,
as well as state fixed effects.
The first column of Table 5.4 contains the baseline specification already reported.
The next three columns demonstrate that the inclusion of New Deal grants and loans
do not qualitatively affect the results, and in the case where New Deal spending is
specified in levels (over intervals of one or two years), the results do not change very
much at all. Thus, I can conclude that the positive effects on manufacturing output
that I am finding are due to the shipbuilding program and not to simultaneous New
Deal payments.
In the baseline estimation, standard errors are clustered at the state level and I
use state fixed effects. The next two columns of Table 5.4 consider whether or not
the baseline findings are senstive to these specification choices. The fifth column of
the table demonstrates that clustering the standard errors at county, rather than
state, level leaves the point estimates unaltered and the significance levels nearly so.
The same outcome is the case when regional fixed effects are substituted for state
fixed effects. One may be concerned that the heavy Northeastern concentration of
the shipyards still operating in 1934 is partly driving the estimated effects, but it is
clear that this is not an issue.
A reasonable question to ask is whether it is not the case that counties that
are home to shipyards are not in some respect fundamentally different from other
counties. That is, it may not be appropriate to pool these relatively urban, highly
industrialized areas with more rural, sparsely populated local economies. In an
effort to address this concern, I undertake the following exercise, which is similar
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to a propensity score-type analysis. I first run a cross-sectional regression, in which
the dependent variable is the presence of a shipyard in 1934 and the independent
variables are state fixed effects, location on a coast, the percentage of the county that
is urban, and whether or not it is highly industrialized. I then sort the counties by
the fitted values from this regression and limit the sample to only the top 25% by this
“propensity score.” I then rerun the baseline regression on this smaller, theoretically
more homogeneous sample. The results are in the seventh column of Table 5.4 (the
one labeled “Propensity Score 1”), where it is apparent that even among like counties,
those hosting shipyards see significantly faster growth in the latter part of the 1930s.
I conduct a further robustness check by examining whether counties with heavy
concentrations in other industries see a similar time path of output and retail sales
over the 1930s. The results of this experiment can be found in Tables 5.5. To make
the regressions in this experiment comparable to those evaluating the outcomes of
shipyard counties, I exploit the fact that the Fishback et al. (2011b) data set gives
the number of employees in a variety of industries as of 1930. I divide the workforce
in each industry by the population in the county and then rank each county by the
industry’s share of the population. Because I have 26 shipyard counties, I code the
top 26 counties in each industry with a dummy variable indicating them as having
a heavy concentration of that industry. Then, I repeat the regression of Equations
5.1 replacing the Shipyard1934 dummy variables with the dummy variables for each
of the industries that I consider. One can interpret these as a sort of placebo test.
It is not obvious that any of these industries were explicitly subject to a government
spending shock, so, on balance, there should not be any significant difference in
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output. At the least, they should have sequences different from those of shipyards.
Table 5.5 gives the results for the output growth regressions. As can be seen in the
table, for many industries, the effect is insignificant in all three years considered. No
industry sees a pattern that matches the trajectory of shipyards exactly (with large
significant increases in the last two biannual periods in the decades). Even those that
do see significant increases tend to be those that would be related to shipbuilding,
such as iron, lumber, and rubber.23 Thus, it is clear that shipyard counties see a
unique combination of effects on output and retail sales that I conclude is due to the
sizable shock to demand emanating from the government starting in 1934 and 1935.
The number of treated counties is relatively small, and this might produce worries
that the results are driven by particularly large responses in one or two shipyard
counties. In Table 5.6, I attempt to address this concern by dropping individual
shipyard counties, one by one, from the regression equation. Each column in the
table reports the coefficient on Shipyard1934,i interacted with the fixed effect for the
indicated year. From the table, it is clear that the results are robust to dropping any
one individual shipyard county from the sample.
Before moving on to other outcomes, it may be important to demonstrate that
the results found so far are not due to mean reversion. That is, I would like to
argue against the notion that the positive effects on manufacturing and consumption
reported above are due solely to the natural recovery of the shipbuilding industry and
23One surprising result of this exercise is the really poor performance seen by counties for whom
cotton was an important industry. This is likely due to policies associated with the Agricultural
Adjustment Act of the New Deal, which incentivized farmers not to plant and may have had very
negative effects on other industries in those counties as well.
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its environs. To be sure, this is an extremely difficult story to rule out, especially
considering the relative paucity of data available to me before the passage of the
Vinson-Trammell Act. I do attempt to argue against this explanation in a couple of
different ways. Table 5.7 gives the results from regressions including only data before
1934.24 For most of the outcomes under consideration, this reduces to the two-year
period from 1931 to 1933, although for manufacturing employment and retail sales
per capita, I can also include the two-year period from 1929 to 1931. The table shows
that there is only weak evidence (seen in coefficients significant at the ten percent
level for manufacturing value added and wage payments) that shipyard counties were
doing especially badly before the passage of the bill. This is inconsistent with the
idea that they were subsequently “due” for a stronger-than-average recovery.
In the last column of Table 5.4, I conduct another propensity score-type analysis,
in which I include, along with the variables mentioned above, the manufacturing
output growth rate from 1931 to 1933. In this way, I hope to limit the sample not only
to counties similar to shipyard counties in terms of their demographic and structural
characteristics, but also to those that had a similar experience economically in the last
observed two-year period wholly previous to the passage of the bill. In this regression,
it is clear that the signs and magnitudes of all of the coefficients are roughly the same
as in the baseline estimation, but the significance is weakened somewhat, especially
for the two years from 1935 to 1937. Still, manufacturing output in shipyard counties
grew nearly 12% faster than in other counties (significant at a confidence level of five
24As can be very clearly seen from the table, I include all of the outcomes that I am considering
in this section of the paper, although the main results on these outcomes will be discussed formally
below.
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percent) from 1937 to 1939, even when limiting the sample to areas that had similar
economic dynamics leading up to the authorization of the spending program.
I turn now to results on some other manufacturing outcomes. Looking at total
manufacturing employment in Figure 5.8 and Figure 5.9, the point estimates on the
three post-1934 interaction terms are all positive, but they are imprecisely estimated.
The p-values on the interaction terms with the 1935 and 1937 fixed effects range
from 0.11 to 0.15 for shipyard counties. There is no significant effect on bordering
counties. It is interesting that output should be so positively effected, while the effect
on employment is more muted. I will use the next series of graphs to try to untangle
why this is so.
Figures 5.10 and 5.11 illustrate that total wage payments by manufacturers were
positively affected by the spending in shipyard counties. Again, no significant effect
is discernible in bordering counties. The magnitude of the effect on wage payments
is similar to that on manufacturing output, and all three post-1934 interaction terms
are significant at the fiver percent level. When I look at the results for average
earnings per manufacturing employee (Figures 5.12 and 5.13), I can see that the
post-1934 interaction terms all have positive point estimates. In bordering counties,
this positive estimate is statistically significant for 1935, and for shipyard counties,
it is significant for 1939. Therefore, the significant effect on wage payments that I
observe must be due to some combination of firms hiring more workers and paying
their existing workers more.
Figures 5.14 provides an additional layer of detail. Here, one can see that the
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effect of the spending bill on manufacturing establishments was negative. This neg-
ative impact is significant at the ten percent level in the two year period to 1935 and
has a p-value of about 0.11 in the two year period to 1937. This decline in the number
of manufacturing firms is accompanied by a rise in the average number of employees
per firm that is strongly significant (see Figure 5.16). Additionally, one can see from
Figure 5.18 that manufacturing output per worker also grew significantly faster in
shipyard counties than elsewhere from 1937 to 1939 (again, with little significant
impact on border counties).
Therefore, the data reveals a story in which the spending on ships has a negative
impact on the number of firms, possibly through higher wages, while surviving firms
are larger and more productive (at least with regards to labor productivity). The
increased hiring of the existing firms is offset by a decline in the number of firms,
muddying the effect on total employment. The result seems to be modestly higher
employment with modestly higher earnings per worker, causing a rise in total wage
payments and having a negative impact on the number of establishments. Although
a detailed examination of the effect of this aggregate demand shock on the industrial
organization of the affected counties is beyond the scope of this paper, these firm
distribution dynamics are interesting and merit further research.25
25Kehrig (2015), for example, builds a model intended to explain the observation that in reces-
sions, dispersion in productivity among firms becomes greater as all firms, even productive ones,
use resources less efficiently. As a result of the (positive) shock I study, the number of firms declines
and the survivors use more labor more efficiently, so it appears, at first glance, that these results
are consistent with the model of Kehrig (2015).
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5.4.1.2 Retail Sales Outcomes
My results suggest an increase in employment in shipyard counties. If I see an increase
in consumption as well, this finding would be consistent with the assumption of
nonseparable preferences, such as complementarity between consumption and labor.
Although I do not have data on consumption at the county level for this period, I
do have evidence on retail sales. Retail sales are by no means a perfect proxy for
consumption, but they have been used for this purpose in previous studies, such
as Ostergaard, Sørensen, and Yosha (2002), Fishback, Horrace, and Kantor (2005),
Shoag (2010), and Romer and Romer (2014). The results from estimating Equation
5.2 can be found in Table 5.8.
The table shows a positive impact of a shipyard’s presence on retail sales growth
in a county.26 The coefficient on the Shipyard1934,i dummy variable is 0.038, and is
significant at the one percent confidence level. What is more, this positive effect on
retail sales also spilled over into bordering counties, where the coefficient is 0.045
and is also significant at the one percent level. This is an interesting result in
that an aggregate fiscal multiplier greater than unity should involve positive effects
even outside the area that directly receives the spending. This is also found in the
international context of Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2013b). These results also
hold up in an instrumental variables regression that includes New Deal spending
(see the additional columns in Table 5.8) and when shipyard counties are dropped
from the regression on an individual basis (see the results reported in Table 5.10.
26The results for per-capita retail sales growth, data for which are present in Fishback et al.
(2011b), are very similar.
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In addition, when I consider counties with high concentrations in other industries,
for very few of them does the same pattern emerge (see Table 5.9). Therefore,
the data reveals the complementarity between labor and consumption implied by
nonseparable preferences and necessary for the large aggregate multiplier suggested
by the Nakamura and Steinsson (2014) model. This is important not least because
they are not able to explicitly test for this complementarity since they do not have
reliable consumption data. In this sense, my results support those of Nakamura
and Steinsson (2014) by estimating results for output that are similar to theirs and
providing direct evidence for nonseparable preferences, an assumption critical to their
model.
5.4.1.3 Miscellaneous Outcomes
Further evidence on the effects on local economic activity can be seen in the regression
results on Equation 5.3 reported in Table 5.11. These include the effects on outcomes
including wholesale employment, earnings, and net sales, as well as employment and
earnings in the retail sector. The period covered by these regressions is from 1935 to
1939, so that these are simple cross-sectional regressions. Here, it is clear that growth
in wholesale and retail employment was much slower in shipyard counties than in like
counties without shipyards. In particular, retail employment grew six percent slower,
significant at the 5% level. This suggests some crowding out within these counties,
as workers gravitated toward the manufacturing work stimulated by the shipbuilding
program, and it is consistent with a story in which sectoral shifts took place in the
local economies, like in the model of Ramey and Shapiro (1998). In addition, when
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I instrument for the change in New Deal spending at the county level, it turns out
that retail earnings growth was itself much slower in these counties. These results
are a bit puzzling, especially in light of the fact that both manufacturing output and
retail sales were concurrently growing so fast in shipyard counties.
5.4.2 Results from Census Data
I now turn to results based on Census data. All of the regressions reported below
take the form of Equation 5.3, and the results are contained in Table 5.12. I note
first that none of the dependent variables for which results are reported above are
in per capita terms, but rather show the growth rate in aggregate quantities. This
is because, for the intercensal years, I only have population data that is arrived at
via straight-line interpolation between the 1930 and 1940 values. The first line in
Table 5.12 illustrates that the significant effects found above are not due merely to an
influx of people to shipyard counties, as these counties see no significant difference in
their population growth relative to other counties. Border counties, however, do see
significantly faster growth over the decade.27 Despite this, for example, retail sales
growth per capita in counties neighboring shipyards is still significantly greater than
in counties not located near shipyards, assuaging some concerns about population
inflows confounding the results. Still, it is interesting that, as a result of the spending,
there is a reallocation of resources, although not to the directly affected areas. To
my knowledge, this is the first paper that uncovers such a result.
27I also run a specification of this regression in which I control for population growth from 1920
to 1930 in order to take account of long run trends in migration, but these do not affect the results
at all.
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Also from census data, I can estimate the impact of the shipbuilding spending
on educational choices in the county. Recent research by Charles, Hurst, and No-
towidigdo (2014) suggests that speculative housing price booms prior to the Great
Recession altered the opportunity cost calculations of marginal college students, lead-
ing more of them to foresake the pursuit of an advanced degree. Gupta (2015) also
finds that macroeconomic policies can have unintended consequences on education
choices. I can use data on the proportion of 14-15 year-olds, 16-17 year-olds, and
18-20 year-olds who are enrolled in school to see if a similar dynamic is at play in this
context. The intuition is that greater economic activity resulting from the spending
on ships (captured by the higher employment and wages seen in Figures 5.12 and
5.8, may have raised the opportunity cost of staying in school, leading to a drop in
enrollment. On the other hand, if the boom in shipbuilding stabilized the earnings
of heads of households, it is possible that it may have relieved the pressure on ado-
lescents to seek work. The second three lines of Table 5.12 show that neither of these
effects makes itself evident in this context, as there are no significants effects on the
proportion of the variously aged groups in school. This would support the notion
that agents operating in the 1930s viewed education as an investment (rather than
as consumption), which should not be affected by short run fluctuations in income.
Finally, I examine whether this new spending on ships had any impact on the
industrial structure of the counties hosting shipyards, such as whether it made the
shipbuilding industry relatively more important to counties that hosted shipyards.
This is motivated in part by the model of Ramey and Shapiro (1998), who develop a
neoclassical model of government spending, in which the spending is sector-specific
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(as is the case in the spending I study), and it is costly to reallocate capital from
one sector to the other. To the extent that there are frictions impeding the mobility
of capital, their model offers differing predictions on the paths of such indicators
as consumption and real interest rates. To answer this question, I calculate the
proportion of employed workers indicated to be working in various sectors of the
economy from the 1930 and 1940 Censuses, and I look to see if the relative change
in counties with shipyards or their neighbors is greater than elsewhere. In the model
of Ramey and Shapiro (1998), labor is perfectly flexible, so relative sectoral shifts
in government spending should draw labor from non-military sectors to the ship-
building sector. The second panel of Table 5.12 reveals that there does not seem to
be much of an effect in Agriculture, Fisheries, and Forestry, Mining, Construction,
Durable Goods Manufacturing, Nondurable Goods Manufacturing, Transportation,
Communication, Utilities, Wholesale, Retail, Financials, Business Services, Profes-
sional Services, or Government in shipyard counties. While there are some significant
coefficients on the indicator variable for counties that border shipyards, the overall
picture is of little industrial flux engendered by the new government spending on
ships, at least when looking at such broad categories. As naval vessels are durable
goods, it is particularly surprising that I see no significant effect on the share of
the workforce employed in durable goods manufacturing. By digging a little deeper,
however, I do see that there are shifts within the durable goods sector, if not across
manufacturing sectors. The share of the workforce employed in shipbuilding rises by
2.3% in shipyard counties relative to other counties. There is also a slight uptick in
the share employed in aircraft and parts manufacturing (not reported). The durable
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goods sectors that are most negatively affected are Other Primary Iron and Steel
Industries and Miscellaneous Manufacturing Industries. The fact that the shares
of durables and nondurables manufacturing do not change supports the notion (ap-
plied in the translation of my results into the Nakamura and Steinsson (2014) model)
that manufacturing output increases did not crowd out or crowd in activity in other
industries.
5.4.3 Results from Consumer Survey
For the last set of regressions with 1930s data, I consider the consumption habits of
households living in counties home to shipyards in 1934. I follow Hausman (2013) in
making use of the Study of Consumer Purchases in the United States, 1935-1936, an
early attempt by the government to gain an understanding of individual consumption
behavior. It is an imperfect measure of consumption in many ways,28 but this survey
ought to provide at least some insight into whether households living near shipyards
were able to consume more as a result.
Table 5.13 gives the first set of regressions of Equation 5.6. The first column of the
table demonstrates that, on average, consumption in shipyard counties is significantly
greater than in non-shipyard counties. Though this number is stark, it does not,
in itself, carry much information, because it does not say anything about whether
consumption increased as a result of the naval spending. Similarly, the coefficient
on the variable measuring the number of days overlapping the household’s survey
28See the detailed description in Hausman (2013) or Section 5.3.4 above. Also, the spending
categories discussed below follow directly from the definitions in Hausman (2013).
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year and the time since the announcement of the first contracts awarded suggests
that overall consumption throughout the country began to rise later in the survey
period, but it is not possible to attribute this to the Vinson-Trammell spending. On
the other hand, the significant coefficient on the interaction between the shipyard
indicator variable and the number of days overlapping is quite informative. It implies
that for every day more than the national average that a particular household’s survey
year overlapped with the Vinson-Trammell spending when they lived in a shipyad
county, they consumed an extra $2.33 relative to households living in a non-shipyard
county. This coefficient is significant at the five percent level. This is on top of the
extra $0.93 per day that they consumed relative to their neighbors whose survey
year overlapped less with the spending. Although the signs of the coefficients when
income is regressed on the same equation are the same, they are not significant.
It is worthwhile to put this result into context. A household living in a shipyard
county spends $2.33 per day (relative to the average) that they are exposed to the
shipbuilding program. The median number of extra days of exposure (again, relative
to the average) is 11, implying that the median household with a greater than average
exposure to the program spends an extra $25.63 ($2.33 per day × 11 days) in their
survey year. This translates to about an extra $325 in 2009 dollars. Thus, the
extra spending is large enough to be significant, but it is not an implausible jump in
consumption.
The first column in the first panel in Table 5.14 shows that this is not merely
due to a relaxing of the household’s budget constraint. The regressions in this table
include income as a right hand side variable. For total consumption, the coefficient
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on the interaction term between living in a shipyard county and the overlap between
the survey year and the spending barely changes. Consumption rises by an extra
$2.34 per day even holding income constant. There are two possible explanations for
this. It could be that households know that further spending is on ships is on the way
as made clear in the newspaper article already mentioned. Thus, their expectations
for higher income in the future are driving higher consumption now. It is unclear how
much weight to give this explanation given the depressed economic environment and
the parlous state of the banking sector at this time. The other explanation could be,
as argued above, that labor supply and consumption are complements in the utility
function, and the increased employment in shipyard counties is causing an increase
in consumption as well.29
The rest of Table 5.14 gives a more detailed breakdown of the type of spending
that consumers were increasing. The most significant effects are on housing opera-
tion, medical care, recreation, and food. Interestingly, spending on education declines
significantly by $0.35 per day of overlap. Although the census regressions in Section
5.4.2 did not show any significant change in whether children were attending school,
it does seem that, on the intensive margin, they were investing less in schooling.
This would be consistent with a story in which the increased public spending raised
the opportunity cost of education and made working a more viable alternative for
younger agents.
29The coefficients on variables relating to households living in counties bordering shipyards were
almost all insignificant, so I do not report them to conserve space.
193
5.4.4 Results on Outcomes Spanning World War II
To this point, I have only considered the effects of spending on ships on various
economic indicators between the passage of the bill (1934) and the end of the 1930s.
This is partly because my most detailed data covers this particular period, but it
is also because I am interested in whether the effects of government spending are
different when there is a considerable degree of slack in the economy, which aptly
describes the years of the Great Depression. As a point of comparison, I would
like to separately consider whether the effects of this spending persisted after the
economy exited the Depression and entered the World War II period. I can do this
first by considering the counties I have already identified which are likely to have
received spending associated with the Vinson-Trammell Act of 1934. I can also
consider the effects on counties that hosted spending sponsored by the United States
Maritime Commission over the period from 1936 to 1946. One of the advantages of
this experiment is that I have at least a rough idea about the allocation of spending
across yards, thanks to Fischer (1946), which I do not have for the Vinson-Trammell
spending. Of course, studying the effects of government spending during World
War II is a veritable minefield, due to the very different nature of the U.S. economy,
including a likely greater degree of “command-and-control” than at any other time in
the nation’s history. Still, some previous papers have dared to tread on this ground,
such as Fishback and Cullen (2013), who find little evidence that local war spending
affected local economic outcomes, and McGrattan and Ohanian (2010), who argue
that a standard neoclassical model can account well for aggregate fluctuations during
the war. It may yet be informative to consider whether the same effects uncovered
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for the 1930s exist for the 1940s as well.
I can measure the effect of shipyards’ presence by 1934 on the growth of a number
of variables between a point in time before the spending (1933 for most variables), and
the first observation on that variable after the war. In some cases, data availability
restricts me to using 1935 or 1936 as a starting year. The ending year is either
1947, 1948, or 1949, depending on what is available for each variable. For reference,
rationing ended by 1945, so the restrictions associated with rationing had only been
lifted for two years by the time I observe my first outcomes. That said, I am hesitant
to allow the focus of this experiment to drift too far past the end of the war. Table
5.15 displays the results from regressions of Equation 5.3 on data that spans from
the era of the Depression to after the end of the war.
Overall, the results are not as strong for the period spanning the war, as the
first panel of Table 5.15 indicates. For counties hosting shipyards, the growth in
manufacturing value added is nearly 17% slower than in the country as a whole,
and this is significant at the five percent level. Wholesale employment growth is
also marginally significantly slower by about 14.5%. I cannot say that this is the
result of the spending associated with shipbuilding crowding out other activity or if
activity in the rest of the country was starting to catch up as military spending was
broadly spread during World War II. Either way, the counties directly exposed to the
Vinson-Trammell spending are seeing no additional benefit from it after the 1930s
end. This is not the case for their neighbors. Interestingly, counties that border
shipyard counties but that have no shipyard of their own see significantly higher
growth in auto registrations (implying higher consumption on durable goods) as well
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as significantly higher retail employment growth, relative to the rest of the country.
I can also control for total military spending in each county over the course
of World War II. The results are generally robust to accounting for this spending.
Growth in manufacturing value added and retail sales is significantly slower in coun-
ties that were home to shipyards in 1934, while their neighbors still see significantly
faster growth in automobile registrations, although the positive effects on retail sales
and employment growth disappear with the inclusion of World War II spending.
It is not easy to pin down the mechanism at work here. It is possible, though
hardly certain, that the benefits of the spending during the 1930s in shipyard counties
are finally spilling over into their neighboring counties. This would support the notion
of a large aggregate multiplier, and though the observed extra growth is some time
later, restrictions associated with the war effort may have delayed the manifestation
of the spillovers. Unfortunately, however, I cannot conclusively answer this question.
Complicating matters is that some new yards began to open towards the end of the
1930s and into 1940 (see Lane (1951), p. 34), quite possibly so as to obtain spending
contracts, and these may very well be confounding the results.
The counties affected by the Vinson-Trammell Act were not, however, the only
areas to experience shipbuilding spending once the war started. I now turn to the
effects of the USMC ship purchase program, which touched a considerably larger
group of localities. I consider two specifications, as discussed in Section 5.3.4, one in
which the right hand side variable is a dummy indicating whether the USMC bought
ships from a given county or not (with a separate dummy for their neighbors) and a
second that specifies the independent variable as the log of the total nominal amount
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spent on ships by the USMC in each county. In this second specification, the border
counties are attributed the total nominal amount spent in all neighboring counties
that hosted shipyards. Thus, the former specification can be considered as examining
the extensive margin, while the latter focuses on the intensive margin. I consider the
effects on the same set of outcomes considered in Table 5.15, and the results can be
found in Table 5.16.
A number of results stand out from these regressions. Firstly, with the exception
of a significantly faster rate of auto registration growth (on the extensive margin)
and a slightly higher rate of growth in the number of manufacturing establishments,
counties that hosted shipyards building USMC ships do not seem to experience bet-
ter economic outcomes than areas with no shipyard connection. In this sense, it is
possible that there is relatively more crowding out of private activity in these ship-
building counties, especially since the period that I study in this exercise is one of
severe capacity constraints. The second point to note is that border counties see
genuine spillover effects from the spending next door. On the extensive margin, bor-
dering counties have significantly faster growth in the number of auto registrations,
retail sales, and retail employment. The same holds on the intensive margin. For
a given county that may or may not host a shipyard, an increase of one percent in
the nominal total of spending in all neighboring counties over the decade spanning
World War II raises the growth rate of auto registrations by 0.47%, the growth rate
of retail sales by 0.37%, and the growth rate of retail employment by 0.39%. All of
these are significant at the one percent level. When I include an additional control
variable for overall military spending in the county, these results mostly hold up.
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This has curious implications. Presumably, the military spending variable includes
the spending by the USMC on ships, so the regression results suggest that spending
on shipyards had effects on border counties over and above that of military spending
more generally. It is not clear why this should be so, but it is also the case that the
data under consideration here is sparse enough that a more detailed analysis may
yet be informative.
5.5 Scaling the Local Multiplier to the Aggregate
Level
In the literature, it is the aggregate government spending multiplier that is often
of greatest interest. Local government spending multipliers may not adequately
convey information about general equilibrium effects that could cause the aggregate
multiplier to fall below unity even as a dollar of spending in a given county generates
more than a dollar of output in that county. If output in counties that do not
receive spending (or that have spending taken away) falls by more than the lost
government purchases, these negative effects could, in the aggregate, outweigh the
booms experienced by areas that receive government spending. For example, I have
already shown in Section 5.4.2 that the spending program compelled a movement of
individuals into bordering counties. In this section, I will attempt to take the results
that I have presented thus far and interpret what they imply for the government
spending multiplier that is often estimated in the literature on fiscal policy. The first
exercise will be to see what the model of Nakamura and Steinsson (2014) implies for
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my results.
To do so, I must alter my baseline regression so that it looks a little more like that
estimated in the empirical section of Nakamura and Steinsson (2014). I first observe
that Ramey and Zubairy (2014) estimate the Vinson-Trammell Act spending at
about 1.5% of 1933 nominal GDP, which was about 57.2 billion dollars. This implies
a spending program of about 858 million dollars. It is implausible to assume that
the spending was distributed evenly among all the shipyard counties, but, for the
purposes of this exercise, I will do so, since I cannot well defend any other allocation
assumption without more detailed data. In Section 5.3.2, I identify 27 shipyard
counties, but I do not have manufacturing data for Newport News, Virginia, so I
will assume that the other 26 counties split the spending equally among themselves.
This obviously raises potential problems, as the regression will be understating the
effects of spending in counties that received less than average, while overstating the
effects of spending in the counties that received more than average. Add to this the
fact that, if any funds were allocated to Newport News, then the regression is now
distributing those funds elsewhere, thus potentially further understating the effects
of spending overall. Again, however, I do not mean this to be a formal multiplier
estimate, but rather to see what the model of Nakamura and Steinsson (2014) implies
for this data.
I also would need to scale the amount of spending by overall output in order
to match the regression of Nakamura and Steinsson (2014). Since I do not have
overall output at the county level for this time period, I create a rough measure
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by scaling manufacturing output in 1933 by the percentage of the population em-
ployed in manufacturing in that year. While this likely introduces further possi-
ble measurement error into the hypothetical regression, it is the best option avail-
able to me. I rerun Equation 5.1, substituting the per-county amount of spending
scaled by overall output in the county for the Shipyard1934,i dummy variable and the
BordersShipyard1934,i dummy variable in the interaction terms. The results of this
regression are found in Table 5.17. This table shows that, if the ship purchases were
distributed evenly across the shipyard counties, the additional manufacturing output
over the course of 1933 to 1939 that could be attributed to them summed to 2.18
dollars for every dollar spent by the federal government on ships. This scales up to a
multiplier of 2.64.30 This is the “Open Economy Relative Multiplier” of Nakamura
and Steinsson (2014).3132
Nakamura and Steinsson (2014) consider develop a model in which regions within
a monetary union are subject to differential government spending shocks.33 That is,
they examine how the aggregate economy will respond when only one region in their
30That is, each coefficient βt for t = 1935, 1937, 1939 is multiplied by the inferred growth rate
of output over the period from 1933. For example, to interpret β1935 as a “multiplier,” (β
M
1935) I
calculate
βM1935 = β1935 ×
Y1935
Y1933
=
∆(Y1937 − Y1935)
Y1935
× Y1933
∆Shock
× Y1935
Y1933
. (5.7)
I follow a similar process for β1937 and β1939, with Y1937 and Y1939, respectively, substituting for
the numerator in the final term of the expression.
31In their paper, the open economy relative multipliers on total output range from 1.4 to 1.9.
32Of course, this extra 2.64 dollars in manufacturing output may have crowded out some other
kind of output, but the data is not capable of revealing this explicitly. For this exercise, I will
assume that no crowding-out or crowding-in results from this extra manufacturing output. Results
below on relative changes in the industrial composition in shipyard counties suggest no crowding
in or out.
33A brief summary of the model can be found in Appendix A.
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model economy is subject to an increase in government spending. They consider
several different specifications of their model. For my purposes, the one that is
likely to be most relevant is that where there is nominal price rigidity, nominal
interest rates are held constant by the monetary authority (because rates were at zero
during the Great Depression), and there is complementarity between consumption
and labor in the representative agent’s utility function. This last point is supported
by my empirical results that show that manufacturing output and retail sales rose
simultaneously in shipyard counties in response to the Vinson-Trammell Act and
that individual households exposed to the spending spent an extra $2.33 per day
that they were exposed in spite of the fact that their incomes had not yet risen. The
results of this specification of their model can be found in the third and fourth rows
of Table 7 in Nakamura and Steinsson (2014). When the government spending shock
is relatively short-lived, the model implies a local government spending multiplier
of $2.04, which is not very different from my empirical finding of $2.64. In this
case, Nakamura and Steinsson (2014) find that the aggregate government spending
multiplier implied by a local multiplier of this magnitude is 8.73. That would suggest
that my empirical results would suggest a multiplier at least this large.
Of course, this figure is huge, and I am not aware of any aggregate multipliers
estimated in postwar data that come very close to this. That said, as implausible as
such a large multiplier might be in the context of the modern postwar United States
economy, it may not be so incredible for the 1930s, when the economy was experienc-
ing an extremely large degree of slack34 and it was much less open to international
34According to the data set accompanying the work of Ramey and Zubairy (2014), the unem-
ployment rate was never below 12% between 1934 and 1940 and in some periods, it was higher than
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trade (and likely even intra-national trade).
Some may even consider the $2.64 figure as a decent approximation to the aggre-
gate multiplier. This number is also large according to modern theory and empirics,
but it is much closer to the standard range than something between eight and nine.
For this multiplier to approximate the actual amount, however, one would have to
take very seriously the idea that there were no spillovers, positive or negative, in
counties not hosting shipyards. Further, one would have to assume that, although
the tax burden was increased in counties not playing host to shipyards, this did not
alter the economic behavior of these counties, which does not seem like a palatable
assumption to make.
Another approach might be to consider the argument of Gabaix (2011), who
posits that when the distribution of firms is sufficiently fat-tailed, idiosyncratic fluc-
tuations for particularly large firms can have effects in the aggregate. That is, they
do not die out according to the central limit theorem. Seeing that the distribution
of manufacturing output across all counties may be fat-tailed as well (which can be
observed from Figure 5.20), it may be useful to adapt the notion of the “granular
residual,” as developed in Gabaix (2011), to this context.
The procedure is fairly straightforward. First, I consider a series of cross-sectional
regressions of the following form for the years 1933, 1935, 1937, and 1939 (the years
for which I have observations on manufacturing output growth),
∆Yi = α + x
′
iβ + εi . (5.8)
20%.
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where ∆Yi is the log difference of manufacturing output from two years earlier and xi
is the vector of control variables considered in the baseline regression above (location
on a coast, percentage urban, indicator for being industrialized in 1933, and state
fixed effects), but I do not include the Shipyard1934 dummy variable in this regression.
I take the residuals from this regression and weight them by the share of overall
manufacturing output of County i two years earlier. The sum of these weighted
residuals is the granular residual of Gabaix (2011) applied to the current context. By
sorting the counties hosting shipyards from those not hosting shipyards, I can divide
the overall granular residual into one from shipyards and one from all other counties,
thus quantifying the contribution from each type of county to overall fluctuations in
aggregate manufacturing output.
By considering Table 5.18, one can see that the overall granular residual (the last
column of the table) follows an expected pattern. It is highly negative in the two years
to 1933, positive in the two-year periods to 1935 and 1937 (as the economy recovered
from the Depression) and negative again from 1937 to 1939 (when the economy re-
entered recession).35 What is surprising is the contribution of the shipyard counties,
especially in the periods from 1933 to 1935 and 1935 to 1937. In the two years
to 1935, has a magnitude equal to about −36% of the overall granular residual,
implying that aggregate manufacturing output would have grown much faster had
it not been for the shipyard counties. In the two years to 1937, it is 122% of the
overall granular residual. This is puzzling, considering the results reported in all of
35The granular residuals of the shipyard counties, counties bordering shipyards, and all others
generally sum to the overall granular residual, although the figures in the table may not do so
exactly due to rounding.
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the previous sections. Note also that shipyard counties contribute positively to the
granular residual in the period to 1939, implying that growth would have been worse
had it not been for these counties.
A closer inspection of the data reveals that the negative contribution to the
granular residual on the part of the shipyard counties is, in large part, a result of
the fact that New York City and a number of its large suburbs in New Jersey are
home to shipyards. This reveals a curious result. The shipbuilding program caused
manufacturing output growth to be much faster than average in the counties that
owned shipyards, but this arithmetic average is driven by the positive growth seen
in many smaller shipyard counties. In some larger areas that also happened to host
shipyards, growth was still less than would have been expected, even after controlling
for a number of covariates. Of course, a tricky aspect of this observation is that the
shipbuilding industry was not nearly the kind of driving industry for New York City
as it might have been for Bath, Maine. It is not at all clear if New York City would
have actually seen even slower manufacturing output growth if it had not had its
shipyards. In fact, the results from looking at the consumer survey suggest as much.
Thus, although this exercise motivated by the discussion of a granular residual that
drives aggregate fluctuations in Gabaix (2011) seems to suggest an overall negative
multiplier on the Vinson-Trammell spending, even this does not settle the question.
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5.6 Conclusion
In this paper, I have contributed to the study of government spending multipliers
at the local level by considering in detail the effects of the Vinson-Trammell Act of
1934, a bill that facilitated the purchase of a substantial number of naval vessels in
response to military expansion by Japan and in order to build the United States Navy
up to treaty provisions. Using a combination of historical sources and contemporary
news media, I am able to identify counties that hosted shipyards before the passage
of the act. I combine this with county level data on various economic indicators in
the 1930s to investigate the effect of this spending bill on local economic outcomes.
I find that counties that hosted shipyards in 1934 experience significantly faster
growth in manufacturing output and value added. Total manufacturing wage pay-
ments are also significantly positively impacted, with this likely composed of higher
employment and higher average wages per worker. This combination seems to have
favored larger firms and negatively affected the number of manufacturing firms in
each county. Retail sales growth grew significantly faster in these counties as well,
lending support to the use of a model with complementarity between labor and con-
sumption in the utility function. These results are not due to faster population
growth and they are robust to the inclusion or exclusion of a number of control vari-
ables, including spending associated with the New Deal. By considering a consumer
survey that was coincident with much of the spending, I find that households living
in shipyard counties spent upwards of two dollars a day more for each day that they
were exposed to the government spending.
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At the same time, the spending associated with the government’s ship buying
program did not affect individuals’ choices on education or the broader industrial
structure of the county, except for some shifting of the relative importance of the
shipbuilding industry within the durable goods manufacturing sector.
These results appear not to have lasted through the Second World War, and a look
at the effect of more detailed data on government ship purchases during the war reveal
no effect on local outcomes, although counties bordering shipyard counties seem to
have experienced greater benefits after the war relative to both shipyard counties and
counties unrelated to shipyards. This supports the idea that government spending
multipliers may be higher when nominal interest rates are pinned to the zero lower
bound, as in Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2011), or when there is relatively
more slack in the economy. These results hold constant the effects of overall military
spending during World War II and the spending received in the 1930s associated
with the New Deal.
When attempting to scale these results into an aggregate government spending
multiplier, each such exercise gives wildly varying results. The aggregate multiplier
on these purchases may have been as high as eight or nine, or it may have been
negative. It seems that more research is needed for translating such local multiplier
estimates into the aggregate government spending multiplier that most policymakers
are interested in.
Although this study has caveats, not least the fact that I do not have hard data
on an annual basis that describes the amount of spending in each county, and that I
rely on imperfect proxies to identify where the money was likely to be spent, I believe
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that it is the first to examine local government spending multipliers on purchases
(as opposed to transfers) before World War II (when aggregate data collection was
harmonized to a lesser degree), comparing the effects in times when capacity was
highly utilized and when there was a great deal of slack in the economy. Also, I
am able to roughly translate my estimates to an aggregate government spending
multiplier (which may be as high as between 7 and 9). Thus, this paper provides
evidence consistent with the segment of the literature finding that federal spending
can have stimulative effects in local economies.
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Table 5.1: Counties Hosting Shipyards Active in 1934
Baltimore (city), MD
Baltimore (county), MD
Cambria, PA
Camden, NJ
Charleston, SC
Dauphin, PA
Delaware, PA
Hudson, NJ
King, WA
Kings, NY
Lackawanna, PA
Lehigh, PA
Los Angeles, CA
Mobile, AL
New Castle, DE
New London, CT
Newport News, VA
Norfolk, MA
Norfolk, VA
Northampton, PA
Philadelphia, PA
Richmond, NY
Rockingham, NH
Sagadahoc, ME
San Francisco, CA
Solano, CA
Suffolk, MA
This list gives counties hosting shipyards active by 1934, the year of passage of the
Vinson-Trammell Act of 1934. The list also includes identified major steel suppliers
to the shipbuilding industry.
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Table 5.2: Counties Hosting Shipyards Receiving USMC Contracts
Alameda, CA Lorain, OH
Ashtabula, OH Los Angeles, CA
Baltimore (city), MD Marin, CA
Baltimore (county), MD Marinette, WI
Bay, FL Milwaukee, WI
Brown, WI Mobile, AL
Camden, NJ Morgan, AL
Cecil, MD Multnomah, OR
Chatham, GA New Castle, DE
Clallam, WA New Hanover, NC
Clark, WA New York, NY
Clatsop, OR Newport News, VA
Cook, IL Norfolk, MA
Contra Costa, CA Norfolk, VA
Cumberland, ME Nueces, TX
Cuyahoga, OH Orleans, LA
Delaware, PA Pierce, WA
Door, WI Providence, RI
Douglas, WI Richmond, NY
Duval, FL Sagadahoc, ME
Galveston, TX Saint Louis, MN
Glynn, GA San Diego, CA
Harris, TX San Francisco, CA
Hillsborough, FL Skagit, WA
Hudson, NJ Snohomish, WA
Humboldt, CA St. Tammany, LA
Jackson, MS Suffolk, MA
Jefferson, LA Thurston, WA
Jefferson, TX Tillamook, OR
King, WA Waldo, ME
Lincoln, OR Westchester, NY
This list gives counties hosting shipyards that received USMC contracts from 1936
to 1946, as indicated by Fischer (1946).
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Table 5.3: Summary Statistics of Main Outcome Variables
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Observations
∆ Number of Manufacturing Establishments 0.04 0.31 −2.22 2.56 9707
∆ Manufacturing Employment 0.06 0.43 −3.86 4.73 8087
∆ Average Employees per Manufacturing Firm 0.06 0.45 −3.86 4.73 9082
∆ Manufacturing Output 0.12 0.40 −3.65 3.98 8087
∆ Manufacturing Wage Payments 0.06 0.45 −3.89 4.16 8087
∆ Average Earnings per Manufacturing Employee 0.01 0.20 −1.64 1.63 8087
∆ Manufacturing Value Added 0.11 0.47 −3.47 16.13 8090
∆ Retail Sales 0.09 0.08 −0.53 0.87 6097
∆ Wholesale Employment 0.20 0.57 −3.00 3.50 2670
∆ Retail Employment 0.15 0.26 −2.35 2.62 3050
∆ Wholesale Net Sales −0.16 0.81 −13.75 0.50 2757
∆ Average Earnings per Wholesale Employee −0.11 0.46 −6.21 4.03 2596
∆ Average Earnings per Retail Employee 0.34 0.43 −7.80 8.48 3044
∆ Number of Tax Returns 0.18 0.38 −3.74 3.91 29616
The table gives summary statistics for main outcome variables obtained from the data set constructed by Fishback
et al. (2011b).
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Table 5.4: Effect of Shipbuilding Program on Manufacturing Output: Robustness Tests
Baseline New Deal
(Levels)
(2SLS)
New Deal
(Changes)
(2SLS)
New Deal
(Two-Year
Sum)
(2SLS)
County
Cluster
Region FE Propensity
Score 1
Propensity
Score 2
1935× Shipyard1934 0.068 0.066 0.259 0.060 0.068 0.068 0.062 0.014
(0.049) (0.050) (0.190) (0.056) (0.049) (0.049) (0.058) (0.059)
1937× Shipyard1934 0.130∗∗∗ 0.127∗∗∗ 0.341∗∗ 0.113∗∗ 0.130∗∗∗ 0.130∗∗∗ 0.117∗∗ 0.080
(0.040) (0.041) (0.150) (0.045) (0.044) (0.040) (0.046) (0.050)
1939× Shipyard1934 0.128∗∗ 0.125∗∗ 0.368∗∗ 0.121∗∗ 0.128∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗ 0.157∗∗∗ 0.119∗∗
(0.053) (0.055) (0.169) (0.061) (0.045) (0.053) (0.056) (0.056)
Num. obs. 6420 6420 6420 6399 6420 6420 2184 1608
Each column reports the coefficients on the Shipyard1934 variable interacted with the time fixed effect indicated
by the row heading for a given specification of the regression indicated by the column heading. More detailed
descriptions of each robustness specification are given in the text. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1,5,
and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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Table 5.5: Effect on Output of Being a County with a High Concentration in Other
Industries
Industry 1935 1937 1939
Shipyards 0.068 0.130∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗
Coal 0.057 0.040 0.139
Oil and Gas −0.020 0.089 −0.009
Other Mining 0.181 0.104 0.049
Mineral Extraction 0.146 0.137∗∗∗ −0.170
Chemicals −0.044 −0.008 −0.058
Cigars −0.049 −0.062 −0.048
Glass 0.046 0.163∗ 0.046
Bread 0.075 −0.008 0.028
Meat 0.224∗∗∗ 0.039 0.058
Automobiles 0.198∗∗∗ 0.159∗∗∗ −0.102∗
Iron 0.225∗∗∗ 0.272∗∗∗ 0.021
Metals 0.103 0.199∗∗∗ 0.086
Planing Mills −0.003 0.025 −0.194∗∗
Lumber 0.117∗∗ 0.197∗∗ 0.068
Boots and Shoes −0.032 0.031 0.049∗
Printing, Publishing, and Engraving 0.093 0.026 0.064
Pulp and Paper −0.054∗ 0.048 −0.073
Cotton Textiles −0.519∗∗∗ −0.270∗∗∗ −0.373∗∗∗
Rubber 0.088∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗ 0.091∗∗∗
Each row in the table reports coefficients on a dummy variable indicating that the
county has is in the top 26 for the whole country in employment per population in
the given industry interacted with the year indicated by the column heading. All
regressions include state fixed effects, a dummy for whether the county is situated
on a coast, the proportion of the county considered “urban” in the 1930 census, and
whether the county is “industrialized.” Standard errors are clustered at the state
level. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1,5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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Table 5.6: Sensitivity of Output Results to Exclusion of Individual Shipyards
Sample 1935 1937 1939
All Counties 0.068 0.130∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗
New London, CT 0.077 0.14∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗
Sagadahoc, ME 0.058 0.113∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗
Norfolk, MA 0.066 0.134∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗
Suffolk, MA 0.072 0.133∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗
Rockingham, NH 0.055 0.117∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗
New Castle, DE 0.077 0.128∗∗∗ 0.136∗∗
Camden, NJ 0.065 0.133∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗
Hudson, NJ 0.067 0.126∗∗∗ 0.124∗∗
Cambria, PA 0.075 0.113∗∗ 0.146∗∗∗
Dauphin, PA 0.059 0.124∗∗∗ 0.129∗∗
Delaware, PA 0.079 0.143∗∗∗ 0.142∗∗∗
Lackawanna, PA 0.081 0.143∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗
Lehigh/Northampton, PA 0.065 0.120∗∗∗ 0.126∗∗
Philadelphia, PA 0.068 0.134∗∗∗ 0.130∗∗
Norfolk, VA 0.034 0.127∗∗∗ 0.118∗∗
Mobile, AL 0.080 0.140∗∗∗ 0.130∗∗
Charleston, SC 0.080 0.133∗∗∗ 0.135∗∗
Baltimore (county), MD 0.072 0.114∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗
Baltimore (city), MD 0.065 0.130∗∗∗ 0.134∗∗
Los Angeles, CA 0.065 0.129∗∗∗ 0.130∗∗
San Francisco, CA 0.070 0.134∗∗∗ 0.130∗∗
Solano, CA 0.070 0.143∗∗∗ 0.138∗∗
King, WA 0.069 0.131∗∗∗ 0.128∗∗
New York, NY 0.068 0.136∗∗∗ 0.123∗∗
Each row in the table reports coefficients on Shipyard1934 interacted with the year
indicated by the column heading when the row county is excluded from the regression.
All regressions include state fixed effects, a dummy for whether the county is situated
on a coast, the proportion of the county considered “urban” in the 1930 census, and
whether the county is “industrialized.” Standard errors are clustered at the state
level. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1,5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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Table 5.7: Pre-Vinson-Trammell Act Outcomes
Outcome Shipyard1934 BordersShipyard1934
∆ Number of Manufacturing Establishments −0.024 −0.002
(0.025) (0.017)
∆ Manufacturing Employment 0.020 0.032
(0.024) (0.020)
∆ Average Employees per Manufacturing Firm −0.040 −0.006
(0.054) (0.032)
∆ Manufacturing Output −0.071 −0.000
(0.051) (0.045)
∆ Manufacturing Wage Payments −0.073∗ −0.010
(0.038) (0.034)
∆ Average Earnings per Manufacturing Employee −0.010 −0.008
(0.026) (0.013)
∆ Manufacturing Value Added −0.095∗ 0.004
(0.048) (0.045)
∆ Retail Sales per capita 0.001 0.002
(0.005) (0.005)
This table gives coefficients on Shipyard1934 and BordersShipyard1934 from regres-
sions on each outcome including only data before 1934. Standard errors clustered at
state level are in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1,5, and 10
percent levels, respectively.
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Table 5.8: Effect on Retail Sales Growth of Hosting or Bordering a Shipyard
Independent Variable Baseline New Deal
Changes
(2SLS)
New Deal
Levels
(2SLS)
Shipyard1934 −0.026∗∗∗ −0.025∗∗∗ −0.034∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.012)
I(Y ear = 1939) ∗ Shipyard1934 0.038∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗ 0.037∗∗∗
(0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
BordersShipyard1934 −0.026∗∗∗ −0.026∗∗∗ −0.034∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.009)
I(Y ear = 1939) ∗BordersShipyard1934 0.045∗∗∗ 0.045∗∗∗ 0.042∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.012) (0.013)
I(Y ear = 1939) −0.074∗∗∗ −0.077∗∗ −0.073∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.037) (0.006)
Observations 5282 5286 5286
R-Squared 0.342 0.341 0.318
The table gives coefficient estimates from regressions of the average annual change
in real retail sales on dummy variables for Shipyard1934 and BordersShipyard1934
and the interaction of these dummy variables with year fixed effects. Standard errors
clustered at state level are in parentheses. ∗∗∗,∗∗ , and∗ indicate significance at the
1,5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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Table 5.9: Effect on Retail Sales of Being a County with a High Concentration in
Other Industries
Industry 1939
Shipyards 0.038∗∗∗
Coal 0.009
Oil and Gas −0.008
Other Mining −0.010
Mineral Extraction 0.004
Chemicals 0.038∗∗
Cigars 0.007
Glass 0.048∗∗
Bread −0.002
Meat 0.027∗
Automobiles −0.023∗∗
Iron 0.001
Metals 0.016
Planing Mills −0.004
Lumber −0.016
Boots and Shoes 0.011
Printing, Publishing, and Engraving 0.028
Pulp and Paper −0.007
Cotton Textiles 0.056∗∗∗
Rubber 0.020
Each row in the table reports coefficients on a dummy variable indicating that the
county has is in the top 26 for the whole country in employment per population in
the given industry interacted with the year indicated by the column heading. All
regressions include state fixed effects, a dummy for whether the county is situated
on a coast, the proportion of the county considered “urban” in the 1930 census, and
whether the county is “industrialized.” Standard errors are clustered at the state
level. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1,5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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Table 5.10: Sensitivity of Retail Sales Results to Exclusion of Individual Shipyards
Sample Shipyard1934
All Counties 0.038∗∗∗
New London, CT 0.037∗∗∗
Sagadahoc, ME 0.038∗∗∗
Norfolk, MA 0.038∗∗∗
Suffolk, MA 0.037∗∗∗
Rockingham, NH 0.040∗∗∗
New Castle, DE 0.038∗∗∗
Camden, NJ 0.037∗∗∗
Hudson, NJ 0.038∗∗∗
Cambria, PA 0.033∗∗∗
Dauphin, PA 0.038∗∗∗
Delaware, PA 0.039∗∗∗
Lackawanna, PA 0.041∗∗∗
Lehigh/Northampton, PA 0.039∗∗∗
Philadelphia, PA 0.039∗∗∗
Norfolk, VA 0.038∗∗∗
Newport News, VA 0.040∗∗∗
Mobile, AL 0.036∗∗∗
Charleston, SC 0.035∗∗∗
Baltimore (county), MD 0.034∗∗∗
Baltimore (city), MD 0.036∗∗∗
Los Angeles, CA 0.039∗∗∗
San Francisco, CA 0.036∗∗∗
Solano, CA 0.041∗∗∗
King, WA 0.038∗∗∗
New York, NY 0.039∗∗∗
Each row in the table reports coefficients on Shipyard1934 interacted with the year
indicated by the column heading when the row county is excluded from the regression.
All regressions include state fixed effects, a dummy for whether the county is situated
on a coast, the proportion of the county considered “urban” in the 1930 census, and
whether the county is “industrialized.” Standard errors are clustered at the state
level. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1,5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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Table 5.11: Effect on Growth in Various Economic Indicators of Hosting or
Bordering a Shipyard
Dep. Variable Whlse.
Emp.
Retail
Emp.
Whlsl. Net
Sales
Whlsl.
Earnings
Retail
Earnings
Baseline Controls
Shipyard1934 −0.136∗ −0.057∗∗ 0.043 −0.020 −0.037
(0.051) (0.024) (0.035) (0.034) (0.034)
BordersShipyard1934 −0.021 −0.002 0.015 0.003 0.001
(0.055) (0.022) (0.027) (0.026) (0.020)
Observations 2351 2678 2413 2287 2685
R-Squared 0.096 0.177 0.247 0.132 0.264
New Deal Changes (2SLS)
Shipyard1934 −0.054 −0.057∗∗∗ −0.023 0.045 −0.120∗∗∗
(0.057) (0.019) (0.033) (0.033) (0.046)
BordersShipyard1934 −0.033 −0.009 0.052 0.078∗∗∗ −0.063∗∗
(0.052) (0.019) (0.032) (0.030) (0.030)
Observations 2350 2677 2413 2287 2685
The table gives coefficient estimates from regressions of changes in the dependent
variable (in real terms, where applicable) from 1935 to 1939 on dummy variables for
Shipyard1934 and BordersShipyard1934. Standard errors clustered at state level are
in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1,5, and 10 percent levels,
respectively.
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Table 5.12: Effect on Growth in Various Indicators of Hosting or Bordering a
Shipyard
Dep. Variable Shipyard1934 BordersShipyard1934 Observations R-Squared
Population −1.124 3.447∗∗ 2960 0.246
(2.302) (1.390)
Pct of 14,15 year-olds in school −1.110 0.567 2959 0.291
(0.682) (0.42)
Pct of 16,17 year-olds in school −0.642 0.483 2962 0.369
(1.297) (0.656)
Pct of 18,19,20 year-olds in school 0.017 0.628 2960 0.212
(0.614) (0.485)
Share of workforce in:
Agriculture, Fisheries, and Forestry −0.004 −0.006 2987 0.083
(0.014) (0.011)
Mining −0.005 −0.005 2987 0.037
(0.007) (0.004)
Construction −0.013 0.003 2987 0.068
(0.010) (0.009)
Durables Mfg. 0.012 −0.008 2987 0.025
(0.015) (0.007)
Nondurables Mfg. −0.005 −0.003 2987 0.061
(0.007) (0.006)
Transportation 0.000 0.000 2987 0.045
(0.008) (0.004)
Communication 0.000 −0.002 2987 0.022
(0.002) (0.001)
Utilities 0.000 −0.002 2987 0.013
(0.003) (0.002)
Wholesale 0.001 −0.001 2987 0.021
(0.003) (0.002)
Retail −0.001 0.008 2987 0.027
(0.008) (0.005)
Financials 0.003 0.004∗ 2987 0.025
(0.003) (0.002)
Business Services −0.001 −0.002 2987 0.019
(0.003) (0.002)
Personal Services −0.012 0.000 2987 0.026
(0.008) (0.006)
Entertainment 0.004 −0.001 2987 0.023
(0.002) (0.002)
Professional Services 0.011 0.004 2987 0.021
(0.007) (0.005)
Government 0.011 0.010∗∗ 2987 0.027
(0.009) (0.005)
Shipbuilding and Repair 0.023∗ 0.003 2987 0.095
(0.012) (0.002)
The table gives coefficient estimates from regressions of changes in the dependent variable from
1930 to 1940 on dummy variables for Shipyard1934 and BordersShipyard1934. Ordinary least
squares regressions include a full set of control variables. Standard errors clustered at state level in
parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1,5, and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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Table 5.13: Results from Regressions based on 1935-1936 Consumer Survey
Independent Variable Total Consumption Household Income
Shipyard 1244.50∗∗∗ 1353.94
(299.98) (1336.67)
Borders Shipyard −360.99 −867.56
(312.36) (1278.86)
Overlap 0.93∗∗∗ 0.36
(0.29) (1.27)
Shipyard*Overlap 2.33∗∗ 2.63
(0.94) (3.50)
Borders Shipyard*Overlap 0.42 −1.90
(0.86) (3.77)
The table gives coefficient estimates from regressions of Equation 5.6. Ordinary least
squares regressions include controls for the age and age squared of the husband and
wife of the household as well as a dummy for whether the household is not white
and state dummies. Overlap and its interaction terms are described in the text.
Standard errors are in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1,5, and
10 percent levels, respectively.
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Table 5.14: Results from Regressions based on 1935-1936 Consumer Survey
Indep. Var. Total Consump. Housing Housing Op. Medical Care Recreation Tobacco Reading Education
Shipyard 1212.02∗∗∗ 369.22∗∗∗ 43.90 40.62 39.07 22.79∗∗ 15.19∗∗∗ 42.27
(291.93) (65.16) (45.34) (37.26) (35.73) (9.57) (4.31) (37.51)
Overlap 0.93∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.00 0.06∗ 0.04∗∗∗ 0.02∗∗∗ 0.02
(0.28) (0.06) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.01) (0.00) (0.04)
Shipyard*Overlap 2.34∗∗ 0.26 0.47∗∗∗ 0.18∗ 0.31∗∗∗ 0.04∗ 0.01 −0.35∗∗∗
(0.91) (0.17) (0.12) (0.10) (0.09) (0.03) (0.01) (0.10)
Indep. Var. Occupational Exp. Gifts Food Autos Clothing Travel Personal Care Equipment
Shipyard 12.53 22.30∗ 363.94∗∗∗ −4.24 75.60 76.32∗∗∗ 21.30∗∗∗ 4.04
(30.72) (13.57) (64.85) (66.03) (49.83) (15.87) (7.85) (6.30)
Overlap 0.03 0.06∗∗∗ 0.26∗∗∗ 0.32∗∗∗ 0.27∗∗∗ 0.00 0.04∗∗∗ −0.00
(0.03) (0.01) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
Shipyard*Overlap −0.02 0.02 0.66∗∗∗ −0.09 0.04 0.01 0.05∗∗ −0.01
(0.08) (0.04) (0.17) (0.17) (0.13) (0.04) (0.02) (0.02)
The table gives coefficient estimates from regressions of Equation 5.6. Ordinary least squares regressions include
controls for the age and age squared of the husband and wife of the household and household income as well
as a dummy for whether the household is not white and state dummies. Overlap and its interaction terms are
described in the text. Standard errors are in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1,5, and 10
percent levels, respectively.
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Table 5.15: Long Run (Spanning World War II) Effects of Shipbuilding Spending
Dep. Variable Shipyard1934 BordersShipyard1934
OLS-Baseline Controls
∆ Manufacturing Establishments (1933-1947) −0.084 0.020
(0.064) (0.048)
∆ Manufacturing Value Added (1933-1947) −0.169∗∗ −0.076
(0.079) (0.060)
∆ Auto Registrations (1936-1947) 0.027 0.088∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.017)
∆ Retail Sales (1933-1948) −0.085 0.034
(0.053) (0.024)
∆ Retail Employment (1935-1948) −0.081 0.049∗∗
(0.055) (0.025)
∆ Wholesale Net Sales (1935-1948) 0.043 0.037
(0.069) (0.046)
∆ Wholesale Employment (1935-1948) −0.145∗ −0.002
(0.082) (0.071)
OLS-Controls Include WWII Spending
∆ Manufacturing Establishments (1933-1947) −0.051 0.044
(0.062) (0.043)
∆ Manufacturing Value Added (1933-1947) −0.151∗∗ −0.063
(0.075) (0.058)
∆ Auto Registrations (1936-1947) 0.003 0.060∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.015)
∆ Retail Sales (1933-1948) −0.096∗ 0.022
(0.050) (0.025)
∆ Retail Employment (1935-1948) −0.102∗∗ 0.033
(0.050) (0.025)
∆ Wholesale Net Sales (1935-1948) 0.049 0.040
(0.072) (0.046)
∆ Wholesale Employment (1935-1948) −0.102 0.042
(0.082) (0.062)
The table gives coefficient estimates from regressions of changes in the depen-
dent variables over the years given on dummy variables for Shipyard1934 and
BordersShipyard1934. A full set of control variables is included in the regression.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1,5,
and 10 percent levels, respectively.
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Table 5.16: Effects of USMC Spending (1936-1945)
Dep. Variable ShipyardUSMC BordersShipyardUSMC ShipSpendingHOST ShipSpendingBORDER
OLS-Baseline Controls
∆ Manufacturing Establishments (1933-1947) 0.095∗ 0.080∗∗ 0.161 0.329
(0.056) (0.040) (0.295) (0.222)
∆ Manufacturing Value Added (1933-1947) 0.069 0.051 0.147 0.082
(0.083) (0.055) (0.408) (0.299)
∆ Auto Registrations (1936-1947) 0.082∗∗∗ 0.087∗∗∗ 0.126 0.470∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.013) (0.153) (0.070)
∆ Retail Sales (1933-1948) 0.032 0.068∗∗∗ −0.126 0.365∗∗∗
(0.040) (0.019) (0.224) (0.107)
∆ Retail Employment (1935-1948) 0.030 0.076∗∗∗ −0.136 0.389∗∗∗
(0.041) (0.022) (0.232) (0.123)
∆ Wholesale Net Sales (1935-1948) 0.025 0.014 0.148 −0.013
(0.061) (0.042) (0.336) (0.224)
∆ Wholesale Employment (1935-1948) −0.069 0.075 −0.674∗ 0.305
(0.070) (0.055) (0.373) (0.302)
OLS-Controls Include WWII Spending
∆ Manufacturing Establishments (1933-1947) 0.109∗∗ 0.102∗∗∗ 0.141 0.444
(0.055) (0.036) (0.287) (0.200)
∆ Manufacturing Value Added (1933-1947) 0.067 0.068 0.065 0.152
(0.084) (0.056) (0.406) (0.306)
∆ Auto Registrations (1936-1947) 0.040∗ 0.069∗∗∗ −0.038 0.378∗∗∗
(0.024) (0.014) (0.139) (0.073)
∆ Retail Sales (1933-1948) −0.009 0.056∗∗∗ −0.315 0.309∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.020) (0.212) (0.112)
∆ Retail Employment (1935-1948) −0.024 0.060∗∗∗ −0.375∗ 0.302∗∗
(0.039) (0.023) (0.216) (0.129)
∆ Wholesale Net Sales (1935-1948) 0.022 0.023 0.096 0.009
(0.064) (0.047) (0.342) (0.252)
∆ Wholesale Employment (1935-1948) −0.059 0.098∗ −0.715∗ 0.434
(0.070) (0.055) (0.371) (0.304)
The table gives coefficient estimates from regressions of changes in the dependent variables over the years given on
dummy variables for ShipyardUSMC and BordersShipyardUSMC (first two columns) or the total nominal amount
spent over 1936 to 1945 on ship contracts (second two columns). Control variables are specified as indicated in
the table. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1,5, and 10 percent
levels, respectively.
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Table 5.17: Effect of “Per-County” Shipyard Spending on Growth in
Manufacturing Output
Shipyard1934 −0.035∗∗
(0.014)
I(Y ear = 1935)∗“Per-County” Spending 0.293∗∗
(0.116)
I(Y ear = 1937)∗“Per-County” Spending 0.844∗∗∗
(0.100)
I(Y ear = 1939)∗“Per-County” Spending 1.051∗∗∗
(0.097)
This table gives the coefficient estimates from a regression of the two year change
in manufacturing output on dummy variables for Shipyard and BordersShipyard
and interaction of “per-county” spending associated with the Vinson-Trammell Act
(defined in the text) interacted with year fixed effects. Standard errors clustered at
state level are in parentheses. ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1,5, and 10
percent levels, respectively.
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Table 5.18: Granular Contributions from Shipyard and Non-Shipyard Counties
Year Shipyard Borders Shipyard No Shipyard Granular Residual
1933 −0.011 −0.000 −0.011 −0.021
1935 −0.008 0.004 0.027 0.022
1937 −0.022 0.002 0.003 −0.018
1939 0.008 −0.004 −0.038 −0.034
Each cell in the first three columns of the table represents the contribution towards
the overall “granular residual” (found in the fourth column), as described by Gabaix
(2011) for the year given by the row header. See the text for a description of how
the granular residual is computed.
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Figure 5.1: Evolution of Defense Spending by the Federal Government in the 1930s
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The figure shows annual real defense spending (in 2009 dollars) for the years from
1929-1940. The source is BEA Series A824RC1A027NBEA deflated by the GDP
deflator.
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Figure 5.2: Locations of Shipyards Active in 1934
Sheet 1
Shipyard
0
1
Map based on Longitude (generated) and Latitude (generated). Size shows sum of Shipyard. Details are shown for Countyfp and Geoid. The view is filtered on Inclu-
sions (Countyfp,Geoid), which keeps 3,109 members.
Large dots indicate the locations of shipyards and major shipyard suppliers, as indi-
cated in Lane (1951) and contemporary news sources.
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Figure 5.3: Locations of Shipyards Receiving USMC Contracts in 1936-1946
Sheet 1
Shipyard
0
1
Map based on Longitude (generated) and Latitude (generated). Size shows sum of Shipyard. Details are shown for Geoid. The view is filtered on Geoid, which keeps
3,109 of 3,234 members.
Large dots indicate the locations of shipyards receiving USMC contracts from 1936
to 1946, as indicated in Fischer (1946).
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Figure 5.4: Additional Growth in Total Manufacturing Output Associated with Shipyard Counties
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Figure plots coefficients on Shipyard1934 dummy variable (corresponding to the year 1933) and coefficients on
interaction terms between Shipyard1934 dummy and dummy variables for 1935, 1937, and 1939. Figure contains
95% confidence bands estimated with standard errors clustered at the state level. Regression includes controls
for state fixed effects, whether county is “industrialized,” on a coast, and its urban percentage in 1930.
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Figure 5.5: Additional Growth in Total Manufacturing Output Associated with Shipyard Border Counties
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Figure plots coefficients on BordersShipyard1934 dummy variable (corresponding to the year 1933) and coefficients
on interaction terms between BordersShipyard1934 dummy and dummy variables for 1935, 1937, and 1939. Figure
contains 95% confidence bands estimated with standard errors clustered at the state level. Regression includes
controls for state fixed effects, whether county is “industrialized,” on a coast, and its urban percentage in 1930.
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Figure 5.6: Additional Growth in Total Manufacturing Value Added Associated with Shipyard Counties
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Figure plots coefficients on Shipyard1934 dummy variable (corresponding to the year 1933) and coefficients on
interaction terms between Shipyard1934 dummy and dummy variables for 1935, 1937, and 1939. Figure contains
95% confidence bands estimated with standard errors clustered at the state level. Regression includes controls
for state fixed effects, whether county is “industrialized,” on a coast, and its urban percentage in 1930.
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Figure 5.7: Additional Growth in Total Manufacturing Value Added Associated with Shipyard Border Counties
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Figure plots coefficients on BordersShipyard1934 dummy variable (corresponding to the year 1933) and coefficients
on interaction terms between BordersShipyard1934 dummy and dummy variables for 1935, 1937, and 1939. Figure
contains 95% confidence bands estimated with standard errors clustered at the state level. Regression includes
controls for state fixed effects, whether county is “industrialized,” on a coast, and its urban percentage in 1930.
232
Figure 5.8: Additional Growth in Manufacturing Employees Associated with Shipyard Counties
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Figure plots coefficients on Shipyard1934 dummy variable (corresponding to the year 1933) and coefficients on
interaction terms between Shipyard1934 dummy and dummy variables for 1935, 1937, and 1939. Figure contains
95% confidence bands estimated with standard errors clustered at the state level. Regression includes controls
for state fixed effects, whether county is “industrialized,” on a coast, and its urban percentage in 1930.
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Figure 5.9: Additional Growth in Manufacturing Employees Associated with Shipyard Border Counties
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Figure plots coefficients on BordersShipyard1934 dummy variable (corresponding to the year 1933) and coefficients
on interaction terms between BordersShipyard1934 dummy and dummy variables for 1935, 1937, and 1939. Figure
contains 95% confidence bands estimated with standard errors clustered at the state level. Regression includes
controls for state fixed effects, whether county is “industrialized,” on a coast, and its urban percentage in 1930.
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Figure 5.10: Additional Growth in Total Manufacturing Wage Payments Associated with Shipyard Counties
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Figure plots coefficients on Shipyard1934 dummy variable (corresponding to the year 1933) and coefficients on
interaction terms between Shipyard1934 dummy and dummy variables for 1935, 1937, and 1939. Figure contains
95% confidence bands estimated with standard errors clustered at the state level. Regression includes controls
for state fixed effects, whether county is “industrialized,” on a coast, and its urban percentage in 1930.
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Figure 5.11: Additional Growth in Total Manufacturing Wage Payments Associated with Shipyard Border
Counties
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Figure plots coefficients on BordersShipyard1934 dummy variable (corresponding to the year 1933) and coefficients
on interaction terms between BordersShipyard1934 dummy and dummy variables for 1935, 1937, and 1939. Figure
contains 95% confidence bands estimated with standard errors clustered at the state level. Regression includes
controls for state fixed effects, whether county is “industrialized,” on a coast, and its urban percentage in 1930.
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Figure 5.12: Additional Growth in Average Earnings per Manufacturing Employee Associated with Shipyard
Counties
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Figure plots coefficients on Shipyard1934 dummy variable (corresponding to the year 1933) and coefficients on
interaction terms between Shipyard1934 dummy and dummy variables for 1935, 1937, and 1939. Figure contains
95% confidence bands estimated with standard errors clustered at the state level. Regression includes controls
for state fixed effects, whether county is “industrialized,” on a coast, and its urban percentage in 1930.
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Figure 5.13: Additional Growth in Average Earnings per Manufacturing Employee Associated with Shipyard
Border Counties
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Figure plots coefficients on BordersShipyard1934 dummy variable (corresponding to the year 1933) and coefficients
on interaction terms between BordersShipyard1934 dummy and dummy variables for 1935, 1937, and 1939. Figure
contains 95% confidence bands estimated with standard errors clustered at the state level. Regression includes
controls for state fixed effects, whether county is “industrialized,” on a coast, and its urban percentage in 1930.
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Figure 5.14: Additional Growth in Number of Manufacturing Establishments Associated with Shipyard Counties
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Figure plots coefficients on Shipyard1934 dummy variable (corresponding to the year 1933) and coefficients on
interaction terms between Shipyard1934 dummy and dummy variables for 1935, 1937, and 1939. Figure contains
95% confidence bands estimated with standard errors clustered at the state level. Regression includes controls
for state fixed effects, whether county is “industrialized,” on a coast, and its urban percentage in 1930.
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Figure 5.15: Additional Growth in Number of Manufacturing Establishments Associated with Shipyard Border
Counties
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Figure plots coefficients on BordersShipyard1934 dummy variable (corresponding to the year 1933) and coefficients
on interaction terms between BordersShipyard1934 dummy and dummy variables for 1935, 1937, and 1939. Figure
contains 95% confidence bands estimated with standard errors clustered at the state level. Regression includes
controls for state fixed effects, whether county is “industrialized,” on a coast, and its urban percentage in 1930.
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Figure 5.16: Additional Growth in Average Employees per Establishment Associated with Shipyard Counties
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Figure plots coefficients on Shipyard1934 dummy variable (corresponding to the year 1933) and coefficients on
interaction terms between Shipyard1934 dummy and dummy variables for 1935, 1937, and 1939. Figure contains
95% confidence bands estimated with standard errors clustered at the state level. Regression includes controls
for state fixed effects, whether county is “industrialized,” on a coast, and its urban percentage in 1930.
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Figure 5.17: Additional Growth in Average Employees per Establishment Associated with Shipyard Border
Counties
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Figure plots coefficients on BordersShipyard1934 dummy variable (corresponding to the year 1933) and coefficients
on interaction terms between BordersShipyard1934 dummy and dummy variables for 1935, 1937, and 1939. Figure
contains 95% confidence bands estimated with standard errors clustered at the state level. Regression includes
controls for state fixed effects, whether county is “industrialized,” on a coast, and its urban percentage in 1930.
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Figure 5.18: Additional Growth in Labor Productivity in Manufacturing Firms Associated with Shipyard
Counties
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Figure plots coefficients on Shipyard1934 dummy variable (corresponding to the year 1933) and coefficients on
interaction terms between Shipyard1934 dummy and dummy variables for 1935, 1937, and 1939. Figure contains
95% confidence bands estimated with standard errors clustered at the state level. Regression includes controls
for state fixed effects, whether county is “industrialized,” on a coast, and its urban percentage in 1930.
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Figure 5.19: Additional Growth in Labor Productivity in Manufacturing Firms Associated with Shipyard
Border Counties
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Figure plots coefficients on BordersShipyard1934 dummy variable (corresponding to the year 1933) and coefficients
on interaction terms between BordersShipyard1934 dummy and dummy variables for 1935, 1937, and 1939. Figure
contains 95% confidence bands estimated with standard errors clustered at the state level. Regression includes
controls for state fixed effects, whether county is “industrialized,” on a coast, and its urban percentage in 1930.
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Figure 5.20: Distribution of Log Manufacturing Output across Counties in 1933
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The figure plots the distribution of log manufacturing output across counties in 1933.
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Chapter 6
Conclusion
This dissertation has had as its objective, the evaluation of the possibility that gov-
ernment purchases may have state dependent effects. That is, it has strived to answer
the question of whether the output multiplier on purchases is greater when the econ-
omy is, as a whole, relatively weaker. This notion dates back at least as far as Keynes
(1936).
In the first chapter, I showed that when one considers a specification in which
control variables are expressed in log differences, monetary policy is controlled for,
and the threshold level of the unemployment rate is estimated via the least squares
technique of Hansen (2000), local projection impulse response estimation methods
suggest that the multiplier is near two when the unemployment rate is relatively
high and is well below one when it is relatively low. The “bad” state multiplier
is significantly greater than one (ignoring the uncertainty inherent in estimating
the threshold level of the unemployment rate), while the “good” state multiplier is
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significantly below one. What is more, the two multipliers are statistically different
as well. These results provide support for the idea that there is state dependence
in the government spending multiplier, agreeing with the results of Auerbach and
Gorodnichenko (2012b) and disagreeing with those of Ramey and Zubairy (2014).
Extensions suggest that there is also state dependence in the effects of tax changes
on output and that the effects of spending changes are driven mostly by a positive
response of private investment and durable goods consumption.
The second chapter, however, questions the robustness of these results to rea-
sonable variations in the empirical specification. I consider variation across eight
dimensions of specification choices. I find that there are certain specification choices
(such as specifying nonstationary control variables as log deviations from a deter-
ministic time trend) that are more likely to deliver “extreme” multiplier estimates
that have no basis in any reputable theory and do not seem realistic. There are some
choices that systematically lead to a higher or lower multiplier estimate, such as
which macroeconomic variable to use to define good and bad states of the economy.
This chapter illustrates the perils attendant to estimating the government spending
multiplier, an inherently complex computation, where there are so few observations
in the aggregate time series. It bolsters the argument for taking seriously the effects
at local level, where identification can be sharper and the number of observations
larger.
The local (county) level is the setting for the third chapter of this dissertation. I
consider the effects on county manufacturing and retail sales of the Vinson-Trammell
Act of 1934, passage of which was plausibly exogenous with respect to the economic
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health of the counties hosting shipyards. This is because the primary motivation
behind this legislation was to counter a rising military threat from Japan. Note also
that this was a time of extreme slack in the United States economy. My results show
that manufacturing output grew six percentage points faster annually in counties
hosting shipyards in the latter half of the 1930s than did like counties that did not
have shipyards. Retail sales, likewise, grew three to four percentage points faster and
this retail sales growth spilled over into neighboring counties as well. Even at the
household level, a positive effect on consumption is visible. Although it is apparent
that counties that received the spending were affected positively, it is less clear
how counties that merely paid for the spending responded. This makes it difficult
to translate the estimated local government spending multiplier to an aggregate
government spending multiplier.
In sum, these results support the idea that government purchases have larger
effects on output when there are more underutilized resources, but that support is
not ironclad. There is a tension in that aggregate studies more directly measure the
object of interest (that is, the government spending multiplier in good times and in
bad), but they do so very noisily, and there will always be reason to quibble with
identification schemes or sample periods, changes in which may substantially alter
the conclusions. Disaggregated studies get around these problems, but it can be
very difficult to generalize the local results. Thus, as ever, more research is needed,
especially given the importance of this question to policy makers who must every so
often make a determination as to whether an increase in purchases may be helpful
in stimulating activity.
248
Bibliography
Acconcia, Antonio, Giancarlo Corsetti, and Saverio Simonelli. 2014. “Mafia and
Public Spending: Evidence on the Fiscal Multiplier from a Quasi-Experiment.”
The American Economic Review 104 (7):2185–2209.
Alesina, Alberto and Silvia Ardagna. 2013. “The Design of Fiscal Adjustments.”
Tax Policy and the Economy 27:19–68.
Alloza, Mario. 2014. “Is Fiscal Policy More Effective in Uncertain Times or During
Recessions?” Working Paper, University College London.
Angrist, Joshua D., Oscar Jorda`, and Guido Kuersteiner. 2013. “Semiparametric
Estimates of Monetary Policy Effects: String Theory Revisted.” NBER Working
Paper 19355.
Auerbach, Alan J. and Yuriy Gorodnichenko. 2012a. “Fiscal Multipliers in Recession
and Expansion.” In Fiscal Policy after the Financial Crisis, edited by Alberto
Alesina and Francesco Giavazzi. University of Chicago Press, 63–98.
———. 2012b. “Measuring the Output Responses to Fiscal Policy.” American
Economic Journal: Economic Policy 4 (2):1–27.
249
———. 2013. “Output Spillovers from Fiscal Policy.” The American Economic
Review 103 (3):141–146.
———. 2014. “Fiscal Multipliers in Japan.” NBER Working Paper 19911.
Bachmann, Rudiger and Eric R. Sims. 2012. “Confidence and the Transmission of
Government Spending Shocks.” Journal of Monetary Economics 59 (3):235–249.
Barro, Robert J. and Charles J. Redlick. 2011. “Macroeconomic Effects from Govern-
ment Purchases and Taxes.” The Quarterly Journal of Economics 126 (1):51–102.
Baxter, Marianne and Robert G. King. 1993. “Fiscal Policy in General Equilibrium.”
The American Economic Review 83 (3):315–334.
Beaudry, Paul and Gary Koop. 1993. “Do Recessions Permanently Change Output?”
Journal of Monetary Economics 31 (2):149–163.
Beveridge, Stephen and Charles R. Nelson. 1981. “A New Approach to Decompo-
sition of Economic Time Series into Permanent and Transitory Components with
Particular Attention to Measurement of the ‘Business Cycle’.” Journal of Mone-
tary Economics 7 (2):151–174.
Biolsi, Christopher. 2015. “Asymmetric Effects of Government Purchases over the
Business Cycle.” Working Paper, University of Houston.
Blanchard, Olivier and Daniel Leigh. 2013. “Growth Forecast Errors and Fiscal
Multipliers.” The American Economic Review 103 (3):117–120.
250
Blanchard, Olivier and Roberto Perotti. 2002. “An Empirical Characterization of
the Dynamic Effects of Changes in Government Spending and Taxes on Output.”
The Quarterly Journal of Economics 117 (4):1329–1368.
Bognanni, Mark. 2013. “An Empirical Analysis of Time-Varying Fiscal Multipliers.”
Working Paper, University of Pennsylvania.
Bruckner, Markus and Anita Tuladhar. 2014. “Local Government Spending Multipli-
ers and Financial Distress: Evidence from Japanese Prefectures.” The Economic
Journal 124 (581):1279–1316.
Caggiano, Giovanni, Efrem Castelnuovo, Valentina Colombo, and Gabriela Nodari.
2014. “Estimating Fiscal Multipliers: News from a Nonlinear World.” Melbourne
Institute Working Paper Series Working Paper No. 26/14.
Calvo, Guillermo A. 1983. “Staggered Prices in a Utility-Maximizing Framework.”
Journal of Monetary Economics 12 (3):383–398.
Candelon, Bertrand and Lenard Lieb. 2013. “Fiscal Policy in Good and Bad Times.”
Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control 37 (12):2679–2694.
Canova, Fabio and Evi Pappa. 2007. “Price Differentials in Monetary Unions: The
Role of Fiscal Shocks.” The Economic Journal 117 (520):713–737.
Canzoneri, Matthew, Fabrice Collard, Harris Dellas, and Behzad Diba. 2012. “Fiscal
Multipliers in Recessions.” Working Paper, Georgetown University and University
of Bern.
251
Charles, Kerwin Kofi, Erik Hurst, and Matthew J. Notowidigdo. 2014. “Housing
Booms, Labor Market Outcomes, and Educational Attainment.” Working Paper,
University of Chicago.
Chodorow-Reich, Gabriel, Laura Feiveson, Zachary Liscow, and William Gui Wool-
ston. 2012. “Does State Fiscal Relief during Recessions Increase Employment?
Evidence from the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act.” American Eco-
nomic Journal: Economic Policy 4 (3):118–145.
Christiano, Lawrence, Martin Eichenbaum, and Sergio Rebelo. 2011. “When is
the Government Spending Multiplier Large?” Journal of Political Economy
119 (1):78–121.
Christiano, Lawrence J. 1992. “Searching for a Break in GNP.” Journal of Business
& Economic Statistics 10 (3):237–250.
Clark, Peter K. 1987. “The Cyclical Component of U.S. Economic Activity.” The
Quarterly Journal of Economics 102 (4):797–814.
Clemens, Jeffrey and Stephen Miran. 2012. “Fiscal Policy Multipliers on Subnational
Government Spending.” American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 4 (2):46–
68.
Coenen, Gunter, Christopher J. Erceg, Charles Freedman, Davide Furceri, Michael
Kumhof, Rene´ Lalonde, Douglas Laxton, Jesper Linde´, Annabelle Mourougane,
Dirk Muir, Susanna Mursula, Carlos de Resende, John Roberts, Wern er Roeger,
Stephen Snudden, Mathias Trabandt, and Jan In’t Veld. 2012. “Effects of Fiscal
252
Stimulus in Structural Models.” American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics
4 (1):22–68.
Cogley, Timothy and James M. Nason. 1995. “Effects of the Hodrick-Prescott Filter
on Trend and Difference Stationary Time Series: Implications for Business Cycle
Research.” Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 19 (1-2):253–278.
Cohen, Lauren, Joshua Coval, and Christopher Malloy. 2011. “Do Powerful Politi-
cians Cause Corporate Downsizing?” Journal of Political Economy 119 (6):1015–
1060.
Cook, James F. 2004. Carl Vinson: Patriarch of the Armed Forces. Macon, GA:
Mercer University Press.
Crafts, Nicholas and Terence C. Mills. 2013. “Rearmament to the Rescue? New
Estimates of the Impact of ‘Keynesian’ Policies in 1930s’ Britain.” The Journal of
Economic History 73 (4):1077–1104.
Davig, Troy and Eric M. Leeper. 2011. “Monetary-Fiscal Policy Interactions and
Fiscal Stimulus.” European Economic Review 55 (2):211–227.
Denes, Matthew, Gauti B. Eggertsson, and Sophia Gilbukh. 2013. “Deficits, Pub-
lic Debt Dynamics and Tax and Spending Multipliers.” The Economic Journal
123 (566):F133–F163.
Diebold, Francis X. and Abdelhak S. Senhadji. 1996. “The Uncertain Unit Root in
Real GNP: Comment.” The American Economic Review 86 (5):1291–1298.
253
Dixit, Avinash K. and Joseph E. Stiglitz. 1977. “Monopolistic Competition and
Optimum Product Diversity.” The American Economic Review 67 (3):297–308.
Durlauf, Steven N., Salvador Navarro, and David A. Rivers. 2014. “Model Un-
certainty and the Effect of Shall-Issue Right-to-Carry Laws on Crime.” Working
Paper, University of Wisconsin at Madison and University of Western Ontario.
Eggertsson, Gauti B. 2010. “What Fiscal Policy is Effective at Zero Interest Rates?”
NBER Macroeconomics Annual 25:59–112.
Elliott, Graham, Thomas J. Rothenberg, and James H. Stock. 1996. “Efficient Tests
for an Autoregressive Unit Root.” Econometrica 64 (4):813–836.
Engemann, Kristie M., Michael T. Owyang, and Sarah Zubairy. 2008. “A Primer
on the Empirical Identification of Government Spending Shocks.” Federal Reserve
Bank of St. Louis Review 90 (2):117–132.
Farhi, Emmanuel and Iva´n Werning. 2013. “Fiscal Multipliers: Liquidity Traps
and Currency Unions.” Working Paper, Harvard University and Massachusetts
Institute of Technology.
Fazzari, Steven M., James Morley, and Irina Panovska. 2013. “State-Dependent Ef-
fects of Fiscal Policy.” Forthcoming in Studies in Nonlinear Dynamics and Econo-
metrics.
Fischer, Gerald J. 1946. “Cost of War Built Vessels from Inception, October 25, 1936
to June 30, 1946.” Records of the Office of the Historian, Box 35. Records of the
USMC (National Archives.
254
Fishback, Price, Werner Troesken, Trevor Kollman, Michael Haines, Paul Rhode, and
Melissa Thomasson. 2011a. “Information and the Impact of Climate and Weather
on Mortality Rates during the Great Depression.” In The Economics of Climate
Change, edited by Gary D. Libecap and Richard H. Steckel. University of Chicago
Press, 131–168.
———. 2011b. “Weather, Demography, Economy, and the New Deal at the County
Level, 1930-1940.”
Fishback, Price V. and Joseph A. Cullen. 2013. “Second World War Spending and
Local Economic Activity in U.S. Counties, 1939-58.” The Economic History Re-
view 66 (4):975–992.
Fishback, Price V., William C. Horrace, and Shawn Kantor. 2005. “Did New Deal
Grant Programs Stimulate Local Economies? A Study of Federal Grants and
Retail Sales during the Great Depression.” The Journal of Economic History
65 (1):36–71.
Fishback, Price V. and Valentina Kachanovskaya. 2010. “In Search of the Multiplier
for Federal Spending in the States during the Great Depression.” NBER Working
Paper 16561.
Fisher, Jonas D. M. and Ryan Peters. 2010. “Using Stock Returns to Identify Gov-
ernment Spending Shocks.” The Economic Journal 120 (544):414–436.
Gabaix, Xavier. 2011. “The Granular Origins of Aggregate Fluctuations.” Econo-
metrica 79 (3):733–772.
255
Gal´ı, Jordi, J. David Lo´pez-Salido, and Javier Valle´s. 2007. “Understanding the
Effects of Government Spending on Consumption.” Journal of the European Eco-
nomic Association 5 (1):227–270.
Giavazzi, Francesco and Marco Pagano. 1990. “Can Severe Fiscal Contractions be
Expansionary? Tales of Two Small European Countries.” NBER Macroeconomics
Annual 5:75–122.
Gilchrist, Simon, Vladimir Yankov, and Egon Zakraj˘sek. 2009. “Credit Market
Shocks and Economic Fluctuations: Evidence from Corporate Bond and Stock
Markets.” Journal of Monetary Economics 56 (4):471–493.
Gordon, Robert J. and Robert Krenn. 2014. “The End of the Great Depression 1939-
41: Fiscal Multipliers, Capacity Constraints, and Policy Contributions.” Working
Paper, Northwestern University and U.S. Airways.
Gorodnichenko, Yuriy. 2014. “Discussion of: ‘Government Spending Multipliers in
Good Times and in Bad: Evidence from U.S. Historical Data’.”
Gospodinov, Nikolay, Ana Maria Herrera, and Elena Pesavento. 2013. “Unit Roots,
Cointegration, and Pretesting in VAR Models.” In VAR Models in Macroeconomics
- New Developments and Applications: Essays in Honor of Christopher A. Sims,
edited by Thomas B. Fomby, Lutz Kilian, and Anthony Murphy, chap. 9. Emerald
Group Publishing Limited, 81–115.
Gupta, Ashmita. 2015. “Effect of Trade Liberalization on Educational Attainment:
Evidence from Indian Tariff Reforms.” Working Paper, University of Houston.
256
Hall, Robert E. 2009. “By How Much Does GDP Rise if the Government Buys More
Output?” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 2009:2:183–231.
Hamilton, James D. 1989. “A New Approach to the Economic Analysis of Nonsta-
tionary Time Series and the Business Cycle.” Econometrica 57 (2):357–384.
Hansen, Bruce E. 1996. “Inference when a Nuisance Parameter is not Identified
under the Null Hypothesis.” Econometrica 64 (3):413–430.
———. 2000. “Sample Splitting and Threshold Estimation.” Econometrica
68 (3):575–603.
Hausman, Joshua K. 2013. “Fiscal Policy and Economic Recovery: The Case of the
1936 Veterans’ Bonus.” Berkeley Economic History Lab Working Paper WP2013-
06.
Hodrick, Robert J. and Edward C. Prescott. 1997. “Postwar U.S. Business Cycles:
An Empirical Investigation.” Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 29 (1):1–16.
Hooker, Mark A. 1996. “How Do Changes in Military Spending Affect the Economy?
Evidence from State-Level Data.” New England Economic Review 7 (2):1–16.
Ilzetzki, Ethan, Enrique G. Mendoza, and Carlos A. Ve´gh. 2013. “How Big (Small?)
are Fiscal Multipliers?” Journal of Monetary Economics 60 (2):239–254.
Interuniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research. 2005. “Historical, De-
mographic, Economic, and Social Data: The United States, 1790-1970.” URL
http://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR00003.v1.
257
Jorda`, Oscar. 2005. “Estimation and Inference of Impulse Responses by Local Pro-
jections.” The American Economic Review 95 (1):161–182.
Jorda`, Oscar and Alan M. Taylor. 2013. “The Time for Austerity: Estimating the
Average Treatment Effect of Fiscal Policy.” NBER Working Paper 19414.
Kehrig, Matthias. 2015. “The Cyclical Nature of the Productivity Distribution.”
Working Paper, University of Texas.
Keynes, John Maynard. 1936. The General Theory of Employment, Interest, and
Money. London, UK: The Macmillan Press.
Kim, Chang-Jin, James Morley, and Jeremy Piger. 2005. “Nonlinearity and the
Permanent Effects of Recessions.” Journal of Applied Econometrics 20 (2):291–
309.
Kim, Chang-Jin and Christian J. Murray. 2002. “Permanent and Transitory Com-
ponents of Recessions.” Empirical Economics 27 (2):163–183.
Kim, Chang-Jin and Charles R. Nelson. 1999. “Friedman’s Plucking Model of Busi-
ness Fluctuations: Tests and Estimates of Permanent and Transitory Compo-
nents.” Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 31 (3, Part 1):317–334.
King, Thomas B. and James Morley. 2007. “In Search of the Natural Rate of Un-
employment.” Journal of Monetary Economics 54 (2):550–564.
Koop, Gary, Hashem Pesaran, and Simon M. Potter. 1996. “Impulse Response
Analysis in Nonlinear Multivariate Models.” Journal of Econometrics 74 (1):119–
147.
258
Kormilitsina, Anna and Sarah Zubairy. 2013. “Propagation Mechanisms for Gov-
ernment Spending Shocks: A Bayesian Comparison.” Working Paper, Southern
Methodist University and Texas A&M University.
Kuhn, Florian and Chacko George. 2014. “Business Cycle Implications of Capac-
ity Constraints under Demand Shocks.” Working Paper, University of Texas and
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation.
Lane, Frederic C. 1951. Ships for Victory. A History of Shipbuilding under the U.S.
Maritime Commission in World War II. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins
Press.
Mankiw, N. Gregory and Matthew Weinzierl. 2011. “An Exploration of Optimal
Stabilization Policy.” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 2011:1:209–272.
McGrattan, Ellen R. and Lee E. Ohanian. 2010. “Does Neoclassical Theory Account
for the Effects of Big Fiscal Shocks? Evidence from World War II.” International
Economic Review 51 (2):509–532.
Michaillat, Pascal. 2014. “A Theory of Countercyclical Government Multiplier.”
American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 6 (1):190–217.
Mittnik, Stefan and Willi Semmler. 2012. “Regime Dependence of the Fiscal Multi-
plier.” Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 83 (3):502–522.
Morley, James and Jeremy Piger. 2012. “The Asymmetric Business Cycle.” The
Review of Economics and Statistics 94 (1):208–221.
259
Mountford, Andrew and Harald Uhlig. 2009. “What are the Effects of Fiscal Policy
Shocks?” Journal of Applied Econometrics 24 (6):960–992.
Murray, Christian J. 2003. “Cyclical Properties of Baxter-King Filtered Time Series.”
The Review of Economics and Statistics 85 (2):472–476.
Murray, Christian J. and Charles R. Nelson. 2000. “The Uncertain Trend in U.S.
GDP.” Journal of Monetary Economics 46 (1):79–95.
———. 2002. “The Great Depression and Output Persistence.” Journal of Money,
Credit, and Banking 34 (4):1090–1098.
———. 2004. “The Great Depression and Output Persistence: A Reply to Papell
and Prodan.” Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking 36 (No. 3 Part 1):429–432.
Nakamura, Emi and Jo´n Steinsson. 2014. “Fiscal Stimulus in a Monetary Union:
Evidence from US Regions.” The American Economic Review 104 (3):753–792.
Nelson, Charles R. 2006. “The Beveridge-Nelson Decomposition in Retrospect and
Prospect.” Working Paper, University of Washington.
Nelson, Charles R. and Heejoon Kang. 1981. “Spurious Periodicity in Inappropriately
Detrended Time Series.” Econometrica 49 (3):741–751.
Nelson, Charles R. and Charles I. Plosser. 1982. “Trends and Random Walks in
Macroeconomic Time Series: Some Evidence and Implications.” Journal of Mon-
etary Economics 10 (2):139–162.
260
Newey, Whitney K. and Kenneth D. West. 1987. “A Simple, Positive Semi-Definite,
Heteroskedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent Covariance Matrix.” Econo-
metrica 55 (3):703–708.
Ng, Serena and Pierre Perron. 1995. “Unit Root Tests in ARMA Models with Data-
Dependent Methods for the Selection of the Truncation Lag.” Journal of the
American Statistical Association 90 (429):268–281.
Ostergaard, Charlotte, Bent E. Sørensen, and Oved Yosha. 2002. “Consumption
and Aggregate Constraints: Evidence from U.S. States and Canadian Provinces.”
Journal of Political Economy 110 (3):634–645.
Owyang, Michael T., Valerie A. Ramey, and Sarah Zubairy. 2013. “Are Govern-
ment Spending Multipliers Greater During Periods of Slack? Evidence from 20th
Century Historical Data.” The American Economic Review 103 (3):129–134.
Ozer-Balli, Hatice and Bent Sørensen. 2013. “Interaction Effects in Econometrics.”
Empirical Economics 45 (1):583–603.
Papell, David H. and Ruxandra Prodan. 2004. “The Uncertain Unit Root in U.S. Real
GDP: Evidence with Restricted and Unrestricted Structural Change.” Journal of
Money, Credit, and Banking 36 (No. 3 Part 1):423–427.
Perotti, Roberto. 1999. “Fiscal Policy in Good Times and Bad.” The Quarterly
Journal of Economics 114 (4):1399–1436.
Perron, Pierre. 1989. “The Great Crash, the Oil Price Shock, and the Unit Root
Hypothesis.” Econometrica 57 (6):1361–1401.
261
Ramey, Valerie A. 2011a. “Can Government Purchases Stimulate the Economy?”
Journal of Economic Literature 49 (3):673–685.
———. 2011b. “Identifying Government Spending Shocks: It’s All in the Timing.”
The Quarterly Journal of Economics 126 (1):1–50.
———. 2012. “Government Spending and Private Activity.” In Fiscal Policy after
the Financial Crisis, edited by Alberto Alesina and Francesco Giavazzi. University
of Chicago Press, 19–55.
———. 2014. “Defense News Shocks, 1889-2013: Estimates Based on News Sources.”
Working Paper, University of California, San Diego.
Ramey, Valerie A. and Matthew D. Shapiro. 1998. “Costly Capital Reallocation and
the Effects of Government Spending.” Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on
Public Policy 48:145–194.
Ramey, Valerie A. and Sarah Zubairy. 2014. “Government Spending Multipliers in
Good Times and in Bad: Evidence from U.S. Historical Data.” NBER Working
Paper 20719.
Riera-Crichton, Daniel, Carlos A. Ve´gh, and Guillermo Vuletin. 2014. “Fiscal Multi-
pliers in Recessions and Expansions: Does It Matter Whether Government Spend-
ing is Increasing or Decreasing?” World Bank Policy Research Working Paper
6993.
Romer, Christina D. and David H. Romer. 2010. “The Macroeconomic Effects of Tax
262
Changes: Estimates Based on a New Measure of Fiscal Shocks.” The American
Economic Review 100 (3):763–801.
———. 2014. “Transfer Payments and the Macroeconomy: The Effects of Social
Security Benefit Changes, 1952-1991.” NBER Working Paper 20087.
Rossi, Barbara and Sarah Zubairy. 2011. “What is the Importance of Monetary
and Fiscal Shocks in Explaining U.S. Macroeconomic Fluctuations?” Journal of
Money, Credit, and Banking 43 (6):1247–1270.
Rotemberg, Julio J. and Michael Woodford. 1992. “Oligopolistic Pricing and the
Effects of Aggregate Demand on Economic Activity.” Journal of Political Economy
100 (6):1153–1207.
Ruggles, Steven, J. Trent Alexander, Katie Genadek, Ronald Goeken, Matthew B.
Schroeder, and Matthew Sobek. 2010. “Integrated Public Use Microdata Series,
Volume 5.0.” Machine-readable database.
Sala-I-Martin, Xavier X. 1997. “I Just Ran Four Million Regressions.” NBER Work-
ing Paper 6252.
Schmidt, Julia. 2013. “Country Risk Premia, Endogenous Collateral Constraints and
Non-linearities: A Threshold VAR Approach.” Working Paper, Graduate Institute
of International and Development Studies.
Serrato, Juan Carlos Sua´rez and Philippe Wingender. 2014. “Estimating Local Fiscal
Multipliers.” Working Paper, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research and
International Monetary Fund.
263
Shoag, Daniel. 2010. “The Impact of Government Spending Shocks: Evidence on the
Multiplier from State Pension Plan Returns.” Working Paper, Harvard University.
———. 2013. “Using State Pension Shocks to Estimate Fiscal Multipliers since the
Great Recession.” The American Economic Review 103 (3):121–124.
Sims, Eric and Jonathan Wolff. 2013. “The Output and Welfare Effects of Fiscal
Shocks over the Business Cycle.” NBER Working Paper 19749.
Sizova, Natalia. 2015. “Efficient Tests for Long-Run Predictability: Do Long-Run
Relations Convey Extra Information?” Working Paper, Rice University.
Tagkalakis, Athanasios. 2008. “The Effects of Fiscal Policy on Consumption in
Recessions and Expansions.” Journal of Public Economics 92 (5-6):1486–1508.
Thornton, Rebecca Achee and Peter Thompson. 2001. “Learning from Experience
and Learning from Others: An Exploration of Learning and Spillovers in Wartime
Shipbuilding.” The American Economic Review 91 (5):1350–1368.
United States Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census. 1992.
“CONTIGUOUS COUNTY FILE, 1991 [United States].” URL
http://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR09835.v1. ICPSR09835-v1, Ann Arbor,
MI.
———. 2012. “County and City Data Book [United States] Consolidated File:
County Data, 1947-1977.” URL http://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR07736.v2.
ICPSR07736-v2, Ann Arbor, MI.
264
U.S. Dept. of Labor. BLS. Cost of Living Division, U.S. Dept. of Agriculture.
BHE. Economics Division, U.S. Natural Resources Committee. Consumption Re-
search Staff. Industrial Section, U.S. Central Statistical Board, and U.S. WPA.
2009. “Study of Consumer Purchases in the United States, 1935-1936.” URL
http://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR08908.v3. ICPSR08908-v3, Ann Arbor, MI.
Wieland, Johannes F. 2012. “Fiscal Multipliers at the Zero Lower Bound: Interna-
tional Theory and Evidence.” Working Paper, University of California, Berkeley.
Woodford, Michael. 2011. “Simple Analytics of the Government Expenditure Mul-
tiplier.” American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics 3 (1):1–35.
Yang, Weonho, Jan Fidrmuc, and Sugata Ghosh. 2014. “Using Military Build-Ups
to Capture Fiscal Shocks: A Reassessment.” CESifo Working Paper No. 4689.
Zivot, Eric and Donald W. K. Andrews. 1992. “Further Evidence on the Great
Crash, the Oil-Price Shock, and the Unit-Root Hypothesis.” Journal of Business
and Economic Statistics 10 (3):251–270.
Zubairy, Sarah. 2014. “On Fiscal Multipliers: Estimates from a Medium Scale DSGE
Model.” International Economic Review 55 (1):169–195.
265
Appendix A
The Nakamura and Steinsson
(2014) Model
The theoretical foundations for this study borrow heavily from the model developed
by Nakamura and Steinsson (2014), who construct an environment in which two
economies (“home” and “foreign” in their terminology) are linked in a monetary and
fiscal union. The objective of their model is the calculation of an “Open Economy
Relative Multiplier,” which they define as the effect of a relative spending increase in
one region relative to another on relative output. They also translate their findings
on open economy relative multipliers to the “Closed Economy Aggregate Multiplier”
often estimated in macroeconomic research. Households and firms exhibit the same
behavior in both regions. Households maximize lifetime utility over consumption
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and labor supply, as given by
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtu(Ct, Lt(x)), (A.1)
and in this formulation, β is the household’s subjective discount factor and Lt(x)
reflects that each household supplies a differentiated kind of labor, indexed by x.
Ct represents a composite consumption good made up of goods produced in both
the home and foreign regions. The home and foreign goods themselves are also
composite goods of a large number of differentiated goods produced in each region,
aggregated as in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). There is open trade in goods between the
two regions, but labor is immobile across regions. There is no capital accumulation
in the baseline model. The authors consider two types of preference specifications
for their households, one that is separable in consumption and labor, specified as
u(Ct, Lt(x)) =
C1−σ
−1
t
1− σ−1 − χ
Lt(x)
1+ν−1
1 + ν−1
, (A.2)
where σ denotes the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and ν denotes the Frisch
labor elasticity. The second specification is nonseparable in consumption and labor
and takes the form
u(Ct, Lt(x)) =
(Ct − χLt(x)1+ν−1/(1 + ν−1))1−σ−1
1− σ−1 , (A.3)
and Nakamura and Steinsson (2014) demonstrate that the specification of preferences
makes a considerable difference in the size of their open economy relative multiplier.
I will discuss the intuition for why this is further below. Households choose con-
sumption (including over home and foreign goods and over the differentiated goods
within each category)1 and labor supply subject to a flow budget constraint where
1Details on how these choices are made can be found in their paper in Equations 10-13. Essen-
tially, consumption of home and foreign goods depends on the elasticity of substitution between
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income is made up of payoffs on state-contingent securities, labor income less labor
income taxes, profits from the home composite good firm, and lump sum taxes or
transfers. This results in a consumption Euler Equation
uc(Ct+j, Lt+j(x))
uc(Ct, Lt(x))
=
Mt,t+j
βj
Pt+j
Pt
, (A.4)
where Mt is the stochastic discount factor that prices the state-contingent securities
and Pt is the composite price index. There is an analogous expression governing the
consumption of the foreign household.2 It also results in an intratemporal equilibrium
condition that determines labor supply
ul(Ct, Lt(x))
uc(Ct, Lt(x))
= (1− τ)Wt(x)
Pt
, (A.5)
where τ is the distortionary tax rate on labor income and Wt(x) is the nominal wage
rate for the worker supplying labor of type x.
By combining the Euler Equations for the home and foreign households, one gets
uc(C
∗
t , L
∗
t (x))
uc(Ct, Lt(x))
=
P ∗t
Pt
. (A.6)
The model features a common fiscal authority that purchases (composite) final out-
put from both the home and foreign regions according to exogenous AR(1) processes,
with consumption of varieties within the home and foreign regions governed by the
same parameters that govern private consumption of these varieties, that is, the rel-
ative prices and the elasticity of substitution among them, which is the same as for
private households.
these composite goods and the relative prices, while within each category, consumption of the vari-
ous differentiated varieties depends on the elasticity of substitution between the varieties and their
relative prices.
2I will denote variables for the foreign household the same way that Nakamura and Steinsson
(2014) do, with a star superscript.
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The government in this model also includes a monetary authority that sets nomi-
nal interest rates according to an augmented Taylor rule, with the arguments entering
the Taylor rule being aggregate inflation, the aggregate output gap, and aggregate
government spending. Thus, monetary policy is common to both regions.
Firms employ labor to produce their differentiated product. There are a large
number of firms within each industry x (which maps to the different kinds of labor
supplied by households). Each firm must satisfy demand on the part of home and
foreign households, as well as the fiscal authority, and it takes the wages in its
industry as given. This leads to its profit maximizing labor demand, given by
Wt(x) = fl(Lt(z))St(z), (A.7)
where fl(Lt(z)) is the marginal product for firm z in industry x, and St(z) is its
nominal marginal cost.
Nakamura and Steinsson (2014) consider a few different varieties of their model,
in which the fiscal authority finances the exogenously given spending shock by raising
lump sum taxes or labor income taxes; in which monetary policy is governed by the
Taylor principle (in which real interest rates rise more than one-for-one with a rise in
inflation) and in which it is not, and where firms face nominal rigidities of the Calvo
(1983) type and where they do not. They find that the model with nonseparable
preferences and sticky prices best fit their empirical findings.
In fact, it is the distinction between separable and nonseparable preferences that
is most relevant to the discussion here. Consider the case of separable preferences.
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Government demand for an individual variety of good in the home region is given by
ght(z) = GHt
(
pht(z)
PHt
)−θ
, (A.8)
which is rising in GHt, government purchases from the home region in period t. A
positive shock to purchases, therefore, raises government demand for every variety
of good in the home region, which must be satisfied by all of the firms. This gives an
increase in marginal cost for each firm, and a fraction 1− α of them can reoptimize
the price of their good. This will, all else equal, push PHt and, consequently also Pt,
higher. A look at the intertemporal Euler equation for the home household, Equation
A.4, shows that consumption will then decline in the home region. The disparity
between the home region’s consumption decline and the foreign region’s consumption
decline will depend on the relative degree of home bias in consumption. With no
investment in the model, this is likely to give a local output multiplier below one.
This is because, when preferences are separable, a government spending shock in the
home region raises prices in that region relative to the foreign region. Equation A.6
implies that consumption will decline in the home region relative to the foreign region.
With nominal interest rates common across both regions, an upward shock to prices
in the home region will make the real interest rate lower in the home region than in
the foreign region in the short term, so one might expect that consumption would
rise in the home region, as an upward shock to prices does in the model of Christiano,
Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2011), among others. In the long term, however, the shock
to government spending in the home region will dissipate and the price ratio between
home and foreign regions will return to its original level, absent any further shocks.
Thus, from the perspective of an agent in the home region after the spending shock
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hits, the expected price path of home produced goods is negative, and the long term
real interest rate (arguably the one that is more relevant for consumption decisions)
is actually higher in the home region relative to the foreign region. This leads to a
sharp decline in consumption.
When, however, preferences are nonseparable, consumption and labor supply are
complementary. This can also be seen from the optimality conditions of the model.
Consider the first order condition for maximizing the period utility function with
respect to consumption.
uc = (Ct − χLt(x)
1+ν−1
1 + ν−1
)−σ
−1 − λtPt = 0, (A.9)
where λt is the Lagrange multiplier. By taking the derivative of this expression with
respect to labor supply, Lt(x), one arrives at
ucl = σ
−1(Ct − χLt(x)
1+ν−1
1 + ν−1
)−σ
−1−1χLt(x)ν
−1
, (A.10)
and this expression is unambiguously positive, as long as χ is not too large. That
is, the more the agent works, the more she wants to consume as well. The rise
in government purchases in the home region raises labor supply and consumption
simultaneously. Nakamura and Steinsson (2014) give the examples of gasoline and
meals away from home as goods that private agents will consume more of as they
work more. This leads to a relatively high open economy relative multiplier and a
high closed economy aggregate multiplier.
In this paper, in order to interpret the empirical regression results, I use this
model to convert my local multiplier estimates to an aggregate multiplier. Following
Nakamura and Steinsson (2014), I assume nonseparable preferences and sticky prices
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(the formulations that best match their empirical findings), and since the context of
my study is mainly the Great Depression of the 1930s, when nominal interest rates
were pinned near the Zero Lower Bound (ZLB), I will also assume a constant nominal
interest rate policy. Also, since I observe that the higher spending was financed with
higher taxes, I force the fiscal authority in the model to maintain a balanced budget
in all periods.
I make one minor modification to the model. Given that the purpose of the
spending that I study is to explicitly build up the navy, it may be that I want
the fiscal authority in the model to have a lower (or at least) separate elasticity of
substitution among the different varieties of goods compared to the households. I do
this by specifying a new parameter θg which replaces θ in the government’s demand
for goods, Equation A.8.
A major contribution is that, unlike Nakamura and Steinsson (2014), I will be
able to test empirically whether consumption rose with output, so as to verify that
a model with nonseparable preferences is the appropriate one to use.
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